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Central Eurasia

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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-009

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Algeria Joins Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

*LD1201133295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1227
GMT 12 Jan 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 11 TASS—Algerian Ambassador to Russia Hamid Bourki on Thursday handed over to the Russian Government the document on Algeria's joining the nuclear arms non-proliferation treaty. The ceremony took place at the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The treaty was opened for signing in 1968. Russia as the successor of the former Soviet Union, together with the United States and Great Britain, is a depository state.

At a U.N. session last autumn, Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Salah Dembri declared that Algeria would join the treaty.

Many Arab countries have yet to sign the basic document. They said they will sign the treaty only after Israel does since they believe it has nuclear weapons.

Algeria is the 158th country which has officially joined the treaty.

The Algerian ambassador handed over the document to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov.

CIS, Baltic States' Commerce Conference Opens

*LD0901124695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1146
GMT 9 Jan 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Dimidetskiy]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kishinev [Chisinau] January 9 TASS—Problems of international trade are in the focus of a regional conference of countries of the CIS and Baltic countries that opened here on Monday.

The forum is organised by the Moldavian Government jointly with experts of the United Nations conference on trade and development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Development Programme.

Taking part in the conference are representatives of virtually all ex-USSR republics in the rank of ministers, who are responsible for foreign economic relations. The participants in the conference that will last for five days intend to consider proposals related to international support for foreign trade of countries of the CIS and Baltic countries.

In addition to representatives of commonwealth countries and Baltic countries, representatives of donor states arrived in Kishinev—of Finland, Italy, Sweden, the United States and of a number of international organizations.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 13 Jan

LD1301091495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0809
GMT 13 Jan 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 13 TASS—
The situation in and around Chechnya is the principal
topic in today's press.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, referring to reports of the
federal command, writes that Russian troops continue to
accomplish tasks of blocking Grozny streets, transferring
reserves and replenishing ammunition and material
resources. They open fire only if the truce is violated by
Dudayev's unlawful armed formations.

IZVESTIYA carries an article headlined "After the
Chechen War" by prominent political scientist Emil
Pain.

Whatever the outcome of the current military campaign,
"it will not be regarded as Russia's triumph. Neither will
it bring laurels to politicians or military leaders," the
scientist points out.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI highlights differences which
have arisen between Russian Defence Minister Pavel
Grachev and deputy ministers. Colonel-General Boris
Gromov emphasises that, as time went by, Grachev
"practically excluded us from his circle and began to
lend ear to his assistants who made career within months
of service in the ministry's central office. Many of them,
unfortunately, have quite low professional qualities".

IZVESTIYA writes that the statement by Federation
Council Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko—to the effect that

plans aimed at "raising the combat efficiency of the
army" and proposals to transfer the General Staff from
under the jurisdiction of the Defence Ministry and
subordinate it directly to the supreme commander-
in-chief, i.e. the president, were discussed during the
president's meeting with parliament leaders and the
prime minister—raised a certain panic in Arbat Square
(where the Russian Defence Ministry is headquartered—
note by ITAR-TASS).

The newspaper carries an explanation by Presidential
Press Secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov who specified that
the General Staff issue was raised only as part of a
general exchange of opinions in view of the presidential
instructions to the prime minister and the secretary of
Russia's Security Council to work out the basic orienta-
tions of a military reform in Russia.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the future of Chechnya.

The newspaper points out that the restoration of the
constitutional order in the republic should be replaced
by "a state- of-emergency zone".

PRAVDA believes that the war in Chechnya is a har-
binger of personnel reshuffle in the top echelon of power.
"The October coalition is breaking up. Grachev is
person number one to go, to be followed by (Viktor)
Yerin".

TRUD runs an interview with Russian Economics Min-
ister Yevgeniy Yasin who stated that the budget is now
being revised in view of the Chechen crisis.

"The purpose is to find essential resources resultant of
redistribution, but by no means at the expense of an
increase in budget deficit," the minister emphasised.

Kozyrev, Christopher To Discuss Chechen Developments

LD1201155795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1400 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—The official spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry Grigoriy Karasin says that Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher may be expected to discuss the Chechen developments on January 17 and 18 in Geneva.

Kozyrev is willing to brief his US counterpart on the foreign angle of the Chechen developments and hear what Christopher has to say on the matter, Karasin told newsmen in Moscow Thursday.

Kozyrev and Secretary Christopher will focus on what Karasin described as "the basic aspects of international and bilateral relations." They will share views on the realization of last September's Yeltsin-Clinton agreements and, especially, Russian and U.S. visions of European security, Karasin said.

Russia's World Image, Role Hurt by Chechnya

MM1301114595 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Vyacheslav Nikonov, chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Subcommittee on International Security, under "Repercussion" rubric: "Chechnya's International Dimension. Russia's Image Now Is Grachev's Image"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most realistically attainable goal on the path of Russia's integration in the community of European states was considered its admission to the Council of Europe, planned for May. On Tuesday, however, the Political Affairs Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a decision to defer a study of this issue. It was pointed out that this will largely depend on how effective the Russian authorities' efforts in surmounting the Chechen crisis are. The following article examines many other facets of the damage that the war in Chechnya has done to Russia's positions in the international arena.

The attention at a strong-arm solution to the Chechen conflict was not yet in itself fraught with a threat to Russia's international positions. Foreign countries—primarily Western countries—were prepared, if not to support Boris Yeltsin's little war, then to shut their eyes to it. In their opinion, the "instilling of order" in Chechnya could promote the establishment of legality and law and order throughout Russia and help to resolve the problem of Chechen crime, which is of no less concern to certain Western capitals than it is to Moscow. Moreover, the president had an opportunity to slightly strengthen his international reputation if he could succeed in convincing the world that he was really in control

of the situation in Russia and its separate regions, was capable of ensuring order, and was a strong master in his own home. But this required a lightning and, as far as possible, bloodless operation aimed directly against the regime of Dudayev, who certainly did not command the sympathies of the world public.

But the obvious failure of the blitzkrieg, the obvious inefficiency of the Russian power machine, which committed all conceivable and inconceivable strategic and tactical mistakes, the tragedy of the bloody carnage, and the deaths of hundreds and hundreds of people have wiped out all trace of the foreign countries' original equability. Following the botched new-year storming of Grozny and the mass killings of civilians, the hopes that the operation in Chechnya would pass off without substantial international consequences have been completely overturned.

It is obvious now that the war, regardless of its outcome, has already had totally unacceptable negative consequences which in many areas are, I am afraid, irreversible.

Although the mass media's main attention is now, by tradition, concentrated on the reaction of the West, the events in Chechnya are capable of doing the most serious damage to relations with CIS and Eastern countries.

For the former union republics, on the one hand, the Russian administration has appeared in its old imperial garb—which will clearly curb for a long time their desire for civilized integration with the Russian Federation. The Chechen wound will have a particularly serious effect on relations with Central Asian states, where the war will inevitably be viewed through the prism of Islamic-Orthodox confrontation. On the other hand, an example has been set of the resolution of the problem posed by a refractory national minority with the help of military force—which might prove infectious and extremely dangerous for the whole post-Soviet area. If Ukraine tries to resolve the problem of destabilizing the Crimean regime, which Kiev regards as not entirely legitimate, with the help of the Army, and if Georgia does likewise with the Abkhazian regime, then Russia will have no moral grounds for objecting to them in essence.

The Chechen drama is perceived most painfully in Muslim states, Russia's relations with which have already been undermined by Bosnia and by our policies in a number of southern hot spots (with some of them by Kozyrev's Iraqi maneuvers also). At the beginning of the year practically all Islamic countries protested to Moscow at foreign ministry level. Protest demonstrations were held from Indonesia to Jordan. Many Muslim countries have issued demands on an official and a semiofficial level for a trade boycott of Russia, while fundamentalist parties and extremist organizations have called for support to be given to Chechen armed formations. Our border guards in Tajikistan have felt the first hints of a possible jihad.

The West's reaction presupposes, above all, that it no longer considers Chechnya the internal affair of Russia alone and that it intends to internationalize the conflict. In fact, it had already become international after the arrival of an International Red Cross mission in the North Caucasus. It is perfectly obvious that the Russian leadership will not be able to resist for long the services being offered by Western countries with regard to mediation and monitoring by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The possibility cannot be ruled out that this will be followed by the activation of UN mechanisms. International organizations will for the first time have an opportunity to tackle internal Russian problems directly—which will do nothing to enhance our country's international authority.

In addition, Russia has had to abandon hopes of speedy ratification of the Agreement on Cooperation With the European Union and, to all appearances, been left with little hope of admission to the Council of Europe as early as May. The ominous pictures from the streets of Grozny, which in no way conform to the Europeans' concepts of operations to instill order at the end of the 20th century, are removing Russia still further from European civilization.

Serious harm to trade and economic relations with the West is inevitable. The credits from international financial organizations, on which the compilers of the budget for 1995 were reckoning, will most likely not be forthcoming. On the other hand, we will be required to give a detailed account of the utilization of previous credits and aid programs, if the recipient country is finding money for a large-scale war. The bloodshed and the power's clearly demonstrated impotence help least of all to create a favorable climate for private investment. The supporters of tougher terms for our commodities' access to foreign markets and the opponents of foreign debt repayment deferment for Russia will gain additional arguments.

Advocates of the idea of expanding NATO have acquired serious arguments. "If this is what the new Russia is like, then the rest of Europe and the United States have every reason to fear it," the well-known U.S. commentator William Pfaff aptly put it recently. East Europeans will find confirmation of their fears concerning Moscow's potential aggressiveness and will start knocking increasingly insistently on the doors of the North Atlantic alliance. Russia, bogged down in the Caucasus, will have neither the strength nor the opportunity to offer much resistance to this.

The failure of the military operation in Chechnya also has another important international aspect. Following the breakup of the USSR, of all the diverse power factors—economic, moral, political, military—which determine a state's international weight and influence, Russia was left with just one weighty factor—the military factor. Our possession of a mighty war machine

made people heed us. But now it has come to light that the Russian Army is worse than a colossus with feet of clay. The inability of the whole huge bulk of the power structures to cope quickly with home-guard detachments whose total strength does not exceed the complement of [President Yeltsin's security service chief] Korzhakov's service has devalued the factor of Russia's military strength in the eyes of serious foreign politicians. There is no doubt that after what has happened they will take still less account of our country in their geopolitical assessments.

Finally, the last point, but not the one of least significance. Catastrophic damage has been done to the international moral and political authority not only of the Russian president but also of the whole of Russia, which people abroad are rashly accustomed to associating with Boris Yeltsin. We appear to be a country whose president is incapable of coping even with a highly local internal conflict. His orders are not carried out, and the power structures are unable to function. A country which does not carry out its adopted obligations, including those assumed quite recently—at the Budapest CSCE summit, where Yeltsin signed the "code of conduct" providing for our compliance with a number of principles in internal affairs. A country whose political regime does not appear fully democratic. Grachev's image has become Russia's image.

It follows from all that has been said that Russia is having to begin the new year of 1995, on which so many hopes of strengthening its international authority were pinned, with a sharp weakening of its foreign policy positions and an increased real threat of international isolation. Damage has been inflicted whose consequences will probably be felt by more than one generation of Russian politicians.

It is possible to at least somehow minimize this damage only by ending the use of the Armed Forces with their aircraft and heavy artillery in Chechnya and by consenting to the OSCE's involvement in seeking paths to a settlement.

'Fierce' Debate Arises Over Yeltsin Control of Military

AU1201131595 Paris AFP in English 1255 GMT 12 Jan 95

[Report by Graham Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Moscow, Jan 12 (AFP)—Proposals that Russian President Boris Yeltsin should seize direct control of the military have sparked a fierce debate here, with the military split over whether to elbow aside Defence Minister Pavel Grachev.

The authorities confirmed here Thursday [12 January] that the proposal had been floated in the Kremlin on Wednesday, but they denied reports that any decision had been taken. [passage omitted]

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Several senior military men warned that any drastic shake-up of the military command would be too expensive and would overload Yeltsin.

But others said that the general staff should be given more power, then made directly answerable to Yeltsin.

Presidential counsellor for national security Yuri Baturin said senior Defence Ministry officials were flooding the Kremlin switchboard with calls to protest any move to dilute their ministry's power.

Georgi Saratov, a Yeltsin aide, maintained Thursday that the move was just a "possible option", and that there would be no hasty decisions.

Another presidential spokesman insisted in a statement that the issue involved months-old proposals for military reform and that no changes had been discussed in depth on Wednesday. [passage omitted]

The speaker of the upper house of parliament, Yeltsin ally Vladimir Shumeiko, reported Wednesday as a fact that the Kremlin had decided to transfer command of the general staff from Defence Minister Pavel Grachev to Yeltsin.

He was speaking after a meeting with Yeltsin which also involved Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the Duma, the lower house of parliament. Shumeiko said all four men had agreed with the move. [passage omitted]

The chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, General Mikhail Kolesnikov, said Yeltsin's reported decision had come as a "total surprise". [passage omitted]

The commander of ground troops, Colonel-General Vladimir Semyonov, said all military power, now spread among several ministries, should be concentrated in the general staff, which should be made directly accountable to the president. [passage omitted]

And Vitaly Moroz, deputy managing editor of Krasnaya Zvezda, told AFP that any switch of the command of the general chief of staff was unlikely and would be short-lived if attempted because impractical.

"Supervising the chiefs of staff is an enormous task. Yeltsin does not have time to do the job," Moroz added. "He already has more power over the military than most world leaders have." The president is commander-in-chief of the military.

Moscow Sees No Link With Chechnya, Baltic Border Issues

LD1201184095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1746 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by our diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 12 (Interfax)—Moscow believes that the linking of the problem on the border with Estonia and Latvia with the developments in Chechnya is "groundless."

"Russia has no power ambitions in the region of the Baltic Sea equally as in any other region," a senior official of the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax on Thursday [12 January 1995].

At the same time he described as "suitable" the appeal by German parliament deputies to Tallinn to recognize the border with the Russian Federation. "The appeal by Bundestag deputies to Estonian leaders could be considered as an appeal to Tallinn to occupy a more pragmatic position in relations with Moscow," said the diplomat.

He said that "with account to the proximity between Berlin and Tallinn, the stand by Bundestag deputies may play a positive role in the development of the Russian-Estonian relations."

The diplomat confirmed that Moscow does not recognize the territorial problem in its relations with Estonia.

The Russian diplomat voiced surprise to the effect that the appeal by the German parliament deputies was addressed not only to Tallinn but also to Riga. "Latvia does not issue territorial claims to Russia," he said.

The diplomat said that on December 14, 1994 there were signed Russian-Latvian agreements on neighboring territories and on simplifying the procedure of crossing the inter-state border. "We believe this is not enough to speak about the absence of territorial disputes in relations with Latvia," he said.

ITAR-TASS Reports Kabul Radio's Assertions About Bombing

LD1201111995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1058 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New Delhi January 12 TASS—Fifteen people were killed and 30 were wounded on Wednesday [11 January] as a result of air strikes on the northern Afghan province of Badakhshan. Destruction was caused in Badakhshan by air strikes, according to reports that arrived here.

Kabul radio that broadcast reports about "bombing strikes on Badakhshan by Russian aircraft" did not state the number of aircraft participating in the raid nor the site of the bombing. Meanwhile it reported that "the government of Afghan President Borhanoddin Rabbani sent to Moscow a note of protest over the bombings of villages in north Afghanistan by Russian planes. The note says, specifically, that two peaceful residents of Badakhshan province were killed and 24 others wounded as a result of air strikes on Darwaz district on Monday.

General Denies Russian Air Missions

LD1201113595 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1058
GMT 12 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondent Igor Shishkov]

[*FBIS* Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 (*ITAR-TASS*)—At the request of *ITAR-TASS* to comment on a report from Kabul about air strikes on Afghanistan's northern districts, representative of the Russian air forces, General Nikolay Grigoruk said this: "There have been no missions by Russian aircraft". Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Aleksandr Sadovnikov refused to give comments. He said that the Foreign Ministry received in the evening of January 10 a statement by Afghanistan about bombings.

Foreign Ministry Supports UN Appeal to Tajik Sides

LD1201210595 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1340 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* diplomatic correspondents Valeriy Sevryukov and Vladimir Suprun]

[*FBIS* Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Jan—The Russian Foreign Ministry supports the recent UN appeal to the Tajik sides to meet their obligations under the agreement on a cease-fire and an end to other hostile activities, which was concluded in Tehran last year. Grigoriy Karasin, director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry announced this at a briefing today.

The diplomat noted that the appeal in question had been made in connection with the consultations started today in Tehran on preparing the fourth round of inter-Tajik negotiations in Moscow planned for the end of January. Raymond Sommereyns, the head of the UN mission in Tajikistan, is taking part in this work.

We, Karasin said, expect that both the Tajik sides will implement the agreements that have been reached on holding the next round of inter-Tajik talks in Moscow. Expressing concern at the numerous violations of the cease-fire agreement by the armed opposition, the official Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed his hope that the system created by the UN for monitoring its implementation would function effectively.

U.S. Wants COCOM Successor To Exclude, Target Russia

MM1201123595 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian* 12 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Gennadiy Obolenskiy: "But Washington Demurs, You See..."]

[*FBIS* Translated Text] A meeting of representatives of the leading Western countries was held in the Hague

recently within the framework of the working group developing organizational measures for the creation of new—post-COCOM—arrangements for controlling exports of advanced technologies. As has now become known, the results of the meeting were not comforting since its participants were unable to overcome the differences which have arisen among them. The point is that most Western states cannot picture such arrangements without Russian participation. But the United States considers that Russia cannot be admitted to the new organization until it "rectifies its behavior."

What behavior is this? Washington, you see, dislikes the fact that Russia sells weapons to Iran and is demanding that this trade be terminated. In the process, whereas the Americans had asked us not to conclude new contracts with Tehran in this field, they have now gone much further and are trying to get us to dissolve all previous agreements for deliveries of arms there.

In making such demands the United States is pursuing several objectives at once. First, it would like, to put it simply, to drive Russia out of the world arms market: Who is going to agree to buy anything from us if we can abandon previously concluded contracts so easily. And second, our normal relations with Iran do not suit Washington, and it is not averse to undermining them.

And finally, the United States appears to simply not want to see our country in the organization which is to replace the defunct COCOM. If COCOM spearheaded its activity against us, is the new organization being created for the same purpose?

Davydov: Import-Export Structure Unlikely To Change

LD1101180495 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1744 GMT 11 Jan 95

[*FBIS* Transcribed Text] Moscow January 11 *TASS*—The Russian Government does not expect any striking changes in the country's export-import structure in 1995, Russian Vice-Premier and Foreign Economic Minister Oleg Davydov said at Wednesday's [11 January] meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Thomas Pickering. However, the weight of industrially developed countries in Russia's foreign trade turnover will gradually increase, he said.

The two officials also discussed the development of economic relations between the two countries, including joint venture activities in the oil sector.

Nuclear Contract With Iran Detailed, West's Hostility Cited

MM1201171195 Moscow *IZVESTIYA in Russian* 13 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Platkovskiy: "Atomic Energy Ministry's Deal With Iran Makes CIA Nervous"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Having beaten off the competition the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy is celebrating the conclusion of a major deal with Iran. The U.S. intelligence department meanwhile has issued an extremely stern warning that the nuclear alliance between Moscow and Tehran will accelerate the creation of an Islamic nuclear bomb.

As IZVESTIYA was told at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, the contract signed with Tehran is valued at \$1 billion, and in present-day terms the deal is unprecedented from all viewpoints. Now we can do our job without having to wonder whether we will be able to pay our highly skilled specialists next month, stated a leading staffer from the ministry, who took part in the signing of the contract. The sector and its service enterprises are experiencing difficult times.

Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov has placed his signature on the contract, which will enable Iran to commission its reactor. Its construction was halted as a result of events connected with the 1979 Islamic revolution. Since then the installations at the Bushehr site 700 km south of the Iranian capital have been mothballed. Russia will help with equipment and specialists and will commission the reactor within three years.

Barring unforeseen complications, as the Ministry of Atomic Energy staffer stated, Russia will secure the following profitable deals—the construction of a 1 million-kw power unit and two 440-megawatt units at Bushehr. The value of these contracts has not yet been cited.

There are already 150 Russian specialists working at the Bushehr site. That number will rise in the near future. To ensure the management of such large-scale work the Ministry of Atomic Energy intends to open its own office in Tehran. In addition, at the talks conducted by Viktor Mikhaylov the sides discussed questions relating to the training of Iranian specialists in Russia, including training for students and postgraduates.

Ministry of Atomic Energy staffers claim that the contract was signed in the face of fierce pressure from Western and, above all, U.S. rivals. Recently, the Russian atomic energy industry has faced opposition degenerating into outright commercial warfare in the world markets literally every step of the way. We have already been ousted from North Korea, they say at the Ministry of Atomic Energy; the work there will now be run by the Americans, the Japanese, and the South Koreans.

The Ministry of Atomic Energy says that the acute intensification of competition in the nuclear technologies market is the reason for the statement by CIA spokesmen that Russian-Iranian cooperation will accelerate work on Tehran's development of its own atomic bomb. In September last year, when the preparation of the deal had entered the final stage, the CIA issued a public warning that Russia was becoming the main source of technologies which would enable Iran to

become a nuclear power. At the moment the contract was signed, U.S. Defense secretary William Perry stated that the Clinton administration was very worried by the Iranian leadership's nuclear ambitions.

The reactor which Russia will complete is water-cooled and water-moderated. Technologically it cannot be used to produce fission materials for military purposes. As the Ministry of Atomic Energy has stated, the contract with Iran does not violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. All the work will be conducted under the control of the IAEA—the international organization which monitors the observance of that treaty.

CIA analysts predict that Iran could produce its own nuclear weapon within seven years.

Moscow Offsets Shortfall in Turkmen Gas Supplies to Kiev

LD1201172595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1606 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—The Gazprom joint stock company of Russia makes up for decreased natural gas supplies from Turkmenistan to Ukraine by supplying as good as twice the agreed daily amount (about 170 million cubic meters compared to 85 million cubic meters), a spokesman for the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil and Gas Industry told BUSINESS-TASS on Thursday.

Turkmenistan stopped supplying natural gas to Ukraine in November, 1994. Turkmenistan maintains persistently that it will not get involved into any talks on resumption of the gas supplies, until Ukrainian consumers pay off all their debts.

In accordance with active Ukrainian-Turkmen intergovernmental agreements, Ukraine is to discharge its debts by rendering 300 million USD to Turkmenistan, and supplying grain in compensation for the rest of its indebtedness.

In March, 1994, Ukrainian Cabinet charged the Respublika Corporation with settling the debt to Turkmenistan before January 1, 1995. However, the corporation failed to comply with its obligations.

The Cabinet had exceeded its powers by permitting the Respublika Corporation to enjoy certain privileges at trading with Turkmenistan, Ukrainian Vice-Premier Yevgeniy Marchuk said.

Moscow Cuts Energy Supplies to Moldova

LD1201221995

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian at 1420 GMT on 12 January, in a Chisinau datelined item transmitted a report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy that says a Moldovan Government delegation led by Deputy Prime

Minister Valentin Cunev has failed to reach agreement in Moscow on the supply of energy by Russia in 1995 on a clearing basis.

Stepan Lupashko, head of the Moldovan Government's Department for Relations with the CIS, told ITAR-TASS that the republic's economy is in great need of 200,000 tonnes of gasoline, 400,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, 800,000 tonnes of fuel oil, and 2.5 billion cubic meters of gas to be supplied on a clearing basis. Russia has promised only 25-30 percent of the amount Moldova needs except for gas where agreement on supplies has been

reached, Lupashenko says. The Russian side has also dropped a range of Moldovan goods from the list of goods to be delivered to Russia on a clearing basis. They include tractors, television sets, and carpets, all of which are manufactured in Russia.

"In spite of such tough conditions put forward by Russia, it seems like Chisinau is not losing heart. I still hope that we will be able to come to an agreement acceptable to both sides at the next meeting in Moscow in the near future," Lupashenko concludes.

Political Issues

Chechen Crisis Seen in Political Terms

MM1201113195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jan 95 First Edition pp 1, 7

[Article by Vladimir Kuznechevskiy: "The Crisis Has Split the Moscow Establishment. Attitude Toward Chechen Events Could Be the Cause of Changes in the Upper Echelons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Democrats have decided to remove the president. They have convinced the West of the need for this action for the sake of preserving the reforms. The West is considering the question of applying sanctions against Russia unless Yeltsin returns to the democrats' bosom.

The Chechen crisis ends with the removal of the criminal Dudayev-Yandarbiyev regime from Grozny. Almost everyone in Russia and in the West agrees with this act (the only objectors are certain leaders of Russian ethnic republics, whom NTV described 8 January as an "institution of resistance" to the president's actions). But the methods for resolving the crisis have created a deep split between Boris Yeltsin and his supporters in the democratic camp and revealed disagreements in the top Army leadership. The difference of positions has proved so great that the democrats have placed on the agenda the question of B. Yeltsin's forcible removal from the post of president by means of impeachment.

The first to give voice to this proposal back in November was State Duma Deputy S. Yushenkov. At the beginning of January this year G. Yavlinskiy also made public the mechanism of this operation, which has been elaborated in the democrats' ranks and in which the chief role is allocated to V. Chernomyrdin.

If the launch of the impeachment procedure succeeds, the leader of the "Yabloko" faction sees the prime minister as the country's interim president for three months. During this time, so Yavlinskiy believes, he must end the military operations in Chechnya, begin talks with its leadership (in other words with Dudayev?—V.K.), and ensure conditions for the election of a new president on terms that are equal for all candidates. The economist believes that Yeltsin has brought Russia to a point beyond which the destruction of Russian statehood follows, and so he must be removed as quickly as possible. According to the information of this faction's leader, negotiations (appeals from various political forces, including from Grozny) are already supposedly being conducted with Chernomyrdin with regard to suspending combat operations.

As Radio Liberty reported at the end of last week, there are allegedly data which make it possible to understand that the prime minister himself is tending toward suspending military operations in Chechnya and is discussing this issue with L. Ponomarev and also (indirectly) with Yu. Baturin and S. Filatov.

It seems to me that there is nothing more farfetched than to suspect Chernomyrdin of pursuing a separate line, still less an antipresidential one, on such a very acute issue. Knowing newspapers are seeking for the umpteenth time to "divorce" the president and the prime minister. This time on Chechen grounds, so to speak. An attempt is being made to misinterpret even such a gesture of trust on the president's part as his appointment of Chernomyrdin as responsible for organizing all the negotiating processes in Chechnya. Certain mass media at once interpreted that as showing the president's desire not to let the prime minister "sit things out," so to speak, away from the Chechen crisis.

Again everything is farfetched. This is yet another exercise in wishful thinking. Explanations by staffers of the Russian Federation Security Council (as is known, the decision was made at its last January session) have shed light on the highly prosaic simplicity even of this situation. The Chechen crisis is now entering a phase when questions of Chechnya's economic rebuilding will increasingly come to the fore, along with military aspects. Taking into account the complexities which have arisen with the budget as a result of this crisis, if anyone holds the cards here, it is the prime minister.

To all appearances, someone is trying with the help of the press to play an old card, which they have already tried more than once to win back and to which the prime minister himself has more than once given a rather sharp rebuke, including at conferences with the president's participation. Still there is no holding them. Evidently there are neither other cards nor other figures.

Ye. Gaydar also seems to be starting to agree with the formulation of the problem of removing the president from power. In particular, G. Starovoytova reported recently that she had had a number of closed meetings with him, at which a possible candidacy for the post of president of Russia in the upcoming elections was discussed, and they had agreed that Sergey Kovalev might be the democrats' single candidate in those elections. True, the cautious Gaydar preferred to speak not of June-July 1995 but of June 1996. But these are just details.

If you consider the force with which, since the start of the Chechen crisis, the Moscow press has been subjecting Boris Yeltsin to scathing criticism and has been literally "whitewashing" Chernomyrdin (witness just the headlines of articles like "All Around in Chechnya, But Chernomyrdin in White"), then it is hard not to conclude that all this looks very much like a compact behind the backs of the president and the premier, directed against both of them.

This compact (if it exists, of course) is being carried on with the approval of the West, whose mass media have simultaneously started "burying" the Russian president, as though at a command.

Alain Juppe, French minister of foreign affairs: President Yeltsin must be called to account over the Russian

military operation in Chechnya. **DEUTSCHE WELLE:** Because of the Chechen war Yeltsin is finding himself in ever greater internal political isolation. The democrats are turning away from the president in horror, believing that he has betrayed them. Geoffrey Howe, Britain's former foreign secretary: Yeltsin's political fate is hanging by a thread. We are interested in continuing the process of reforms in Russia and in preventing the restoration once again of a totalitarian or military regime. But this does not depend on the survival of some one individual, in this case Yeltsin. Like the Russians themselves, of course, we are anxious about the question of the president's possible successor, about which forces will replace him if Yeltsin is forced to lay down his presidential powers. **Radio France Internationale:** There is danger in Yeltsin. The barbarity (in Grozny) was begun by Moscow under the leadership of Yeltsin himself, whom the West only recently was calling a wise statesman and democrat. Russia is on the brink of an abyss. On one side there is war, and on the other an authoritarian regime, but the state is headed by a lost, sick man surrounded by dangerous stooges.

He Realized That There Would Be Bloodshed

The general background of such comments on events in Russia is growing. Demands are being made increasingly loudly, including by representatives of Western governments, for Russia to be subjected to economic and political sanctions. Like the ones to which Serbia was subjected and which Russia has recently been opposing increasingly insistently through Yeltsin's lips (it cannot be ruled out that this is a belated reaction to the Russian president's Budapest speech). The only exception in this harmonious chorus at present is the Washington administration, which declares that the United States will not quarrel with Russia over Chechnya. But some Western analysts interpret this statement as follows: "With Russia" still does not mean with Yeltsin.

Retrospective analysis enables us to conclude that this united front (of democrats and the West) against Yeltsin did not arise at the end of December, nor because of the Chechen crisis. The latter was merely the final excuse, the spur. You get the impression that all this had been conceived much earlier, some time in the very early fall. It all proved to have been very well stage-managed in December.

To all appearances, the decision to remove the president certainly did not come into being among the democrats but in those powerful commercial structures which had concluded that the president was increasingly firmly adopting a policy of curtailing the reforms in the key which had been developing prior to that and which suited precisely those commercial structures most of all.

It seems to me, however, that the Chechen crisis was chosen not quite successfully as the excuse for carrying out what had been conceived. To judge from public opinion polls, the stand taken on it by the president (on a principled plane) is shared by the majority of the

population. Resistance is elicited by the methods for carrying it out, and this resistance could cost Yeltsin the presidency in 1996. But prior to that, given skillful maneuvering of cadres and propaganda opportunities, Yeltsin will have coped perfectly with his opponents by sending them, in the end, to where he sent his opponents in 1993—to the settling tank called the State Duma of the new convocation. But if the West decides to apply sanctions to Russia in order to help the democrats to remove Yeltsin from the presidency, his authority in the country will in all events be maintained through 1996. The West has already been convinced of this, when it tried to remove S. Milosevic from the Serbian presidency with the help of sanctions and thereby contributed to an unprecedented rise in his authority in the country and to the democratic opposition's almost complete departure from the political scene.

But let us return to the Chechen crisis. The opposition and the mass media are seeking to shift onto Yeltsin all the blame for starting it. But is this so in actual fact?

Boris Yeltsin put off a decision on the Dudayev regime for three long years precisely because he realized that there would be bloodshed. He hoped to avoid bloodshed, and so he delayed for as long as he could. Until it became clear that no more could be endured.

Right from the start there was no doubt about the crime-ridden nature of the Grozny regime and its illegitimacy. But Dudayev was able to speculate on a most holy thing—the Chechens' sense of national pride. He came up with the slogan that Russia wanted to enslave all Chechens, exile them to Siberia, and appropriate Grozny's oil. From a propaganda viewpoint this was the strongest step: Moscow was being opposed not by the ruler of Grozny but by an entire people.

The Russian president was actually faced with a dilemma during all these years. Either let himself be intimidated, undertake nothing, and thus create in Russia's "soft underbelly"—the Caucasus—a criminal state, whose spasms and convulsions have long been shaking not only Russia and the whole Caucasus region but also contiguous states. Or else adopt the decision to remove the Grozny regime and so save peace for the country in that region. (Not only peace, by the way. M. Shaymiyev's exasperated reaction to the decision to put an end to the Dudayev-Yandarbiyev regime and then the Cheboksary conference of the heads of seven Russian republics under Yu. Skokov's auspices showed that things of far greater value are at stake in the Chechen crisis—the nature of Russia's unified statehood).

It was becoming increasingly dangerous to delay the decision. It was necessary to decide and choose something. There was a choice.

The Kremlin was offered at least three options for resolving the Chechen crisis.

The first—to all appearances, inspired from Moscow by people close to the president—was proposed by the

anti-Dudayev organized opposition located in Chechnya's Nadterechnyy Rayon. With Moscow's economic, technical, and military help it was proposed to use Chechen forces to oust the Dudayev-Yandarbiyev regime from Grozny and then to hold elections.

R. Khasbulatov's proposal may be considered the second option. When it became clear that the Grozny dictator had failed to cope with the economic and social management of the republic, the former chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decided that it would be possible to play on this and also on the contradictions between Grozny and the village of Znamenskaya, to persuade both to agree to free elections, to nominate his own candidacy, to win the elections, and, ultimately, to offer the Kremlin a pacified Chechnya headed by Khasbulatov.

The third option was that of General A. Aslakhonov, a Chechen and former chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Combatting Infringements of the Law. After traveling the length and breadth of Chechnya, he reached the conclusion that: a) Members of the opposition will not succeed in overthrowing Dudayev and b) Dudayev himself will not voluntarily give up power to anyone—neither to Nadterechnyy Rayon, nor to Khasbulatov, nor to Moscow, nor to any other Chechen whatsoever. He had not concentrated heavy arms in his hands, right down to tanks, salvo fire systems, and aircraft, in order not to use them at the critical moment to defend his personal power. The former assistant to the USSR minister of internal affairs did not formulate his recommendations sharply, but his conclusion was clear enough: The Dudayev regime can only be removed by force, and by the force of the Russian war machine.

Admittedly, there was also a fourth option, different from the first three. It was proposed by Ye. Gaydar and S. Kovalev, leaders of Russia's Democratic Choice: To make contact with Dudayev and resolve the matter by means of political negotiations—and then a referendum and elections.

This last option was the least comprehensible, to say the least. First, to begin talks with Dudayev would have meant recognizing his regime both *de facto* and *de jure*, and Moscow could not have done this in any form, if we bear in mind the integrity of the Russian State. Second, both the Kremlin and the Russia's Choice people were well aware that Dudayev would not agree to any referendum and elections, since he was well aware of its possible results (it was for this very reason that he fired upon the opposition rally in Grozny which demanded a referendum and elections). Third, Gaydar made a generally very curious formulation of the conditions for accepting his option: It was necessary to disarm the illegal armed formations and only then sit at the negotiating table. Gaydar failed to specify sensibly who would disarm Dudayev's supporters and how. In short, it was not even worth considering this option in view of its politicking, demagogic nature.

Roughly the same words can also be used to describe the option proposed by Khasbulatov.

"If the Nation Is Unworthy of Its Leader..."

The first option seemed the most attractive. Who knows? If it had been worked out profoundly and comprehensively enough, tactically and operationally, it might have been crowned with success. But it turned out that there was no one in the president's entourage to work it out. Therefore the failure to apply the first option was natural and, moreover, predetermined.

In the end, it was necessary to resort to Gen. Aslakhonov's option. But since it had not been the main one right from the start, had not been worked out profoundly and comprehensively, and started to be applied at sight, as it were, when the first option was already failing, its first stage also ended in complete failure. They wanted the best, but it turned out as always.

The crisis in the upper echelons of the Army made a considerable contribution to this.

Not only the neophytes of Russian politics—former lecturers in higher educational institutions, well-known human rights campaigners, attorneys, ministers of finance, and so on—but also some Western politicians consider the Army's mobilization in Chechnya Yeltsin's mistake. I believe that it is the Russian president's critics who are making a mistake. First, the Chechen population is armed almost to a man. It is extremely difficult to take away their weapons. But this, of course, is not the main point. It is that Dudayev has managed to concentrate heavy arms in his possession. MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] units will never be able to requisition them.

In addition, the character of Dudayev himself should be taken into consideration. Recent events have shown that if he had had an atom bomb at his disposal, he would have unhesitatingly detonated it at a critical moment for his personal power. In this respect Dudayev reminds me of Hitler, who in April 1945 ordered the flooding of the Berlin subway system, where the civilian population was sheltering from air raids, with these words: "If the nation is unworthy to have a leader such as me, let the nation perish." Dudayev, who has plunged his people into a catastrophe, differs little in this respect from the raving *fuehrer*.

The minister of defense has made a mess of all the operations in Chechnya which he has undertaken (it has now come to light that the failed 26 November offensive against Grozny was also his handiwork). The very independent press and Duma democrats long ago lambasted him with scathing criticism and are literally badgering Pavel Grachev. To all appearances, the criticism of his abilities is correct.

It is, however, permissible to ask the critics: Who is on the spot? For more or less everything in the Army has been subjected to scathing criticism for a number of years now. In the course of the Chechen crisis certain

Moscow newspapers have, in my view, altogether gone beyond all conceivable bounds: Deserters are elevated to the rank of heroes, only those soldiers and officers who are moaning with hunger and discomfort are sought out under the microscope in battle formations, and so on. Why such selectiveness? For there are not just deserters and whingers. Television still sometimes shows other things, albeit sparingly—those who carry out an order without moaning, slightly wounded men in Moscow who are longing to go back, and so on.

But it is, in the end, not a matter of them. It is a matter of the generals.

Pavel Grachev proved to be the only person who obeyed the order of the supreme commander in chief. But where are the rest? The rest, as soon as the preparations to carry out the supreme commander in chief's order began, at once dispersed to the bushes [made themselves scarce], and there, in those bushes, as one respected newspaper unhappily (or, on the contrary, happily, maybe) put it, they "have honor."

It is said that precisely these generals, who are sitting things out in these political bushes, know how to organize and direct operations like the Chechen one and are able to do so. But if this is so, why has not a single one of them put his personal opinion to the president and stated that he disagrees with the methods of preparing and conducting combat operations employed by the minister of defense or offered his own view of the problem? (Instead, they prefer to show kindness to the wounded in hospitals). What did they lack? Intelligence? Bravery? Or honor? Have they not all suddenly engaged in politics because they are not sure that they would cope with the task set by the president? Maybe all of them, our combat generals, have been made unsure of themselves in recent years, as it were, by the democratic press, which year after year has been saying the same thing over and over again: The Army is shit, the generals are shit...? Is this not why one general, who has gotten caught up in politics and who is rumored as a future president, has gone so far as to say that he agrees and knows how to **withdraw** the troops from Chechnya but does not wish to lead them in combat operations?

When I heard this, I thought—this general does not care about Chechnya but about the Russian Federation. Today Chechnya, tomorrow the Caucasus, the day after tomorrow the Khanty-Mansiysk Okrug, then everywhere, and in the end only the Principality of Moscow will remain. And still later? Will an Ivan Kalita [14th-century prince of Moscow who greatly increased Moscow's power and influence] come along and start once again gathering up Russian lands and Russians, this time with other generals? No, we should not be in any hurry to elect generals to the presidency. General Eisenhower was right: "Politics are too important to be entrusted to the military."

I am not writing these bitter lines out of a subjective wish to justify the president's actions. Time will appraise both

his actions and those of the military. And yet absolutely everyone both in our country and abroad agrees with the essence of Yeltsin's decision. But if the Gromovs, Konratyevs, and others failed to carry out the supreme commander in chief's order and, in order to rescue their reputation, tried to put a brave face on a sorry business, what was the president to do? He does not have any other generals today. Therefore the president has been forced to rely on him who has not refused his professional duty on farfetched pretexts.

Here I must cite U.S. experience. Their officers are the same kind of people as ours. They quarrel among themselves and compete in the struggle for posts. All as in our Army. But they always have a line which they never cross. This line is the security of the state and the nation. They never get carried away by politics. But if such a sin is committed sometimes, then the newspapers and public opinion at once turn away from them and do not write that this apostate from professional duty "has honor." Two examples.

In 1952 the legendary General MacArthur, who had courted deserved fame during World War II and the Korean War, tried to dispute a political decision of President Truman's and to express his own view of the conduct of combat operations on the Korean Peninsula. The general was immediately relieved of his command of the U.S. expeditionary corps in Korea and brought home. The Americans greeted the disgraced general as a national hero, but in his quarrel with the president and the secretary of defense (naturally, the latter at once sided with the president) they unconditionally supported the president. In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, a similar incident occurred with the talented General Schwarzkopf. The outcome was the same.

In the Chechen crisis the president has found himself in a very complex situation precisely because of the stand of the generals, who are playing at politics and forgetting their professional duty. For in practice these generals are not in the Army but serve in offices.

Back in the thirties Antonio Gramsci [founder of the Italian Communist Party] noted down in his "Prison Notebooks" a very curious observation concerning the current expression "generals without an army." Objecting to the disdainful tone of that phrase, Gramsci remarked: "if there are generals, it is possible to create an army in a very short time even out of a ragtag rabble. But if there is a population which has been placed under arms but no generals, then this host will never become an army or be able to win any war."

To Support the President

From this point of view, the president is currently in a most unfavorable situation: The Moscow mass media are destroying some generals in the eyes of public opinion and virtually urging others to organize a putsch, naming their names bluntly. If this trend continues, I do

not know who will ultimately regret the political climate created in society more—the president or the democrats.

In August 1914, when World War I started, the Bolsheviks, headed by Lenin, advocated the defeat of their own government in it. And they achieved this. But Lenin at least explained openly why he had done this: War could sweep the czarist regime from the political arena—and then the Bolsheviks would have the chance to come to power. The present Russia's Choice figures, headed by Gaydar, are in fact also advocating the defeat of Yeltsin's government in the war with Chechnya. Why? What for? With what aim? To sweep away the government and the president? And then? Surely they are not really hoping to come to power themselves?

About the Army. In 1917, the Bolsheviks strongly assisted in the process of the Army's demoralization and disintegration. And they did break it down. But by the summer of 1918, when the question of reconstructing the Russian state arose, the Bolsheviks needed the Army. And they had to restore it following a period of demoralization, with the help of mass executions. Do the present democrats realize that, by breaking down the present social order, they are certainly not clearing the path for themselves but for those who in the near future will be forced to establish order in the Army and in society with an iron hand to safeguard the Russian state itself against collapse?...

The Chechen crisis has put the stability of Russian statehood in jeopardy, and it has not been stable for a single month since 1991 anyway. The definitive destruction of this stability will bury not only Russian democracy under its wreckage, but also the Russian democrats. Therefore it is not a good idea to go to the West now looking for support in the fight against B. Yeltsin, as Ye. Gaydar did a few days ago, apparently with a view to settling the Chechen crisis peacefully. It is too late for a peaceful settlement. It is now a question of an acceptable settlement with minimum damage to everyone. And people should not be playing off V. Chernomyrdin against the president. Judging by his real behavior, rather than his behavior as interpreted by the mass media, the prime minister is not putting himself in a confrontational position as regards the president. The boat should not be rocked. We may turn everything upside down. We should not be thinking about replacing the president today. We have had enough of Bolshevik slogans and actions. In the present situation, the democrats must assume their share of the responsibility for the Chechen crisis and, rather than calling for the replacement of the president, help the president to rectify the mistakes that have been made. The president must serve out his term and, in 1996, the people, rather than the all-knowing politicians, will decide the fate of both Boris Yeltsin and the democrats. And their own fate.

Official 'Hopes' West 'Understands' Chechnya

LD1201175595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1709
GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 ITAR-TASS—The Russian foreign Ministry's spokesman Grigori Karasin told a briefing today that "the thesis that

Russia as any other state may not and must not tolerate uncontrolled armed formations in its territory" meets with an understanding abroad.

Karasin said the Foreign Ministry, closely watching external responses to the Chechen conflict, is satisfied that most states are demonstrating weighed attitudes, want Russia to retain its territorial integrity and understand that the problem is internal.

The spokesman also mentioned "tendencies of a biased response from political figures and human rights organizations." "Obviously, human rights are a crucial aspect of the events, and we are not closing eyes to it. But it must be clear that the scale of the crisis which Russia encountered in Chechnya has made human tragedies and losses actually inevitable," Karasin said.

Institutions which have emerged in Russia open broad possibilities for preventing violation of human rights, such as seen in Chechnya in the recent three years, Karasin continued. "On the other hand, we have a possibility to gouge [as received] our own power acts from this point of view," Karasin said.

The Foreign Ministry official said Russia would "continue to cooperate with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in restoration of democratic institutions and in organisation and conduction of elections in Chechnya."

Karasin described as "irrelevant and hasty" calls of politicians and organisations to freeze the political and economic cooperation with Russia. The spokesman said this was a rhetoric which "reminds of the recent and rather sad past of our relations with the West, when an old reflex syndrome works."

Karasin voiced hope that correctly understood interests of Russia would be supported in the West, and the West would think whether it was worthwhile to be blunt and quick in scrapping its positive experience of cooperation with Russia.

Officials Release Chechnya Loss Figures

LD1201170495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1504
GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—The losses of the forces of the Russian Defence and Interior Ministries amounted, as of January 11, to 394 servicemen killed and more than 1,000 wounded in the Chechen conflict.

These official data were aired at Thursday's parliamentary hearings at the Federation Council.

Update Troops' Operations

LD1201192195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1825
GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—The Russian Government issued a statement on

Thursday saying that after the 48-hour cease-fire expired at 8.00, "federal troops resumed active operations to increase the zone of influence in central districts of Grozny in all directions and achieved substantial progress."

The statement also said that "Russian Air force delivered missile and bombing air-strikes against concentrations of illegal armed groups, and secured the announcement of Russian troops along transport routes" stressing that Grozny itself was not subject to air-strikes.

Send 'Fresh' Forces to Grozny

LD1301072595 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0700 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The press reports today that fresh federal forces have been deployed toward Grozny. Over the past few days elite units of the Dzerzhinskiy division; Marines from the Pacific, Baltic, and Northern Fleets; and two detachments of OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] from Altay have been transferred there.

Duma Rejects Plan To Offer Cease-Fire

LD1301095995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0919 GMT 13 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 13 Jan—The Russian State Duma has rejected a proposal that it should send a letter to [Chechen President] Dudayev about a cease-fire, the surrender of weapons, and the holding of talks on an exchange of POW's. The proposal was put forward at today's plenary sitting by Nikolay Tropin of the Democratic Party group. He was supported only by the 108 parliamentarians who had voted to put the question on the agenda.

The deputies also turned down another proposal by Nikolay Tropin—that Russian President Boris Yeltsin be asked to bring Duma Deputies Anatoliy Lukyanov and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy into the Russian Federation Security Council.

Grozny Shelling Seen To Continue

AU1301114495 Paris AFP in English 1123 GMT 13 Jan 95

[By Paola Messina and Catherine Triomphe]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Grozny, Russia, Jan 13 (AFP)—Russian forces launched Friday a furious artillery barrage across a broad swath of Grozny, extending their grip on the Chechen capital and cutting off rebel reinforcements from the city centre.

From 7:00 a.m. (0400 GMT), shells pounded into central Grozny every 10 seconds for more than three hours,

targeting mainly the train station—the scene of bitter fighting in recent days—and the main streets leading to the centre.

At around 9:30 a.m. (0630 GMT), some 40 Grad missiles slammed into Minutka square in southern Grozny, until now the main rallying point for rebels returning into the city. There were no immediate reports of casualties.

Russian warplanes also circled over the city early Friday, firing several rockets on unidentified targets.

The assault followed reports citing senior Russian military sources saying Moscow was preparing for a final assault Friday or Saturday to take Grozny after a month-long offensive to crush Chechnya's secessionist revolt.

The new attack—following a relentless artillery barrage on Grozny throughout Thursday—prevented the Chechens from sending reinforcements to help fighters defending the central presidential palace, the battered symbol of the Caucasus republic's three-year independence drive.

The intensification of the Russian assault has turned the city centre into a virtual no-go zone.

Both residents still in the city and many of its defenders were holed up in basements since Thursday, when Russian fire raining down on the city broke a two-day lull in fighting.

But despite the incessant shelling, some residents ventured out Friday in search of water.

The arrival announced here Thursday of an additional 100 armoured vehicles has heightened residents' fears that Moscow authorities are determined to trap them in Grozny.

Russian snipers gained ground towards southern Grozny on Thursday, inching their way down Lenin Street, the avenue leading south from the palace, in a bid to cut off the rebels' last route in and out of the capital.

If Russian forces succeed in imposing a blockade of the city, the secessionists would face a rapid depletion of their stocks of food and ammunition. [passage omitted]

Grachev Orders Gromov, Mironov To Take Leave

LD1301121295 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1130 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's defense minister [Pavel Grachev] has ordered his deputies Boris Gromov and Valeriy Mironov to take leave without their consent.

Yeltsin on Press Day, 'Congratulated' Media

LD1201192895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1914 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS; embargoed by ITAR-TASS until 2100 GMT 12 January]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin congratulated journalists of Russia, all workers of the mass media on the day of the Russian press observed on January 13. Follows the full text of the congratulatory message of the head of state circulated by the press service of the Russian president:

"To workers of the mass media of Russia,

"my cordial congratulations to the many thousands of journalists in Russia, to all workers of the mass media on the day of the Russian press.

"the Russian press exerts much influence on transformations in the country. The mass media play a great role in defending democracy, heightening political culture, enhancing a sense of responsibility of people to each other, to society and before law. The mass media play an invaluable educating role. Normal life and preservation of civic peace in Russia largely depend on journalists' professionalism, objectivity and responsibility.

"The press is in need of support in complex conditions of the transition period. I will continue to promote the creation of favourable political and economic conditions for the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the press.

"I am sincerely grateful to Russian journalists for the participation in democratic transformations. I wish happiness, good health and well-being to all workers of the mass media of Russia. [Signed] Boris Yeltsin"

Adviser 'Pessimistic' on Yeltsin, Media Relations

MK1201132895 Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 2/78, 12-18 Jan 95 p 1 (signed to press 11 Jan 95)

[Interview with Georgiy Satarov by Anna Politkovskaya: "Will the President Be Collectively Checkmated by the Russian Press? Georgiy Satarov on Confrontation Between Journalists and the Ruling Authority"—date and place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Politkovskaya] How do you envision the further evolution of the interrelations between the ruling authority and the press in Russia, which have now obviously come to a deadlock?

[Satarov] Pessimistically. Mutual misunderstanding and estrangement are growing. The ruling authority—if we talk about it in a generalized form—is not showing the requisite discrimination in its relations with the mass media. I regard the accusations against the press, which have now been made also by the president, as a political blunder. And although the president spoke cautiously and referred only to some representatives of the press who have been bribed by Dudayev, a new level of confrontation has emerged, as compared with what there was earlier. It was not what the president said, or how he said it, that was important, but how it was perceived by

the press. Likewise, very often the press says something but the authorities interpret what has been said quite differently.

[Politkovskaya] Do you think appropriate public apologies will be made to the mass media? If so, in which form? Are any such options being contemplated in the first place?

[Satarov] Yes. And this is all I can say on this count. What worries me however is that the understandable oppositionist attitude by the press as a social institution is now turning into opposition by the press to the state in general. This above all contributes to transforming our state into an uncontrolled dictatorship. The state will not be able to exist in this form for very long, and it will fall apart.

I am alarmed by some historical analogies. Relatively recently representatives of our liberal ideology were at one in condemning the position of the liberal intelligentsia at the beginning of this century for effectively making October 1917 possible. They condemned it because that liberal intelligentsia was in opposition to the existing state, which, from the point of view of the intelligentsia of the time, displayed illegitimate violence against another part of society, namely the working class and the peasantry. So, at that moment liberal thought, in defending one part of society, carried that defense to the point where it led to the collapse of the state. The backwash of that collapse brought political thugs to power, and everyone knows what they did.

[Politkovskaya] Excuse me, but do you still have doubts as to who was to blame in 1917: the ineffectual Provisional Government or the liberals?

[Satarov] I think that present-day liberals should remember that if the state is destroyed, it will also bury liberal values and their exponents under its ruins. This rather trivial circumstance, in my opinion, has been ignored by the mass media since 11 December. I do not even mean the attitude to concrete facts and events but simply the ethical background. It is this pose that I call opposition in general, indiscriminate opposition—opposition as an end in itself.

[Politkovskaya] It appears that again the press is to blame, as always when the authorities do something criminal, and the only thing they hope for is that information about the wicked actions they are perpetrating will be forever buried in the archives. How then do you view recent statements by Sergey Nosovets, as head of the presidential staff's Information and Analytical Administration, openly targeted against the press? For instance, he is outraged not only over "the journalists' sellout to Dudayev" but even over the fact that newspapers publish photos of demolished buildings in Groznyy.

[Satarov] I believe that an official performing his functions has no right to such statements, from the professional point of view.

[Politkovskaya] When could the imposition of a full-blown censorship and the suspension of the Mass Media Law be effected?

[Satarov] Judging by the trends that I am seeing now, this likelihood is increasing. Such misgivings are not at all groundless: The state has given the press enough reason for such suspicions. The state has also given enough reason for the public to distrust its power.

[Politkovskaya] Do you think the confrontation between the ruling authority and the mass media will continue until the latter are completely cornered and turn into an institution of dissent?

[Satarov] It can also continue until the state is cornered. And any animal at bay behaves in a perfectly definitive way.

[Politkovskaya] Have the implications of suspending the Mass Media Law for Russia's further political development been calculated?

[Satarov] No. What has been estimated are scenarios which could lead to such changes in the regime when the imposition of censorship will be just one manifestation of more general developments.

[Politkovskaya] To what extent, do you think, the current mass media are in a position to oust the president?

[Satarov] What in chess is called a collective checkmate is theoretically possible.

Nevzorov Chechnya Film Provokes Furor

MM1201195095

[Editorial report] Several of the Moscow newspapers dated 13 January 1995 carry contrasting reactions to a program on Chechnya presented by Aleksandr Nevzorov and entitled "Hell," screened on Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel on 11 January immediately after the "Vremya" program.

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 January 1995 carries on page 4 an article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich under the heading "600 Seconds of Outright Malice. What's On, According to Aleksandr Nevzorov," the text of which reads as follows:

"Last Wednesday [11 January], at the end of the 'Vremya' program, the announcer kindly informed us of a change in the evening's TV broadcasting on the First Channel: 'At the request of State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin, we are showing a program by Aleksandr Nevzorov's creative company.' In the old days, such things were preceded by the more elegant: 'At the request of the working people.' Somehow they did not like to come right out and say: 'At the request of Politburo member....' But now here it is, in so many words, openly, as if in confession....

"Requests from the boss are not subject to discussion, that is understood. But the Ostankino management

apparently considered it necessary to let viewers know who had requested what on this occasion, evidently being ashamed of the show they were offering us and trying to justify themselves even before screening it: Look, we're being leaned on, so don't be too hard on us....

"This reportage from Chechnya, put together by Aleksandr Nevzorov on the official instructions of the Russian authorities, with the author's characteristically trenchant and meaningful title 'Hell'—well, we'd seen it before. More than once. The emotional subject, its heroes, the style, the descriptive techniques, are the same as we used to see from Nevzorov at one time in his reportages from Vilnius, Riga, the Dniester region.... Using new but equally tragic and bloody material, the zealous reporter gave us a kind of retrospective screening of the '600 Seconds' independent TV company's product. Apparently he had decided that the viewer is sick with longing for cruel, malicious guardians of great-power principles who are sure they are right, don't suffer from doubts, and are ready for anything. Yes, for those very same people on whom was conferred the highest (designer-label, Nevzorov's very own) mark of excellence—'Our Boys' ['nashi'].

"'They must be stamped on, these scum, right!' an ardent 'liberator' of Grozny yells to camera, referring to the Chechens and mixing some choice swear words into his incoherent remarks. Next to him is the author, nodding, excited, burning with fierce impatience: 'So are there many of them left down there in the palace?'

"Next comes a string of touching pictures. There is a young soldier reading stories in a break between fighting (but the reporter does not ask how this kid is getting on here, how many of his comrades have already been killed). There is a soldier leading an old lady by the arm (but the author does not inquire whether the woman's home is still standing or where her children and grandchildren are).

"'Here there are no loudmouth deputies or unthinking correspondents who have never seen action,' Nevzorov tells us in the voice-over. And we were hearing this after Sergey Kovalev's three-week stay in Grozny (and now he's off again), after the expeditions to Chechnya by Sergey Yushenkov, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, Ella Pamfilova, Aleksandr Osovtsov, Viktor Sheynis, and many other deputies. This went on the air on the day that Jochen Piest, correspondent for DER STERN magazine, was killed, the third journalist so far to die in Chechnya.

"If Oleg Poptsov is after all removed from the post of All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company chairman 'for distorting both points of view' on events in Chechnya, how should Nevzorov be rewarded for his objectivity?"

"Let us pay due tribute to the film-maker's skill: Where the sugary sentimentality of individual episodes like those described above is forced out by the merciless facts

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of life, the blood and sweat of war are visible and tangible enough to make you shudder. But that only makes the text of the voice-over all the more shameless, and the attempt verbally to justify the dreadful picture of events all the more disgraceful.

"On the day the program went on air, Nevzorov spoke in the Duma, calling for an information blockade of Chechnya. The reportage by Nevzorov the journalist that was screened in the evening is not in any way at odds with the appeal made by Nevzorov the deputy during the day. Because what we saw was not information. It was propaganda. False, shameless, and executed on the orders of those same powers that Nevzorov only recently used to abuse and criticize selflessly, and by which he himself has now been recruited."

Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 15 January front-pages a commentary by Tatyana Valentinova, headed "Swearing on the Air," which reads:

"Ostankino Television and State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin presented TV viewers with an unexpected 'gift.' At the request of the speaker of the lower house, a film shot in Chechnya by Deputy Aleksandr Nevzorov was screened immediately after the 'Vremya' program on the first channel on Wednesday.

"The 'ardent reporter' did not tell us anything new about the Chechen war. In fact, his work was strongly reminiscent of the notorious '600 Seconds' pieces on the Vilnius events and the life of the Riga OMON [special-purpose militia detachment]. Once again, to the accompaniment of Wagner's music, we heard soldiers' swearing and Nevzorov's fine words about 'great Russia' and its incommensurately 'small army.' Once again the 'dogs of war' gave tongue, roaming the streets of Grozny on top of tanks to demonstrate their disregard for the danger. Although this time the malicious calls to 'stamp on them...stamp on them all' referred not to Lithuanians and Latvians, but to Chechens.

"Journalists who write about Chechnya while allegedly never having been there were roundly cursed. But what about the three correspondents who have been killed? And Nevzorov's words about the 'old fool' allegedly trying to persuade people to kill Russians can only be called outrageous.

"We are familiar with Nevzorov's 'creative work.' It is something else that is surprising. It is well known that representatives of the media are not allowed into the Russian troops' quarters—even Sergey Stepashin admitted the erroneousness of such actions by the military. But Nevzorov, on his own proud admission, was issued with a special permit by Nikolay Yegorov personally, signed by no less a person than Pavel Grachev himself. Furthermore the Nationalities Ministry offered to conclude a contract with the journalist to cover events in Chechnya, but because of his love of freedom and independence he did not agree to that. One wonders at the lack of fastidiousness shown by Ivan Rybkin—and

all those who initiated and gave their blessing to the journalist-deputy's trip to Chechnya—in their choice of a figure who could supposedly show us the truth about the war. Is this not akin to the lack of fastidiousness about means that has characterized the actors in the Chechen drama from the outset?

"Of course, you have to respect the [Duma] speaker's request. But what about respect for TV viewers, for you and me, who finance both the Duma and Ostankino?"

In contrast, Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 January 1995 front-pages an unattributed report on the same topic, under the general heading "Aleksandr Nevzorov's Truth From the Trenches," which reads:

"A TV reportage by Aleksandr Nevzorov, 'Hell,' was shown on the First Channel on 11 January. We have received a number of responses to it. This, for instance, is what Major I. Nikolayev said over the telephone:

"For probably the first time, we were shown not moaning and groaning about the horrors of war, but the real truth from the trenches. For the first time someone spoke honestly about the purpose of our Army's operations in Chechnya, and showed us people—real Russian soldiers....

"Ah, if only Nevzorov was given the chance to make not just one report like this, but a dozen or so. The wall of lies and ill-will around our Army would be broken down! Aleksandr Glebovich! Can you do it? After all, you aren't going to achieve anything in the Duma at the moment. But your talented words could do so much to help ordinary soldiers and officers."

Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 January 1995, Weekend Edition, carries on page 3 a 1,100-word article by Vladimir Verin headed "Freedom of Speech and Dictatorship of Opinion" on the continuing tensions between the authorities and the media over Chechnya and the difficulties of obtaining accurate information. It contains the following passage:

"A. Nevzorov's film, shown the day before yesterday on the First Channel immediately after the 'Vremya' program, even gave rise to the hope that there are still people at Ostankino, the semi-state TV and radio company, who are capable of not waging war on their own state, but supporting it in difficult times."

Chernomyrdin, Agrarian Leader Discuss Issues

LD1201191495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1743 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin met on Thursday chairman of the Russian Agrarian Party (RAP), leader of its Duma faction (55 deputies), Mikhail Lapshin.

Lapshin told Interfax that the meeting continued for "about an hour" and was mainly devoted to the Chechen

crisis, the possible opposition membership in the government and to the federal budget for 1995.

The prime minister backed, according to Lapshin, the position by RAP and LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] factions, by the deputy group "New Regional Policy", who displayed "common sense" during the Duma debate on January 11 of the Chechen crisis and who favored the law-makers' non-interference into "the development of the situation".

At the same time, Chernomyrdin, according to Lapshin, denounced the position occupied by the Russia's Choice faction, whose leaders "were directly involved into the deepening of the crisis in Chechnya and now are trying to gain political dividends on destructive things".

Lapshin said that the talk on participation of the opposition representatives in the work of the Cabinet of Ministers started from Chernomyrdin's question to him concerning his (Lapshin's) attitude to the recent appointment to the post of Justice Minister of Valentin Kovalev who was member of the Duma Communist faction.

Having reminded to the prime minister, that three RAP members: Vice-Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, Agriculture Minister Aleksandr Nazarchuk, Chairman of the Land Resources Committee Nikolay Komov, are members of the present government, Lapshin said that the RAP "is prepared to propose its candidatures for several ministerial posts of the social bloc".

Lapshin said that "discussions on the budget were the most difficult". He said that the prime minister had backed the position by the Agrarian deputies who proposed to preserve in 1995 the 2- percent special tax (in 1994 it amounted to 3- percent deductions from profits of all types of enterprises) for forming a fund for sustaining important industries. But the proposal was voted down by Duma deputies since it was not backed by the Communists, who "taught the Agrarians a tough lesson," said Lapshin.

Chernomyrdin proposed that Agrarian deputies "either try to find new sources for increasing support of the Agro- Industrial Complex, or, by winning a more reliable support in the Duma, raise again the question about the 2-percent special tax during debating of the draft budget in the second and third readings," said Lapshin.

Zhirinovskiy Sees Army 'Entitled' To Fight

BR1201144095 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 12 Jan 95 p 7

[Report by "L.Ip." "Zhirinovskiy's Performance: 'It Was I Who Saved Boris'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Moscow—His big puffed face shone in the spotlights along parliament's corridors. Lately, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's fortunes had somewhat declined, but now the Chechen crisis has brought him back into the limelight, and the extreme right's advocate

was delighting in his new role: that of upholder of the government and "spokesperson" of the majority, given that his group's votes were decisive for the purpose of rejecting the pacifist motions. It was no mere coincidence that, on the eve of the voting session, he met Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. For his part, former Finance Minister Boris Fedorov is once again casting the old doubt: "Who is financing Zhirinovskiy? Apparently no banks or companies are giving him any money. Therefore..."

He has come back as the old actor, the unstoppable demagogue: "The Army is fully entitled to move into Grozny," he thundered in front of the journalists. "Their action is in perfect agreement with the Constitution. Besides, this is only a policing operation. We already waged a war 150 years ago." He searched his pockets, produced a small box, and pulled out a coin from it. "Here is a medal of the czar, 'for the conquest of Chechnya and Ingushetia.' There already was a war, and we won it. Today Chechnya forms part of Russia."

But can a solution be found to the current crisis in the Caucasus? "There is no Caucasian crisis. The only crisis we have here is an anti-Russian crisis. They want to pull our country apart and overthrow the government. Instead, it should be allowed to do its work..." However, it looks as if, rather than the government, it is a sort of Politburo, not accountable to anybody, which is running the show. "So, what is so surprising about this?", Zhirinovskiy cut short. "In every country there is a small circle making all the decisions. This is normal. Journalists are to blame for all the trouble."

How do you mean journalists are to blame? "Yes, they are worsening the situation, distorting reality. It is high time to put an end to these attacks against Korzhakov (the Kremlin's so-called Rasputin), against the Army, against the counterintelligence services. They are just doing their duty. It was perestroika which destroyed everything." [passage omitted]

Chernomyrdin Shuns Zhirinovskiy's Proposals

MK1301080295 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1

[NEGA report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Premier Was Offered a Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a well-informed source close to the Russian Federation government, during a meeting on 10 January between Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the latter insisted on replacing some Russian Federation government ministers with representatives of his party. In the words of the same source, Viktor Chernomyrdin did not react in any way to this proposal.

Zhirinovskiy Joins Duma Defense Committee

LD1301114395 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskv
in Russian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has been brought onto the Duma Defense Committee. This was done at the request of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader himself and has been confirmed by the State Duma.

Intelligence Official Discusses Operations

MM1201122595 Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Jan 95
p 6

[Interview with Colonel General Vyacheslav Trubnikov, first deputy director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service [FIS], by Gennadiy Shilin; date, place unspecified: "Intelligence Operating for the Homeland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Shilin] Vyacheslav Ivanovich, it is seen as axiomatic today that Russia has no opponents, only partners. But there are national interests too, of course. What are the goals of Russian foreign intelligence in this context?

[Trubnikov] In the Soviet period our country had very real opponents who were averse to the very existence of the USSR. Now it is as if no one in the world is opposed to Russia's existence as an independent state, and in this sense it has no opponents. But the concept of "opponent" should not necessarily be identified with a particular state. At the moment we could regard as opponents, for example, such phenomena as terrorism, the drugs trade, organized crime, and so on. In the context of the fight against these phenomena one can talk about cooperation between intelligence organizations in different states as partnership. Anyway, I do not believe that the question of partnership in some way precludes a situation which could give rise to threats to partners' interests, that is, to the states the special services represent. Indeed, a threat could arise as a result of a combination of circumstances and emanate from a particular point, from a particular entity, and this entity, if it threatens the interests of the state, could well become an opponent.

The main thing is that at the moment the intelligence service is operating in a nonconfrontational mode. We are not looking for opponents where there are none, above all because we do not have the "iron curtain" and ideological barrier that would divide the world into two systems at opposite poles.

[Shilin] Partnership implies cooperation. To what extent and in what specific ways is it manifested in relation to the intelligence services of Russia and other countries? For instance, in assisting UN peacemaking efforts in the world's trouble spots. How are things in the sphere of contacts with the intelligence services (if they exist) of the former Soviet republics, now independent states?

[Trubnikov] We maintain working relationships in the intelligence sphere with the corresponding services in all

of the CIS countries. Moreover, the Foreign Intelligence Service maintains working contacts and collaborates with several dozen special services in other countries. The activeness and depth of this collaboration are determined by the extent to which the political and other state interests of the relevant countries and Russia coincide. At the moment these interests coincide most fully in the sphere of maintaining the system of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism, the drugs trade, organized crime, money laundering, and so on. In the practical sphere collaboration between special services is manifested in the exchange of intelligence information and in assistance in the training of cadres and in the strengthening of the material and technical base of interested special services. Of course, the exchange of information on the situation in trouble spots is an important area of this collaboration.

[Shilin] Cooperation in any sphere presupposes, above all, honesty in relations between partners. Can you say that since the breakup of the USSR, Russian intelligence's new partners have behaved like gentlemen?

[Trubnikov] If you take partnership as a whole, the FIS [Foreign Intelligence Service] regards it as gentlemanly. Otherwise there would be no sense in it as far as Russian intelligence is concerned. But some new partners are finding it difficult to shake off the inertia of confrontation and of the mentality of the cold war period. We know of instances where Western intelligence agents and counterintelligence agents have approached former GDR intelligence staffers with recruitment offers, using the FIS label (or "flag," to use the professional jargon) as a cover. The same method was used only recently by the FBI in an operations game on U.S. territory with two individuals of Indian extraction, as reported by the U.S. press.

This practice is dangerous in the new conditions by virtue of the fact that the name of the FIS, through the efforts of such "partners," could suddenly turn out to be linked to operations relating to the illegal trade in fissile materials, with the activities of extremist or terrorist organizations, with the drugs trade. "Games" behind the FIS's back can scarcely be described as gentlemanly.

[Shilin] Have Russian intelligence's working methods changed in the new conditions?

[Trubnikov] Intelligence observes specific "ground rules." You can stop using particular ways and methods of work, but there is one principal thing you cannot stop doing—acquiring sources of intelligence information. Otherwise intelligence will cease to be intelligence and turn into a news agency.

For a long time now we have been using perfectly modern methods, we have not been using anything that will not be in the arsenals of foreign special services conducting intelligence work on Russia. The methods and means of intelligence activity are defined in the most general way by the Law "On Foreign Intelligence,"

which authorizes the use of overt and covert methods and means on condition that they are not detrimental to the lives and health of people and the environment. For reasons of secrecy I am unable to provide a detailed description of these methods and means, but I would assure you that the procedure for using them is thoroughly regulated by our domestic normative acts, which are adopted in consultation with and under the supervision of legislators.

I would emphasize that our intelligence service establishes relations of cooperation only with those who voluntarily consent to do so. In this connection, all the talk about our intelligence service's using blackmail, compromising material, and other coercive methods and means has nothing to do with present-day reality. Anyway, if you employ particular methods of intelligence activity in relation to foreigners, be prepared for the same methods to be used against your own country's citizens. That is also one of the "rules of the game."

[Shilin] The economy is a problem area for Russia at the moment. What is the FIS' role in resolving this problem?

[Trubnikov] As for the economic sphere, we will always be competing with other states in all things, whether we like it or not. Intelligence is using its own specific ways of ensuring the implementation of state policy in the economic sphere. It has a wide range of tasks in this sphere. One very important function is that of keeping track of the situation in the sphere of Russia's foreign economic activity. Intelligence identifies both threats to our interests, for example, attempts to pressure us in world markets (arms, space, and so on), and emerging opportunities, for example, advantageous market trends for particular types of commodities and raw materials. Ensuring balanced development of relations with foreign countries in such spheres as currency and finance, export and import transactions for strategic raw materials, and in the high technology sphere is very important from the viewpoint of the protection of Russia's national interests.

Often we are commissioned to ascertain the business reputation and real potential of foreign firms and individual dealers who intend to establish business relations with Russian state organizations. We often identify foreign firms attempting to persuade certain Russian partners to conclude illegal export deals. We also have to keep track of Russian capital going abroad.

[Shilin] In other words, so-called industrial espionage remains one of the main areas of intelligence work? Shouldn't it be abandoned?

[Trubnikov] You have to start by saying that we never had industrial espionage as such, since industrial espionage is a matter for companies and firms, that is, private business.

As for Russian intelligence, the scientific-technical sphere emerged for one simple reason: All USSR

industry was state-run. We had no other sector. It was the state that presented intelligence with its tasks, intelligence acting as an instrument.

But you're asking, what about now?

If the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions are lifted and the new democratic Russia has free access to all new technologies and it is free to sell them on the usual terms, at normal world prices, there will be significantly less need for state-organized intelligence of this kind.

[Shilin] What is your view of the "Ames affair"? Are they true, the obvious hints by certain U.S. press organs that Ames was allegedly underpaid for his services to the tune of nearly \$1 million, and this money will now be paid in some way to his family? They say that this practice exists in the international "intelligence community"...

[Trubnikov] For obvious reasons, I do not intend to comment on the "Ames affair." But anyone can see that the intelligence service that had or has such a person on its books can be proud of this outstanding achievement. As for the world intelligence community's practice, good intelligence services do not leave their people in the lurch and Russian intelligence is no exception.

[Shilin] TRUD recently reported that the defector Oleg Gordiyevskiy said in Berlin that the repeal of the death sentence passed on him in the Soviet era for betraying the homeland "would show how actively democratization was proceeding in Russia." What do you think of the fact that Soviet intelligence agents who went over to the West are now using ideological motives to justify their actions?

[Trubnikov] Gordiyevskiy's claims are ridiculous and have nothing to do with democracy. He was convicted of betraying the homeland under article 64 of the existing Russian Federation Criminal Code. I have expressed my opinion of him publicly on more than one occasion and my colleagues are behind me. I believe anyway that to mention Gordiyevskiy in the context of ideological considerations is at least insulting to the memory of real fighters for ideas, and I am thinking primarily of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. You can assess the late academician's views in various ways, but he was privy to just as many secrets as Gordiyevskiy and he did not sell them, he did not remain abroad, despite the hardship he had to suffer here, in his homeland. He defended his ideas loud and clear, without hiding behind anyone's back.

As for Gordiyevskiy, in my view, he is a criminal. He violated his oath, and he is no different in my eyes from the warehouse manager who sells off official property. Except that the warehouse manager is selling off clothes, whereas Gordiyevskiy sold out comrades and our assistants, many of whom, incidentally, were working for us for ideological reasons and were getting paid for it. The common feature was that they were both criminals and

deserve to be punished accordingly. Whatever way you look at it, the "ideological commitment" of Gordiyevsky and those like him is based on the money they are getting abroad. I could name another "fighter" against communism and "totalitarianism"—former Soviet intelligence employee Yuzhin, who also went over to the West. He was convicted and then pardoned. Not rehabilitated, but pardoned! Now he is continuing to "fight for the ideas of democracy"! Where? In Russia today?! Oh no, on the territory of the United States, receiving money from foreign institutions...

So I, as I believe, any unprejudiced person, take a very particular view of the aforementioned "fighters for democracy" and assess them accordingly.

[Shilin] Vyacheslav Ivanovich, in what way have working conditions changed for Russian intelligence agents abroad in the new world situation?

[Trubnikov] From the viewpoint of the tasks facing the intelligence service one might say that they have changed for the better in some ways. The wall of ideological confrontation between East and West has been surmounted and our policy has changed from dogmatic to pragmatic. This enables one to think not about how to do the opponent down, but about how to provide for one's own interests and concentrate on what is really important for Russia. Russia's new countenance is winning sympathy for its representatives abroad, and this helps us. But this sympathy is by no means invariably shared by the official authorities in certain countries which sometimes try to place Russian representatives in a position where they are being discriminated against. So, as before, the intelligence officer's job is a tough one.

[Shilin] Does your service have a problem with young cadres? Do you think the prestige of the intelligence service, whose image was shaped to a large extent by literature and the movies (books by V. Pikul and Yu. Semenov, the serial "Seventeen Moments in Spring," and so on), remains intact in our society?

[Trubnikov] The intelligence service's prestige in our society was created through the selfless labor of generations of intelligence officers. Literature and the movies have paid homage to the profession. Although I have to say that in recent years certain circles have been working rather hard to discredit the service and blame its staff for things that happened long before before most of them were born.

But the intelligence service is working on behalf and for the benefit of Russia and the profession of intelligence officer is even now attracting young people with a sense of patriotism, a hankering after knowledge, and a desire to taste the adventure that is part of intelligence work. A far from insignificant role is played by the stability that state service provides, the system of social protection and material provision for servicemen, which extends to intelligence officers. The main training establishment—

the Foreign Intelligence Academy—is not undersubscribed, but we are constantly looking for able youngsters. We expect quite a lot from our candidates. Only a few of the hundreds of people who get noticed by our cadre officers see actually become intelligence officers. Fortunately, there are plenty of talented specialists in Russia prepared to serve their Fatherland.

Economic Issues

Aide Warns West Against Sanctions

LD1301070195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0641
GMT 13 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 13 TASS—The economic aide of the Russian president warned the West against imposing any economic sanctions on Russia over Chechnya as this might trigger a wave of anti-Western moods in the country.

"Attempts to use economic sanctions as a means of pressure on Russia can boomerang against the West where hardly anyone would welcome a growth of chauvinism and nationalism among the Russians", Aleksandr Livshits told reporters.

The growth of anti-Western moods will surely be used by certain politicians and parties which "is fraught with an influence on the Russian policy in general", he added.

At the same time Livshits said that the West "clearly realises such a danger and therefore the talk about sanctions will, most evidently, remain just a talk".

Livshits also warned the International Monetary Fund against "making a serious mistake" and refusing to grant Russia the promised credits because of the Chechen developments. At the same time he said that he doubts such a possibility. "The IMF is a creditor which soberly assesses the situation and tries to determine whether the money would be returned back. Today, after the draft 1995 budget was approved under the first reading by the State Duma, all major conditions set by the IMF have been fulfilled. Experts of the IMF will not demand that Russia submits for their consideration all articles of the budget as it is important for them to know the key positions and not the details", the aide said.

"As the key positions have already been determined the international financial institutions have no grounds to postpone the credits promised to Russia. Moreover, they have been already included into the budget", Livshits said.

Chernomyrdin Meets Chechen Businessmen

LD1201205495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000
GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—The restoration of Chechnya's economy must

begin with stopping bloodshed on its territory, representatives of Chechnya's business circles told Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Moscow Thursday [12 January].

The head of the trading company Novaya Moskva, Boris Shantayev, told Interfax after the meeting that "Chechen businessmen promised to the Russian government to actively promote normalization of the republic's life using not only their own material resources, but also their ties with and influence upon their relatives in Chechnya."

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhrai told Interfax that the meeting "outlined priorities in the restoration of Chechnya's economy, in the first place oil wells, housing under construction, public services and infrastructure."

According to Shakhrai, "in the common opinion, restoring normal life in the first place implies creating a legitimate body of power and starting preparations for elections."

Shakhrai remarked that the meeting with Chernomyrdin was "attended by representatives of various views, who differently treat not only each other, but also the situation in the republic; however, they are united by the common aspiration to restore normal life in their historical homeland."

According to Shakhrai, "the echo of Chernomyrdin's meetings with representatives of different stratum of Chechen society will not be limited by the corridors of the Russian government." He hoped that "the meetings will lead to positive moves in Chechnya's political and economic life."

Shakhrai said Chernomyrdin will continue the series of consultations. "There will be many of such meetings," he added.

Livshits on Inflation, Chechnya

LD1201183795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1757 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—Rates of inflation in Russia will go down from February, President Boris Yeltsin's top economic aide said on Thursday, adding that the January slide of rouble has nothing to do with the Chechen crisis.

"The influence of the Chechen crisis on the situation in Russia's finance system shall not be exaggerated", Aleksandr Livshits told a news conference. According to him, rouble usually tends to go down in January, because enterprises stand idle during the extended Christmas and New Year holidays (unlike in the West, Russia celebrates Christmas on January 7—TASS). On the other hand, the increased demand for consumer goods results in a huge cash mass that pours to the dollar market.

Replying to reporters' query whether privatisation might be curtailed in Russia, Livshits resolutely excluded such possibility, adding at the same time that he "did not exclude flexible management of the state property".

Government Seen Content To Let Ruble Fall

MM1201175995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Chuprin: "Does Weaker Ruble Suit Central Bank of Russia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new year is seeing a repetition of the old October picture. There are waiting lines outside currency exchange centers. Buying a dollar in Moscow for 4,000 rubles [R] is considered a success, even though in official trading the "greenback" is R300 cheaper. Admittedly, the slight foreign-exchange panic is due to the fact that over the past few days the ruble has been falling 30-50 points a day against the dollar and stood at R3,734 against the U.S. unit in yesterday's trading. A repetition of the notorious "Black Tuesday" could be around the corner. Prices of consumer goods are creeping upward and steadily devaluing the ruble. Customers are dumbfounded at the cost of bakery, dairy, and meat products.

Of course, there are explanations for all this. People earned considerable sums in the form of bonuses and 13th-month payments at the end of the year. And they took their "surplus income" to exchange centers. Demand determines supply—and so we have seen the ruble falling to the point of collapse.

Certain politicians see the "hand" of the mass media in this new inflationary spiral. The media are allegedly painting a gloomy picture of the future because of the Chechnya events and are encouraging taxpayers to get their hands on some bucks.

I do not want to discuss these views. At any rate, it is clear that the assurances from the Finance and Economy Ministries about the rapid and inevitable stabilization of finances often remain in the sphere of illusion. In 1994 many people had predicted inflation of 3 percent a month and price growth of 40 percent over the year on average. What actually happened? The figures were 9 percent and a 220-percent rise in the cost of goods respectively. What else will happen?

State Duma Deputy Pavel Bunich, the well-known Russian economist, believes that the ruble's fall against the dollar is an entirely natural phenomenon and that it will continue for some years to come. In his opinion, there are three main reasons for this process.

The first is that the Russian Federation Government is unwilling to pay its domestic debt. And as soon as it "comes up with the money" under the pressure of circumstances with which we are acquainted, we see the dollar rising by 50-60 points a day. This situation will

continue for as long as the federal authorities take impulsive and irregular action in repaying their debts on the domestic market.

The second point relates to the Chechnya panic and the inflationary expectations bound up with it. Journalists have already calculated that a single shot fired by a tank costs society as much as a brand-new "Zhiguli." But these are just the first shoots—the "harvest" is yet to come, when we will have to restore the republic's industry. We will have to pay workers to build a plant that does not produce any output. We will have to pay soldiers to protect roads, and so on. The government will need additional finance that is not matched by the supply of available goods. This means that it will be safer to keep dollars rather than rubles under your mattress. Lack of confidence in the future is what is driving Russians to exchange centers; this is the reason why the waiting lines in Moscow are not diminishing.

Finally, Pavel Bunich claims, both the Council of Ministers and the Central Bank—paradoxically enough—benefit from a weaker national currency. For this reason the executive is making no effort to save the ruble. The "heavyweight" dollars being sold in trading are making it possible to rapidly and painlessly paper over the cracks in the federal budget.

It is an improbable fact that, the worse things get for the ruble, the better it is for our exports. As an example he quoted the economic "phenomenon" of Japan, where the yen has notably strengthened of late, and this fact has plunged Tokyo business circles into shock. The Land of the Rising Sun mainly exports its goods. And a strong, heavyweight national currency has tripped it up. The Japanese needed economic restructuring (what is currently happening in Russia!) so as to weaken the yen to a certain extent. And they need to learn how to make dual-use products.

In short, a further fall in the ruble plays into the authorities' hands (it boosts exports, immediately followed by imports) but it does not benefit the population. For those imports go up in price in the stores by the same amount as the ruble falls.

Nonetheless, Mr. Bunich says, we should not despair. According to his forecasts, consumer prices will increase by 100-200 percent in 1995. We would recall that in 1992 we went through a 20-fold increase. Pavel Bunich believes that we will get through 1995 as well—the estimates on which the budget is based envisage prices and incomes growing in parallel with one another.

Council on Estimate for Grozny Restoration

LD1201173795 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English 1716 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—The entering of federal troops in Chechnya cost 400 billion roubles whereas the restoration of Chechen capital Grozny will need an estimated 5 trillion roubles.

These figures were announced today during parliamentary hearings at the Federation Council (upper chamber of the Russian legislature).

Another 500 billion roubles will be needed to restore the republican power grid, *ITAR-TASS* has learnt in the "Energoseti Rossiya" company, the main electricity distributor in Russia.

As for the Chechen railroads' restoration, the Russian Railway Ministry estimates the expenses will be at the rate of 165-180 billion roubles. Deputy Minister Oleg Moshenko told TASS today that 77 kilometres of railway tracks have been already repaired in Chechnya which cost 50 billion roubles.

Ministry Presents Revised Draft Budget Figures

LD1201170995 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service* in Russian 1046 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By unidentified *BIZNESS* correspondent for TASS]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Jan—The Ministry of Finance, on the instructions of the Russian Government, today presented a revised version of the draft budget for 1995 to the State Duma. However, it still gives no indication of the expenditure connected with the military operations in Chechnya. The main parameters of the draft federal budget for 1995, though, have been clarified: Income will be R [rubles] 160.3 trillion; expenditure—231.9 trillion.

The revision of these figures has been caused mainly by a change in the structure of the gross domestic product, an increase in the predicted payment-of-wages fund [up to R28.4 trillion], an increase from 1 March 1995 in the minimum wage scale [up to R34.4 billion a month] and amendments to the calculated rate of exchange against the U.S. dollar and other individual clauses of tax legislation.

It is anticipated that the 1995 federal budget deficit will be covered by domestic and external financing, with the maximum rate of foreign borrowing in 1995 amounting to \$12.3 billion or \$40 million less than the volume previously planned by the Russian Government.

Yeltsin Signs Debt Edict

MM1201150395 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA* in Russian 11 Jan 95 First Edition p 5

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 2218 "On Rescheduling the Debts of Enterprises and Organizations of the Agro-Industrial Complex Relating to Centralized Credits Issued in 1993-1994," dated 29 December 1994 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin: "Promissory Notes for the Repayment of Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the purpose of stabilizing the financial status of enterprises and organizations of the agro-industrial complex, I decree:

1. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation are to reschedule in December 1994 the debts of agricultural commodity producers in all forms of ownership which do not have sources for repaying them, as well as of enterprises and organizations for the primary processing of flax and wool, for the repair of land improvement systems and agricultural equipment, and for material and technical supplies to enterprises of the agro-industrial complex, rural construction enterprises and organizations carrying out the construction of projects in the agro-industrial complex, and consumer cooperative retail trade enterprises in rural localities, relating to centralized credits granted in 1993-1994 and due for repayment in the current year in the sum of up to 5.6 trillion rubles [R] owed by the said enterprises and organizations to the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance by agreement with them and with appropriate guarantees by the components of the Russian Federation, with repayment to begin in 1995 in equal installments over 10 years and on payment of 10-percent annual interest.

The said arrears relate to the Russian Federation's internal state debt within the framework of its upper limit set by the Federal Law "On the Federal Budget for 1994" by means of the Russian Federation Finance Ministry's issuing of promissory notes to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation with repayment terms in equal installments over 10 years and on payment of 10-percent annual interest.

2. Enterprises and organizations which have rescheduled their debts in accordance with Point 1 of this edict are to implement measures to find sources for the timely repayment of debts to the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the payment of interest on these debts.

3. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance is to channel funds in the sum of R3 trillion out of the appropriations provided for in the federal budget for 1994 for state investments in the agro-industrial complex (including on a returnable basis), as well as the formation of a leasing fund for the sale of agricultural equipment and a federal fund of financial support for the most important national economic sectors, into repaying the interest accrued in 1994 on centralized credits granted in 1993-1994 to agricultural commodity producers in all forms of ownership, including fur, beekeeping, fish, peasant (private), and experimental training farms.

4. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation is to be entrusted with deferring until 1 October 1995 the payment of the accrued interest on centralized credits granted in 1993-1994 to agricultural commodity producers in all forms of ownership, including fur, beekeeping, fish, peasant (private), and experimental training farms, in respect of which an earlier deferment of the payment of interest was granted by Russian Federation Government decrees.

Commercial banks are to be recommended to ensure the recovery of deferred interest on credits within the times laid down in this edict.

5. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance and the Russian Federation State Tax Service are to ensure control over the timely and full payment of interest on arrears to the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance by agricultural commodity producers in all forms of ownership, including fur, beekeeping, fish, peasant (private), and experimental training farms, whose financial position allows them to pay over 50 percent of the amount of interest accrued in 1994 before 1 October 1995.

In the event of the late channeling of their own funds by agricultural commodity producers in all forms of ownership, including fur, beekeeping, fish, peasant (private), and experimental training farms, into the repayment of interest on centralized credits, the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance is to reduce the amounts of current funding to the said enterprises and organizations out of the federal budget in 1995. The said reduction is not made in respect of peasant (private) farms or the economic societies and companies formed as a result of the reorganization of kolkhozes and sovkhoses, whose members have in the prescribed manner been granted rights, as of 1 October 1995, to the property and land shares belonging to them in the property of reorganized agricultural enterprises.

6. This edict comes into force the day it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

[Dated] 29 December 1994

Yeltsin Appeals Over Bank Appointment

LD1201201295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1706 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Jan ITAR-TASS—An announcement from the Russian president's press service reached ITAR-TASS today. It says:

"B.N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, has sent a message to the deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly and to I.P. Rybkin, chairman of the State Duma. The text of the message is given below.

"The existing gaps in the legislation (e.g. the lack of a law on the appointment of the highest officials), and also the continuing period of the change in the validity of various legal norms, which began after 12 December 1994, have again led to contradictions that are, in my opinion, being excessively dramatized and politicized. That is precisely what has happened with the question of the appointment of a chairman of the Central Bank.

"Taking account of the position of the 203 deputies who voted on 23 November 1994 for the question of the release of V.V. Gerashchenko from the post of chairman of the Central Bank to be included in the agenda for a

plenary session of the State Duma, and respecting the place and role of the State Duma within the system of the organs of state power, I ask you to agree to the release of V.V. Gerashchenko from the post of chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

"Since the question of the chairman of the Central Bank brooks no delay, I ask you to reconsider the question of the appointment of T.V. Paramonova to the post of chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. [Signed] B. Yeltsin"

Panskov on Budget Concerns, Chechnya

*MM1201120395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Jan 95 p 2*

[Account by Ivan Zhagel of conversation with Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov; date, place not given: "The Chechen Factor Could Bury the Present Budget Concept. That Conclusion Emerges from Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov's Conversation With IZVESTIYA Observer Ivan Zhagel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As previously planned, the Russian Finance Ministry sent the 1995 budget as reworked with the conciliation commission to the State Duma before 10 January. We asked Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov what kind of document this is.

According to the minister the basic concept and parameters of the budget have not changed. The additional work done on it was mainly aimed at making the revenue section more realistic, in other words, increasing it from noninflationary sources. To that end the concept of taxes and other payments relating to foreign economic activity have been revised or, to be more precise, all concessions on export-import operations have been abolished, as many State Duma factions wanted.

For example, concessions to individual organizations for the duty-free import of goods into Russia have been abolished and the rates of import duty themselves have been raised from 5.6 percent to 7.5 percent. At the same time, export duty rates on oil, for example, have been increased. All of this is designed to boost budget receipts.

To some extent the chaos over the national currency exchange rate in the fall helped the Finance Ministry make the budget more realistic. In any event, whereas the first version of this document was based on an exchange rate of 3,200 rubles [R] to the dollar, on 1 January the working figure was R3,500 to the dollar while the average exchange rate figure projected for the year is R4,500. In principle this increases not only revenue but expenditure too, although foreign borrowings on the same scale will plug a large budget deficit gap, so to speak.

Foreign borrowing at the previously presumed figure of \$12.7 billion will now cover a budget deficit of more than R40 trillion. But the proportion of domestic borrowing to cover the deficit is reduced to R30 trillion. As

before, it is planned that this money will be obtained from the issue of state short-term bonds and treasury bills. At the moment, inflationary means of covering the budget deficit, Central Bank credits, for instance, are in theory rejected.

Incidentally, according to the Finance Ministry's estimates the budget deficit should fall by R430 billion to around R71 trillion or 7.7 percent instead of the previous 7.8 percent.

Among the other significant measures for boosting the federal budget Panskov mentioned certain changes in the distribution of taxes. In particular, whereas in 1994 personal income tax went almost entirely into the local budgets, 10 percent of it will now go into the federal budget.

Presumably, this decision will not be greeted with special enthusiasm by the Federation Council, and this measure could even cause the budget to be rejected at this level. On the other hand, however, it is hard not to notice the government's desire for compromise with the State Duma, as shown in the abolition of many concessions on export and import operations, which was a source of considerable income for certain individuals.

There could also be problems with the ratification of the budget, as Panskov said, because the document which has been sent to the Duma makes absolutely no mention of the additional cost of restoring the Chechen economy. Especially since, according to the minister, State Duma Budget Committee Chairman M. Zadornov has sent a letter to the Finance Ministry asking for a breakdown of these costs.

However, Panskov believes, the cost of rebuilding the Chechen economy should not lead to an increase in the budget deficit and these measures should be implemented from existing budget items. For example, the cost of restoring Chechen railroads is to be borne by a proportion of the funds allocated to the Railways Ministry in the 1995 budget. The same goes for agriculture, too. Finally, the military's costs in disarming the illegal armed formations are also to be met from the Defense Ministry's resources.

On the other hand, Panskov acknowledged that last year the Defense Ministry received only 69 percent of the planned resources. Thus the ministry is hardly going to agree to shoulder the cost of the military operations itself. Other lobby groups in parliament will probably also protest against such a principle, and the problem of the Chechen costs could be an insurmountable barrier to budget ratification. Especially since substantial sums will have to be found.

For example, in the words of the finance minister, R430 billion were spent on military operations in December alone and another R50 billion have already been allocated in January. The Finance Ministry has also made preliminary assessments of the expenditure which may

be needed to restore the Chechen economy—around R4 trillion. However, Panskov believes that if this money is sought from additional taxation or by increasing the budget deficit, the concept of the present budget—which has been approved on first reading by the parliamentarians themselves—can probably then be ditched altogether.

Military & Nuclear Issues

Officials Make No Decision on Army Reform

LD1201180195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1617 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] No decisions on military reform or the armed forces' chief of staff were discussed or adopted during a meeting of top four officials in Moscow yesterday, Presidential Spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov said on Thursday [12 January].

The denial comes in response to a statement from Speaker of the Federation Council (the upper house of parliament) Vladimir Shumeiko (who took part in yesterday's meeting that agreement was reached to bring the armed forces' chief of staff under direct control by the president as supreme commander-in-chief. [no closing parentheses as received] He said the chief of staff would be authorized to carry out army reform while the defence ministry be responsible for the forces' combat capability.

However, the spokesman made it clear that the chief of staff issue was raised as part of an exchange on Yeltsin's own instruction of several months ago to the Prime Minister and Secretary of the National Security to flesh out the guidelines of the army reform.

For his part, Presidential Aide for Political Issues Georgiy Satarov who also attended the meeting told Interfax that issue was discussed only as one of the possible options for army reform with Yeltsin issuing an instruction to work on this.

He also said the question cropped up as part of the overall situation in the country and general discontent over the government's ill performance. Satarov said the question is one of political decision making and implementation of it including that on the armed forces.

"The question is not one of hasty decisions. The president and others involved in the meeting stressed that experts must be invited to work on the problem," he said.

A senior defence ministry official speaking on condition of anonymity described as unrealistic the idea of weaning away the chief of staff from the ministry. He said that any reorganization of this kind could be carried out under entirely different economic conditions.

The official said that cash-strapped as the army is now, the separation of functions of the defence ministry and chief of staff would require considerable spending, something that is very hard to implement unless the country's budget is reviewed.

For his part, Head of the General Chief of Staff General-Colonel Mikhail Kolesnikov described the proposal as a perfect surprise. In an interview with Interfax, Kolesnikov said that no one had ever discussed the issue with him.

On his department's new functions, the general warned against any hasty decisions saying that the Security Council must set up an independent commission to examine the question and come up with "optimal results."

Nonetheless, he thinks that with the country's march on the road of democracy, the general chief of staff must be given higher role in solving national security problems. Kolesnikov believes that the head of the general chief of staff must sit on the security council and relations between it and the top leadership must be reviewed.

Kolesnikov spoke of having good rapport with the president as supreme commander-in-chief but such contacts must be envisaged in the department's new functions. He said that many officers and generals of the staff were first class experts.

Chief Commander of Russian Land Forces General-Colonel Vladimir Semyonov has called for delineation of functions between the defence ministry and the general chief of staff whose status must be higher than it is now.

In his view, the department must coordinate actions by all power ministries in national security matters. "Its main task is Russia's combat readiness for a possible war," Semyonov said.

He thinks the general chief of staff must be under president's personal control and its head sit on the security council. More importantly, the general chief of staff must be in charge of the armed forces.

Semyonov believes the defence ministry's should comprise defence policy issues, defence budget and arms procurement, and initiating bills on army reform in parliament.

He thinks the army reform must be carried out by the parliament and government with the Russian president in charge.

The idea of army reform is widely seen as Yeltsin's reaction to Defence Minister Pavel Grachev's failure to implement his political guidelines linked to the military operations in Chechnya.

Head of the State Duma's Defence Committee Sergey Yushenkov is supportive of plans for army reform with the general chief of staff taking control of the armed forces. Speaking on Thursday, Yushenkov said that as

many other democrats, he was convinced that civilian experts must be in charge of the defence ministry, though the general chief of staff be subordinated both to the president and the defence ministry.

At the same time, Yushenkov expressed concern that plans to bring the armed forces under the general chief of staff were being caused by one-off rather than longer range considerations. He thinks there are two main reasons to explain this: one is the administration's decision to protect the army from Grachev's incompetence which is only too welcome; and the other to try to save the defence minister who can be put on trial for incompetent management of military operations in Chechnya.

Nuclear Plants Seen To Have 'Two Trends'

MK1201154995 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
12 Jan 95 p 9

[Report by Veronika Romanenkova under the "Atom" rubric: "Our Nuclear Power Plants' Increased Safety Is a Very Relative Value. Particularly Given the Growing Number of Problems Facing Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Analysis of Russian nuclear power plants' operation last year has revealed two trends—one toward increasing their safety and the other toward the forced reduction of their power units' capacity. These two trends may be interrelated, but still the former is being ascribed to nuclear power operators' efforts, while the latter is being blamed on bureaucrats.

In 1994, there were 127 accidents at Russian nuclear power plants, or 32 fewer compared to 1993. Professionals prefer to talk about 13 accidents, however—precisely this number of emergencies "fits in" with the international 7-point scale classifying irregularities at nuclear power plants (there were 30 such accidents in 1993), while the rest can be ranked at zero level. Only one of the 13 accidents was given two points, the rest being classified as one-point emergencies. A total of 26 accidents caused a blackout of power units, and 11 set off emergency protection systems.

At the same time, nuclear power plants' authorized capacity ratio dropped to 52.6 percent, while electricity production in 1994 fell 15 percent against 1993. Your *SEGODNYA* correspondent was told at the Rosenergoatom concern that this is attributable first of all to the plants' forced operation below capacity. The point is that the "Russian Single Electric Power Grid" state joint-stock company, being the monopolistic middleman between electricity producers and consumers, has set single tariffs for electric power generated by different sources. Nuclear power plant operators think that they have thus been put at a disadvantage—in fact their electricity is cheaper. Naturally, during the current production slump consumers cut down on their energy appetites, while, just as naturally, paying no attention to the commodity's origin. Being unable to resort to

dumping, nuclear power plants would prefer a different manifestation of state diktat: the closure of old fuel oil and coal power plants.

Money received by the nuclear power plants from consumers accounted for barely 30 percent of the commodities' overall cost. Of this, half the money went on paying taxes right away, while the other half was scarcely enough to pay wages to employees. So nuclear power plants are relying on trade in kind with many subcontractors: electricity in exchange for fuel, parts, equipment.

As for the industry's direct state financing, although many a government meeting on the subject was convened last year, 1994 never saw the wished-for solution to the problem.

What is more, 1994 has shown that to all appearances the concept of the development of the nuclear power industry in Russia, which calls for the replacement of old power units and construction of new ones over the next 20 years, will not be implemented, at least on schedule.

For instance, this document calls for one power unit (VVER-1000) to be put in operation at the Kalinin power plant in 1995. Given the current economic conditions, however, this event is receding into an uncertain period in the future.

Soskovets Addresses Ceremony for TU-204

LD1201145995 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English 1322
GMT 12 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondents Oleg Velichko and Yevgeniy Nikitin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—A new type aircraft developed and built by the Aviasar Stock Company in Russia testifies to partial stabilisation of the industry and development of production links between domestic enterprises, according to Russia's First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets.

The vice-premier was speaking at a ceremony of presenting the flight certificate for the medium-range airliner TU-204.

The general director of the Tupolev Research and Production Association, Valentin Klimov, told TASS today that the TU-204 made its maiden flight on January 2, 1989 and has since performed more than 400 flights to practically all regions of the country, including its northernmost and southernmost parts.

Specialists report that it landed and took off from more than 30 airfields in Russia and other Commonwealth countries. It performed smoothly every time and required no additional land equipment for either landing or take-off.

The airliner's chief designer Lev Lanovskiy stressed that special efforts had been made to make the plane safe,

economical and easy to service and maintain. When the question was raised about selecting an aircraft for the president of Russia, experts were unanimous in proposing the TU-204. Two airliners have already been built for the purpose. The Ulyanovsk-based Aviastar Stock Company has received orders to build three more airplanes for the president's command post as the supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces.

The TU-204 with its western avionics and Rolls-Royce engines is expected to be competitive on the world market where it will vie for customers with the Boeing and the Airbus-Industrie. Lev Lanovskiy said that the TU-204's performance characteristics are better than those of the Boeing-757 and are quite close to those of the west-European A-320.

Market research in the Commonwealth of Independent States has revealed that there is demand for at least 400 TU-204's before the year 2000. Flight crews from St. Petersburg, Moscow's Vnukovo Airlines and the former government air squad, now known as the Russia Air Company, are already getting ready to fly the TU-204.

Visitors to the world's major air shows have seen the TU-204 in flight. The airliner has been to China, India and other southeast Asian countries.

The first regular passenger flights of the new Russian airliner are due to begin in summer.

Federal Assembly

Duma Official: Chechen Operation Will Cost R5 Trillion

LD1201125495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1228 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—Military operations in Chechnya will cost at least five trillion rubles (some 1.2 billion US dollars), an influential Russian lawmaker said on Thursday, qualifying the specified budget submitted to the State Duma by the Finance Ministry with no expenses on Chechnya as "nonsense".

Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the State Duma committee for budget, taxes, banks and finances told his committee that "the draft 1995 budget will be nonsense if expenses for military operations in Chechnya are not reflected in it".

"If the government quickly calculates such expenses, the draft budget will be submitted for State Duma approval under the second reading already on January 20", he stressed.

Zadornov also said that he had sent a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin asking to include Chechen expenses into the specified draft budget. "The government has to explain how it is going to cover the

expenses—either by reducing budget expenditures or by new sources of revenues", he said.

However, TASS learned that the Finance Ministry had submitted to the State Duma on Thursday the specified budget which mentions no Chechen expenses and, moreover, has a slightly decreased budget deficit compared to the draft submitted in October.

The revenues are envisaged at 160.3 trillion rubles and the expenditures at 231.9 trillion. The October figures were 144.3 and 216.3 trillion. Thus the budget deficit decreases by 500 billion rubles from 72.1 to 71.6 trillion.

The ministry said the specifications were caused by changes in the structure of the gross domestic product, a predicted increase of the wage fund up to 28.4 trillion rubles and the increase of the minimum salary up to 34.4 thousand rubles a month from March 1, as well as by changes in the rouble-dollar exchange rate.

The specified budget decreased by 40 million US dollars the amount of allowed foreign borrowings. The 1995 figure is now fixed at 12.3 billion dollars.

Duma Deputies Protest Marines' Dispatch to Chechnya

LD1201102495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1002 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Eduard Popov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vladivostok January 12 TASS—Duma deputies today protested against "throwing more cannon fodder" to Chechnya. "The Chechen conflict must be solved by peaceful means. There are too many troops there already," Yabloko faction member Mikhail Golubkovskiy told TASS.

He, among others, was protesting against the airlift of a Pacific Fleet marine regiment to Chechnya.

The decision to airlift Pacific Fleet marines to the secessionist republic in the Northern Caucasus was made by the Pacific Fleet Command in pursuance of a directive received from Russia's general staff, even though the press service of the Pacific Fleet earlier, on January 6, cited the fleet commander, Admiral Igor Khmelnov, as categorically rejecting the possibility of any airlift of his marines to the conflict zone.

The Pacific marines are due to arrive first in Mozdok, North Ossetia for further deployment in the conflict zone. They follow the arrival of units of marines from the North and Baltic fleets. All of them are due "to take part in disarming unlawfully armed formations in Chechnya".

Deputy: General Staff Can Report to Yeltsin After Reform

LD1201203895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1943 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—The Army's General Headquarters [GHQ] can report directly to the supreme commander-in-chief, but under certain conditions and this problem should be thoroughly analyzed, said a member of the Russian parliament committee in charge of defence, commenting upon an idea of the headquarters' subordination to the president. The idea was voiced at Wednesday's meeting of President Boris Yeltsin with the prime-minister and Russian parliament speakers.

Before 1917, Russia's general headquarters were subordinate to the head of state. But it would be impossible to introduce the scheme at once by a presidential decree as this will bring tremendous deformations in the army, Colonel-General Yuriy Rodionov said.

In Rodionov's opinion, Russia needs not to reform, but to create her Armed Forces which would correspond to a new geopolitical situation after the USSR collapse. Then it will become possible to solve problems related to the headquarters subordination, the general said.

Gaydar: Russia's Choice 'Will Collaborate' With Communists

MM1201105195 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Boris Slavin: "Democrats and Communists Alike Figure Among the Pacifists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The question of the situation in Chechnya was heard at the State Duma session Wednesday [11 January]. Russia's Choice representatives Shabad, Sheynis, Yakunin, and others spoke during the discussion. They demanded an immediate cessation of military operations in Chechnya and called for those responsible for the conflict to be punished. Gleb Yakunin angrily described the president as a "traitor of democracy." Deputies commented that it is mainly innocent civilians, old people, children, and women who are dying in this war. Sixty children had died in just the last few days.

During the recess I approached Sergey Shakhrai and asked him to talk about the future development of the situation in Chechnya. He said that he saw no solution other than for Dudayev's followers to lay down their arms and the Russian Army to remain in Chechnya, as was the case up to the fall of 1991. Regarding Dudayev's fate, he said that he had heard nothing about him for a whole week now. Asked whether he thought Dudayev would fight to the end, Shakhrai replied: "Dudayev has few military options, therefore he will exploit conflicts within the Russian authorities."

Yegor Gaydar, during my conversation with him, described the situation in Chechnya as a "blow to democracy." In his opinion, people want to live in peace, and the authorities have to offer that opportunity to all Russians. Asked whether Russia's Choice would form a bloc with the Communists on the Chechen question, he

replied: "We won't form a bloc, but we will collaborate. We already did that in the delegation to Grozny: Both democrats and Communists were there."

Representatives of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] held a press conference during the recess. Gennadiy Zyuganov deems it essential to hold a joint session of the State Duma and Federation Council and to invite representatives of executive power and the power structures to it. In the CPRF leader's opinion, the radical democrats' desire to resolve the problem of Chechnya on the basis of a confederation would signify Russia's definitive collapse. Regarding the conflicts among the democrats, Zyuganov wished them "bon appetit" in their devouring of one another.

Discussion continued in the Duma after lunch. Communist Leonid Petrovskiy proposed a moratorium on military operations in Chechnya. He considers that a commission must be set up to identify those responsible for the war. These proposals were supported by Ella Pamfilova. Sergey Baburin, who spoke after them, described the deputies' pro-peace actions as a pseudopacifist stance detrimental to Russia's integrity. He considers that an anti-Russian power struggle among various political clans is under way in Chechnya.

Report Sums Up State Duma's 11 Jan Debate on Chechnya

MM1201102195 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Nikolay Dorofeyev and Nikolay Kishkin: "Will Peace Come to Chechnya?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the State Duma convened for its spring session two days earlier than scheduled in order to intervene in the course of the Chechen crisis. This happened on the initiative of the "Russia's Choice" faction and a number of deputies. The draft laws proposed by members of "Russia's Choice" included the following: laws on amendments to the Constitution (stepping up the parliament's supervisory functions); on amendments to the Law On Defense; on banning combat operations on Federation territory; on the procedure for publishing lists of servicemen killed, captured, and injured; and on changes to the funding of state expenditure for the first quarter [of 1995] (the reference being to control over military spending). Most of these questions, apart from the constitutional amendments, were ultimately included on the agenda although the version proposed by "Russia's Choice" was rejected.

We have already gotten accustomed to the process of adopting an agenda becoming slanging matches during which deputies uselessly waste time and propose more and more questions which are immediately rejected. The only point on which it proved possible to reach unanimous agreement yesterday was the idea of examining the question of setting up a commission to investigate the legal violations committed during events in Chechnya.

Only by midday did deputies embark on the matter for which they had assembled. And although an hour earlier there was no support for V. Zhirinovskiy's suggestion that no laws should be adopted but a general political debate should be held on Chechnya, that is in actual fact what happened. There was by and large a stormy rally, extremely far removed from any constructive decisions as to a solution to the crisis.

Some people called for the bloodshed to be stopped by any means and for political solutions to be sought and condemned the strong-arm operations which are bringing about the death of soldiers and civilians, including those who took up weapons after the troops were brought in without even supporting Dudayev.

Others for some reason viewed the press criticism of the hopeless actions taken by those preparing the operation and our generals as "censure of the Army" and virtually as support for Dudayev's illegal regime and the legal anarchy that has long reigned in the Republic. Federation Council Deputy Chairman A. Dolgolaptev, without lengthy reflection, said that the "mass media have moved into opposition to the state's foundations" and "have created an image of the Army as a collective monster"—at the same time, admittedly, acknowledging that "there are indeed flagrant cases of human rights violations" in the conflict zone. But the Army is still operating in a fitting manner in the conditions in which it has been placed....

As always A. Nevzorov was blunt and suggested putting an end to the talk of humanism and human rights and condemning the activity of S. Kovalev and the other deputies in Grozny, who (and he called them "blathering peacemakers") are providing inspiration for Dudayev's bandits. He thinks it necessary to organize a kind of information blockade on events in Chechnya to enable the Army to calmly do its job.

Specific proposals pertaining to the settlement of the situation had difficulty getting a hearing. There is no one here who defends Dudayev's regime, V. Sheynis said, but that does not mean that war alone is the way to normalize the situation. The question of Chechnya's status can only be resolved in peaceful conditions and they must be provided via talks with those who really control particular territories without any preliminary conditions. The main point is to achieve a cease-fire and to do everything to save people's lives.

The following question was also raised: How can a normal legitimate authority be recreated in Chechnya? Can a government perceived by citizens as backed by Russian tanks be such an authority? It was suggested that the constitutionally elected Supreme Council dissolved by Dudayev be restored. It alone will be able to hold elections whose legality will be in no doubt, V. Lysenko believes.

But all that is a thing of the future. Today everyone is waiting for an answer to the main question: Will people

continue to die in Chechnya or will the authorities find sensible solutions? When we left, the Duma deputies had still not provided any clear answer to this.

Regional Affairs

Premier's Enhanced Role in Chechen Crisis Viewed

MK1301095695 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Dmitriy Kamyshev under the "Situation in Chechnya" rubric: "Premier Decided To Raise His Profile"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Russian leadership have said that political methods for solving the Chechen conflict are coming to the fore. This has not yet affected the situation in the republic, however: Yesterday [12 January] columns of Russian troops and armor moved on Grozny, while fighting continued to rage in the city. Yet some analysts interpret the fact that Viktor Chernomyrdin himself is now involved with the problems of a settlement in Chechnya as a sign of upcoming changes in Moscow's Chechen policy.

A number of meetings and conferences attended by Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin, which have been held over the past few days, have infused optimism into some presidential advisers. According to Mark Urnov, chief of the presidential administration's analytical center, the latest steps of the Russian leadership confirm the shifting of emphasis onto political methods of resolving the Chechen crisis, something which presidential analysts have long called for. Mr. Urnov believes that this positive shift is largely attributable to the fact that the solution of problems relating to a Chechen settlement has now been entrusted personally to the prime minister.

Even if the presidential adviser's hopes prove to be somewhat premature, his mentioning of Viktor Chernomyrdin as the initiator of Moscow's new Chechen policy is quite significant. From the outset of the military action the prime minister has kept a low profile: Ministries' activity in Chechnya was coordinated by his first deputy, Oleg Soskovets, while Nationalities Minister Nikolay Yegorov was directly in charge of the operation on the ground. In case of success the head of government would have shared the laurels with the ministers. Yet yesterday Oleg Soskovets was swift to distance himself from a number of actions that had been ascribed to him; in particular, he denied a report, carried by some mass media, about his involvement in the Grozny assault on the night of 1 January (following which he allegedly was actually removed from Chechen affairs). He also denied reports that he was supervising the power ministries.

Be that as it may, now that all efforts of the power ministries, whoever really is supervising them, proved to be ineffective, Chernomyrdin has moved to take the process of Chechen settlement into his own hands and to

rectify the mistakes made by his slovenly subordinates. His choice of the role of peacemaker in this situation is undoubtedly a winning move. If his tactics bring about even the slightest changes for the better in Chechnya, this would seem to be a clear success against the backdrop of endless debacles. But the most important thing for the premier is that this success would be noticed not only by politicians and journalists, but also by ordinary voters.

There are nowadays more than enough people laying claim to the role of peacemakers, though: This has also been demonstrated by a host of programs for settling the Chechen crisis offered by many political leaders and by the daily deliberations at the State Duma and the Federation Council. Neither faction leaders nor even the speakers of the Federal Assembly chambers have the premier's capabilities, however, so they cannot stop the war. Only two men—Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin—can play the "Chechen card" to the end.

Incidentally, the power structures are still controlled by the president, without whose consent the military operation in Chechnya will not be halted. But the prime minister's peacemaking effort may prove to be useful even for Boris Yeltsin, who has found himself in a situation where the recognition of defeat would cost him whatever scraps of authority he may still have, while a war to the victorious end would entail further casualties. Viktor Chernomyrdin's entry into the game could help the president avoid such a painful choice.

Shakhray Proposes Settlement, Defends Own Role

MK1201092695 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Boris Sherman under the "Intentions" rubric: "Sergey Shakhray Suggests Reliance on a 'People's Chamber' of Chechnya. New Generation of Chechen Leaders Is To Be Nurtured as Talks Progress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] Duma faction officially introduced in parliament a draft federal law "On Measures for a Political Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic." The document calls for the creation of a special conciliation commission under the Russian Federation president to settle the crisis in the Chechen Republic. The commission would be formed "from among leaders of the legislative and executive branches of the Russian Federation and plenipotentiary representatives of public movements," and be headed by the country's prime minister. According to the drafters' idea, the commission is supposed to "hammer out proposals on interaction between federal organs of state power and Chechen Republic organs of power for the period until elections are held in Chechnya." This body could define "principles for forming a People's (Public) Chamber of the Chechen Republic" which could represent the republic's population in further talks with Moscow on all outstanding issues and become a power body [subyekt

vlasti] on the Chechen Republic's territory during a transition period, directly following the cessation of active combat actions.

Commenting on the draft law, Sergey Shakhray, leader of the PRES faction, conceded in the course of his news conference that the draft has an extremely slim chance of being passed by the Duma as it stands. It is, however, almost inevitable that sooner or later parliament will agree with the general concept of "shifting the conflict from the military path onto a peaceful path" suggested by the vice premier and his faction associates.

Mr. Shakhray thinks that the most valuable idea is the suggestion to create a "People's Chamber of the Chechen Republic," which would naturally be composed of authoritative representatives of individual rayons and localities of Chechnya, heads of clans, religious figures, elders, and so on. Mr. Shakhray thinks that it would take two months to set up such a body. He is convinced that such a chamber could serve as a partner for federal authorities in talks to settle the conflict, since it would be influential and worthy of the Chechen people's trust. It is only in the course such talks, to Sergey Shakhray's mind, that a new generation of leaders and plenipotentiary representatives of the Chechen people can emerge and gain political experience. "Politicians who have been alternately warring among themselves and against the federal authorities for the last three years will be unable to end the crisis," he claims. He thinks that it is "all the more hopeless" to try to reach agreement with General Dudayev who, according to the vice premier's count, "was asked on at least 11 occasions, in the course of these three years, to elaborate principles of delimitation of powers" with Moscow.

Sergey Shakhray dismissed repeated accusations that he was the "author" of the Chechen crisis, which were heard during yesterday's discussion in the Duma. He asked those deputies, who claimed that all the extra-budgetary funds intended to pay pensions and benefits to inhabitants of the Chechen Republic were turned over to forces opposing Dudayev, to back up their suspicions with documents. "I do not feel ashamed of a single decision made with my participation," the vice premier stated.

Elite Troops Moved Into Chechnya

LD1201114695 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1052 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] According to INTERFAX, part of the detached special operations division [otdelnoy divizii operativnogo naznacheniya, ODON], formerly the Dzhherzhinskiy division, has been sent to Chechnya to replace units of the North Caucasus district internal troops who have been in the conflict zone for about two months.

Observers note that prior to this, elite marine units from the Northern, Pacific, and Baltic fleets were sent to Chechnya. Experts believe this may indicate reinforcement of the group of federal troops on the eve of the decisive phase of the operation in Grozny.

Earlier the Vityaz unit was sent from the ODon to Chechnya. The unit has great experience in combat operations in hot spots. The Dzhherzhinskiy division is considered to be the most combat capable and mobile unit of the Russian armed forces, alongside the elite special purpose airborne troops and the marines.

Moscow Seeking North Caucasian Leaders' Loyalty

МК1201115495 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "North Caucasus Has Been Offered Financing in Exchange for Loyalty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federation Council Chairman Shumeyko yesterday accompanied the chief executives of North Caucasian regions to a meeting with Premier Chernomyrdin. As President Aushev of Ingushetia told journalists, they discussed "economic and financial problems of Federation subjects in connection with the events in Chechnya." According to him, the premier offered them "priority financing of their needs" in exchange for their loyal support for the federal authorities' actions in Chechnya. The chief executives of Dagestan, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and other North Caucasian regions were invited to present to the government, by 20 January, a list of costs sustained and expected in connection with the Chechen operation.

Nevzorov's 'Hell' Program on Chechnya Aired

LD1201212395

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1840 GMT on 11 January broadcast a 15-minute program entitled "Hell" introduced by correspondent Aleksandr Nevzorov from Chechnya.

The report begins with Nevzorov, off camera, talking to a Russian soldier on the battlefield who says he is from the 16th Unit. "From our point of view the war is just and right," the soldier says. Another soldier says: "What is the use of these soldiers—I have a sniper who is minus 5.5 shortsighted and he is deaf too, he cannot hear a mine blowing up three meters away. He has been recruited as a sniper, in the ranks. The subunit was formed three days ago and sent here. They do not know whom to fight, do not know anything about fighting in towns."

The video shows ruined buildings and soldiers in the middle of the fighting with background solemn music and Nevzorov's voice-over: "Here, in Hospital Street in the center of Grozny, where General Rokhlin's 'Sever'

army group is fighting on the approaches to Dudayev's palace, nobody gets in the way, thank God. No chattering deputies, no correspondents and other rogues who have never seen a front line, but keep jabbering on, nonstop, about the Chechen war."

The video then shows wounded soldiers carried on stretchers. Young soldiers say they are willing to fight, and that many of them have even requested they be sent here.

In a basement of a local hospital, headquarters of General Rokhlin's 'Sever' army group, Nevzorov is shown talking to a group of commanders over a map. The general says he reckons there are about 4,000 Chechen defenders at the presidential palace. Nevzorov speaks with admiration about the general.

The video then shows Russian soldiers' bodies on the ground, many with horrific injuries. The wounded are being picked up and carried away under continuous fire.

Speaking to General Rokhlin, Nevzorov suggests that the Chechen forces cannot any longer be qualified as bandit formations, they are, in actual fact, a proper army. Bandit formations do not have heavy artillery. The General agrees: "This is one aspect. Another is that it is a mercenary army."

Showing the faces of very young soldiers, Nevzorov says: "Indeed, the bandits have a well-trained, well-equipped army. But the Great Russia has boys. True, these boys are magnificent."

Over a shot of a mature soldier, named Kostya, Nevzorov muses: "Of course, there are pitifully few of these true 'dogs of war' in Great Russia, the 'dogs' so badly needed at this point in time, the 'dogs of war' who know how to kill and how to die. Here, at the front line, there are fewer than 100 of them. And what do we expect when we have such an indecently small army, the shrunk, eaten away, impoverished, and with no rights? It is indecently small for such a colossal country as Russia. This army has barely enough strength to guard its facilities."

A young soldier is shown saying he is prepared to die for this land, he is a Cossack, his ancestors built this city and he is proud to defend it. Nevzorov ends the report by saying: "Here, in this hell, amid this fire and blood, Russia's character and its greatness that always thundered across the world, down to the inferno and up among the angels in heaven is being born again."

Prokhanov Assesses Chechnya Crisis

954F0887A Nalchik SEVERNYI KAVKAZ in Russia 7 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Aleksandr Prokhanov, ZAVTRA editor in chief, by O. Kusov; place and date not given:

"Aleksandr Prokhanov: 'Everything That Is Happening Now In Chechnya Is a Result of the Kremlin's Criminal Policy'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, editor in chief of the opposition newspaper ZAVTRA, was born in a Molokan family in Tbilisi, and his father came from Vladikavkaz. Naturally, everything that happens in our region invites the attention of one of the leaders of Russian patriots.

[Kusov] Your assessment of the events in Chechnya?

[Prokhanov] This is a whole complex of problems and contradictions that accumulated in Russian life and that are being resolved so terribly. The action undertaken should achieve numerous objectives. The new type of authority that has practically almost been built in Russia and that has become the possessor of colossal material, financial, and political wealth, is interested in continuing the concentration of wealth in its own hands. Federal authority is interested in winning the fight with regional authority, because a new type of power has also been formed in the regions, and it has accumulated colossal regional valuables in its own hands—oil, diamonds, and copper ore. This fight is taking place in all of Russia—in the Urals, where the idea of a Ural Republic has appeared, and in diamond-rich Yakutia—but it is taking place in Chechnya with brutal methods. Of course, this can be explained as the preservation of the territorial integrity of Russia—the new type of authority is interested in this. I am convinced that the center will win. I do not rule out that right after this the center will also have to begin to gather up other lands as well. Just what is the North Caucasus without Chechnya and Abkhazia? What is Abkhazia without Georgia? An absurdity.

[Kusov] Will not these events raise all of the Caucasus against Russia, and will not Russia's borders move farther to the north of today's line?

[Prokhanov] This is possible, only in the event that Russia loses to Chechnya, and Russian tanks and weapons will be burned by Chechen fighters. But I think that this is unlikely, because what remains of the Russian military machine will grind everything. And this awful bloody lesson will stop the people in the North Caucasus. I do not think that the entire Caucasus will rise up at once. It can rise up, if the center has the will for this. The USSR broke up, because the federal center had the will for this... A guerrilla war is impossible in the Caucasus. The entire territory is covered with oil pipelines and gas pipelines, and all of this will blow up. The insurgents will doom their homes and their descendants to destruction. All of this should be resolved, of course, through political and economic means.

[Kusov] Will Turkey's influence in the Caucasus increase against the background of the Chechen crisis?

[Prokhanov] Turkey's influence in the Caucasus has always been strong, even in Soviet times. There existed

secret and latent forms of Turkey's "breathing." Politically and economically, it has "moved very energetically" in the last 10 years. Through Turkey, America is imposing its own antifundamentalist variant of Islamic development on the Eastern world. Of course, Turkey's presence here is strong. But Turkey is not in a position to control policy on these territories, and it has only a small economic and political potential for this. The Great Ottoman empire is a myth with which old men live.

[Kusov] The opinion exists that there where Moscow cannot cope with regions politically, armed conflict is incited, in order later to rule regions with the help of weapons...

[Prokhanov] During the last three years, Chechnya was a transshipment base for illegal trade in Russian weapons for the East and the South. Many politicians "dumped" their illegal money through Chechnya. Everything that was started with it is the result of the Kremlin's criminal policy. Three years ago, when Rutskoy wanted to introduce a state of emergency in Chechnya, all of this could have been done without spilling blood. Dudayev would have been arrested and deported, and he would not even have to be exterminated. But at that time, Chechnya was important as a buffer zone, a Switzerland of crime, through which immense resources were dumped abroad. Therefore, Moscow always had and has the capability to influence the regions politically and economically. It closed the border, and that is it... That conflicts are "dumped" on a region and that problems are resolved through them is an oversimplified view.

Further on Handover of Weapons to Dudayev

MK1201163695 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 3

[SEGODNYA report under the "Information" rubric: "Anonymous Person From Defense Ministry Updates the Number of Military Equipment 'Given as Gift' to Chechnya. The Version of a 50-Percent Division of Property Is Doubtful"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Anonymous sources in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have turned over to the St. Petersburg-based "Shans" news agency a document—information on the number and types of arms remaining on the territory of the Chechen Republic after the last Russian Army subunits were withdrawn from it. This is mainly the property on the balance sheet of the Russian motorized rifle division which was stationed in Grozny. Judging from the information, virtually all the armaments belonging to the division remained in Chechnya and a 50-50 division of property between the sides is absolutely out of the question. In the view of specialists, it is these arms that enabled the Dudayev regime to counter the opposition and the Russian forces so effectively last year. However, this set of arms (especially ammunition) is clearly not sufficient for large-scale and protracted combat operations. Therefore, to make

the picture more complete, channels of additional supplies for Dudayev's forces during 1993-1994 are yet to be revealed.

Shakhray Cited on Meeting With Chechen Businessmen

LD1201200295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1919 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—The Union of Chechen Entrepreneurs and Bankers will be the main partner of the Russian Government in restoring Chechnya's economy, Russian Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray told ITAR-TASS today.

Shakhray took part in a Thursday meeting of Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin with representatives from the union, which had been established in Moscow.

According to Shakhray, the meeting defined priorities of such cooperation as consisting in restoration of oil industry, rebirth of agriculture and rebuilding of the Chechen capital.

The parties at the meeting joined in conclusion that first of all, legal and executive bodies, dismissed by Dzhokhar Dudayev's regime, should be reinstituted and free democratic elections should take place in the republic.

Boris Shantayev, member of the union and president of the "New Moscow" company, told TASS that Chechen businessmen will support any provisional government in Grozny provided it "shoulders a heavy burden of restoring the ruined economy".

Chechen Moves To Involve Dagestan Decried

954F0888A Nalchik SEVERNY KAVKAZ in Russian 7 Jan 95 p 4

[Reports by G. Murklinskaya and E. Urazayev: "Lowering Clouds on the Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dagestanis were able to appreciate in full the fact that it is good to have good, tranquil, and respectable neighbors this summer, when they found themselves, through no fault of their own, in an economic blockade, practically. On my first trip to Chechnya, which was still torn by an intertribal, clan power struggle at that time, I was from the very first words of conversation with representatives of the press office shocked by the statement expressed in aggressive and unceremonious form that Dagestan would not be allowed to remain aloof and that we were duty bound to fight with Chechnya against Russia. To my objection that it was merely a customary scuffle at the trough and that, whatever the turn of events, Dagestan had no intention of fighting Russia, my partners gave a hostile grin; we will see how you manage this.... The words seemed to me at that time utterly absurd, although they induced an involuntary shudder, nonetheless. I was

shortly after to be convinced that this was no idle threat, at the time of the first provocation against Russian border guards in Khasavyurt. And a few days ago the border post at the Grebenskiy Bridge was attacked late in the dead of night by a bandit group that was attempting to penetrate the territory of the Republic of Dagestan from the Chechen side. Two border guards, one of them an officer, were wounded as a result of the exchange of fire. According to the information of army intelligence, Dudayev's combatants are attempting in small groups to filter through into contiguous territories in order themselves to mimic support for Chechnya by the entire North Caucasus region. Having despaired of gaining their ends with the aid of various anonymous letters containing appeals for a "holy war" signed by well-known persons and delivered to our republic by well-known persons and also by numerous messages and local agents of influence, the regime, in its death-throes, was obviously making a last gamble: With the aid of various terrorist acts to provoke Russia into mounting punitive operations on the territories of other republics and then, having availed itself of the moment, to once again attempt to draw the population into its struggle. All this compels the thought that those who incited the war were deliberately speculating on the national and religious feelings of their people: Even then, more than two months ago, they had drawn up plans for the enlistment of the entire region in a senseless lengthy war. In terms of the tension and danger, Dagestan's northern border may now be compared only with Manchuria in the periods between the two world wars. The fear of Dagestani mothers of all nationalities and faiths is understandable: They do not want the young lives of their sons to be sacrificed to interests that are alien and even hostile to us. And what is most offensive is that those on whose conscience there are already so many young lives, both Chechen and Russian, will never be deservedly punished—they will wash their hands and end up at the other ends of the earth with silver plate reeking of blood and with different names. And the people who believed them will for a long time to come be suffering from the devastation and ruin, mourning their dead, and... killing. For the regime has succeeded in resuscitating an evil against which the Muslims fought for so many years—blood vengeance. The fate of the region, lest grief, war, and havoc come to our home also, is now being decided there, on Dagestan's northern border.

[Signed] G. Murklinskaya

A meeting of representatives of official structures of the Republic of Dagestan with the leaders of national movements and parties of Dagestan has been held in Makhachkala. M.-S. Gusayev, minister for nationalities and external relations of the Republic of Dagestan, termed the immediate reason for it the demonstration in Makhachkala's Central Square scheduled for 7 January and the congress of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus in connection with the events in Chechnya. He announced that the leadership of the Republic of Dagestan is making big efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Specifically, he considers useful the conversation between M.-A. Magomedov, chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Dagestan, and V. Chernomyrdin on 4 December [as published] on the need for an end to the bombing and other military

operations.

V. Pasuyev, chief of the Dagestan Directorate of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] of the Russian Federation, who spoke next, reported that back in August 1994 his directorate had sent the leadership of the FSK information and a recommendation for a resolution of the Chechen crisis. It criticized the central news media, which are shaping an enemy image in the person of people of the Caucasus and, in fact, contributing to the maintenance of Dudayev's authority.

It was proposed also sending to the Chechen Republic a delegation of leaders of the North Caucasus republics on a peace-making mission. The Russian authorities, in their opinion, should have concluded an economic treaty with Grozny officials and instituted visa procedures for entry into and exit from the Chechen Republic. Local security officers warned the center of the impermissibility of drastic measures. They tried together with the leadership of the Republic of Dagestan to ensure that troops not be committed to the Chechen Republic via Dagestan. They refuted the information concerning the formation of detachments of volunteers and clashes on the border.

Pasuyev suggested that the participants in the meeting think hard before staging a demonstration, noting that although after the demonstration on 17 December few people enrolled (42 enrolled in the square, but only 10-12 came to the auto-repair shop), the participation of young Dagestanis in the war was, nonetheless, undesirable. V. Beyev, first deputy minister of internal affairs, announced that operational reports show an increase in incidents of a provocative nature in relation to Dagestan. In the early hours of the fifth there was an attack by an armed group of 25-30 persons on the militia checkpoint at the village of Naradilova of the Republic of Dagestan's Khasavyurtovskiy District. One attacker was killed, and one Special Militia officer was wounded. Five assault rifles, two grenade launchers, two grenades, and 500 cartridges were stolen. Aside from the clash at the checkpoint at the bridge next to Grebenskaya Station, there have been attempts to blow up a further three on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, not to mention the actions of individual citizens of Chechnya and Dagestan. A group consisting of a Chechen, a Dagestani, and, it is presumed, an inhabitant of Astrakhan took hostage a young girl in Astrakhan and now, holed up in Dagestan, are demanding a huge ransom from the father. Eight to 10 infantry fighting vehicles drove up from the territory of Chechnya to the Kizlyarskiy Checkpoint, but, following warning shots, turned back. He also reported threats to blow up the Cherkeysaya Hydropower Plant and other acts aimed at distracting attention from Chechnya.

Representatives of the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus and the IPD [Islamic Party of Dagestan] sharply criticized the leadership of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Dagestan for the insufficient

urgency of the protests against the military operations. Representatives of the majority of parties and movements expressed fears that the demonstration would be used by extremists, but on the question of the expediency of staging it, opinions differed. Many people believed that the active participation of the leaders of the national movements and parties would help prevent a violation of the law and would direct the demonstration into a peaceful channel. It was decided to continue the consultations on the expediency of the demonstration. A statement of the leaders of national movements and parties of Dagestan on the events in the Chechen Republic was adopted at the meeting. They demanded an immediate end to the combat operations and a search for ways to resolve the conflict. They also declared that they had not sent armed people to Chechnya and opposed attempts to involve the republic in the armed conflict.

[Signed] E. Urazayev

Lebed Calls For Negotiated Chechnya Solution

BR1201114695 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
12 Jan 95 p 10

[Telephone interview with Russian General Aleksandr Lebed in Teraspol, Moldova by Fiammetta Cucurnia; date not given: "I as a General Do Not Want War, But Negotiations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Cucurnia] General do you think there is still a way to stop the bloodshed in Chechnya?

[Lebed] Of course there is, but only through negotiation, not with arms. This criminal war must be stopped; the Army must be withdrawn immediately; and we must sit down around the negotiating table. The problems will not be resolved by sending our own sons to the slaughter, killing our own people, and causing innocent blood to be spilled.

[Cucurnia] But is that a realistic scenario?

[Lebed] Sooner or later it will happen.

[Cucurnia] But when? One gets the impression that the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces is not thinking along those lines.

[Lebed] That is indeed the impression. It depends on the president.

[Cucurnia] Yeltsin has already promised several times to stop the shelling, but his orders are not always obeyed. Is it possible to influence the Kremlin's decisions?

[Lebed] I have already said: I am prepared to go to Grozny. Not to participate in this murderous war, of course, but simply to get the Army out of that meat grinder, bring it home, and initiate the negotiation process.

[Cucurnia] Marshall Shaposhnikov, a former commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces, said that it was

[Defense Minister] Grachev who, after the collapse of the USSR, gave the order to the troops returning from Chechnya to leave 50 percent of their armaments there for supply purposes. In substance, he said that it was the current defense minister who armed the Chechens. Did you know about that?

[Lebed] Yes, unfortunately that is how things are, and sooner or later they will have to answer for it.

[Cucurnia] Answer how?

[Lebed] Before a war crimes tribunal. I am sure of it. Sooner or later it will happen.

[Cucurnia] General, everyone knows how difficult and painful Russia's post-communist history has been, but nobody could have imagined that in only three years the Army would be reduced to the state we saw in Chechnya, ready to abandon the dead and wounded in the streets, with hundreds of soldiers surrendering to the Chechens, desertions, insubordination, etc.

[Lebed] It is painful. But we have to look at the causes of all this. The Army has been forced to carry out a task that is not part of its duties and forced to pay a very steep price in blood to cover the failure of an economic reform which, in actual fact, did not make progress and, indeed, never really existed. If one is to wage war, have the necessary strength of mind, and die with dignity, then one has to believe and know that a just idea is being defended. The Chechens are fighting from the doorways, defending their very children, women, mothers, their very land, and their very future. To them it is a war of liberation. The Russian soldiers do not know why they are fighting. They are going to die in an unjust war of oppression. That too is a crime. And sooner or later those responsible will have to answer for it for destroying the country's moral underpinning and cutting off its soul at the roots.

[Cucurnia] Who can help the Russian president make wise decisions?

[Lebed] They will do it. The Western countries will do it when they begin to figure out that the money for economic aid is being spent on a fratricidal war; then they will not give any more. Russian taxpayers will also do it. Already, they are beginning to refuse to pay taxes to send their own sons to the slaughter in a war that nobody understands and nobody wants.

Abdulatipov Criticizes Operation Against Chechnya

MK1201120095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No.1, 8-15 Jan 95 (Signed to press 10 Jan 95) p 3

[Interview with Federation Council Deputy Speaker Ramazan Abdulatipov by Sanobar Shermatova; place and date not given; under the "Opinion" rubric: "Our Stupidity Is Outstripping Our Actions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How confidential peace initiatives were blocked—an interview by Federation Council Deputy Chairman Ramazan Abdulatipov for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI observer Sanobar Shermatova.

[Shermatova] Do you think the proposals on holding talks, which were made by the Chechen side, reached President Boris Yeltsin?

[Abdulatipov] The most serious confidential proposals were brought by a group of Caucasians at the end of last year. They met with Dudayev in Grozny and arranged a meeting with me in Moscow. Many of them were familiar to me—the most authoritative elders in the Caucasus. They brought proposals, but in exchange they wanted guarantees that only the president could give. Do not ask me what was the essence of their proposals, I have no right to disclose it. I can only say that within three hours the bloodletting in Chechnya would have been halted without detriment to Russia or Dudayev. On 30 and 31 December, and also on 1 and 2 January I tried to reach Premier Chernomyrdin or the president on the phone. I was asking: "Give me five minutes—I will outline proposals that would help us." To no avail. On 3 January I went to one of the most high-ranking persons in the president's inner circle. He, who usually can speak to the president as soon as he asks to do so, tried for two hours to reach the president. No dice. Thus yet another chance to overcome the Chechen situation, even while saving face, was squandered.

[Shermatova] Was that the first such incident?

[Abdulatipov] On 26 December I was to fly to the Caucasus together with a group of deputies to hold talks with Chechen leaders. Boris Nikolayevich gave the go-ahead, Shumeyko said "OK," I so advised State Duma leaders, and by 8:00 PM we had discussed and agreed on everything. Three hours later, all of a sudden—at least it was sudden for me—Ivan Rybkin's secretariat issued a statement saying that the Duma had not authorized me and informing me that my security personnel would be recalled. Afterward a Security Council decision emerged—no talks with Chechnya, only surrender.

[Shermatova] Who do you think has enough influence on the president to get him to reverse his own decisions?

[Abdulatipov] I would not like to delve into this subject, all the more so because this is an obvious fact: Our stupidity is outstripping our actions. Take, for instance, the meeting of the religious elders and chiefs of the North Caucasus that did not take place in Pyatigorsk on 8 and 9 January. Extensive preparatory work was done, in which Patriarch Aleksey and Muslim religious figures were involved. I know that Boris Nikolayevich signed a decision to give the Moscow delegation a special plane. I was attending an exchange of Georgian and Abkhazian POW's in Abkhazia when an urgent directive canceling the meeting arrived in my office from Filatov's staff. As a matter of fact, this meeting was being prepared precisely with Filatov's assistance. Meanwhile, the North

Caucasian public movements and religious elders assembled in Makhachkala, but those who might have neutralized the fallout from the military operations at least to some extent were once again sidelined. The war will end tomorrow, if not today, but unless urgent measures are taken it may evolve into a confrontation between the Christians and the Muslims in the Caucasus. I do not know of anything more terrifying. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Ingushetia, and now Chechnya—Russia is being increasingly dragged into a struggle with the Muslims, and Islamic countries are closely watching developments.

Last fall I was to visit a number of Arab countries, where meetings with the general secretaries of the Islamic Conference Organization and the Arab League, and also with the chairman of the Arab Interparliamentary Union were scheduled to take place. I was to inform them about the situation in Chechnya, and to tell them that the Dudayev regime has nothing to do with Islam. A directive by Chernomyrdin had already been drawn up, but the trip was canceled. I was told that this was done at the recommendation of Soskovets and Kozyrev. You know the reaction of Islamic countries to the events in Chechnya. It is easy to guess how this might affect our economic and political relations with the Arab countries, which have traditionally been friendly toward Russia.

Kovalev Alleges Generals 'Too Busy' for Truce

MM1201164595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Yevgeniy Albats: "Generals Too Busy to Talk of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy is awaiting a new assault. The truce has ended in failure. At his news conference, which was held in [the Ingush capital] Nazran, Sergey Kovalev surmised that Dudayev's statement that he does not rule out the possibility of Chechen autonomy could be assessed by the Russian military as a manifestation of weakness. And they will certainly try to end the "battle" for Groznyy. According to Dudayev, around 18,000 civilians have died in Groznyy and its environs so far, while the number of servicemen killed is as yet unknown. Dudayev cites a ratio of 50:1. He believes that for every Chechen volunteer, Russia has lost 50 men. Sergey Kovalev also believes that the losses among Russian servicemen exceed Chechen losses.

Sergey Kovalev reported that he had tried to get in touch by telephone with Generals Grachev, Kvashnin, commander of the grouping, and Shevtsov, deputy commander of the grouping, in order to guarantee the necessity for a truce for the collecting of corpses as a minimum. However, the generals were too busy to come to the telephone. Kovalev told the journalists about his other proposals for settling the Chechen crisis: It is necessary to discontinue immediately the use of aviation, artillery, and rocket and armored equipment in the conflict zone and recall the snipers. Sergey Adamovich

also proposed further steps to ensure a political settlement to the conflict. He proposed that preparations be started immediately and a sitting of a Caucasus peace conference held with the participation of representatives of public organizations of the Caucasus peoples and of the organs of power of the republics, krais, and oblasts of the North Caucasus. The conference will elaborate and propose to the organs of power of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic plans for a peaceful settlement in Chechnya. Kovalev also conveyed to journalists the Appeal to the Mothers of Russia:

"The ruins of the city of Groznyy are piled high with corpses. They are the corpses of Russian soldiers. Wild dogs are gnawing at them. These gnawed bones were somebody's sons—I hope with all my heart that they are not your sons.

"The wounded are lying in a dark, damp bunker. These are Russian soldiers who have been captured. Some of them have gangrene. They too are someone's sons.

"I received instructions from Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to reach agreement on the conclusion of a 48-hour truce. The truce is necessary to collect the corpses and evacuate the seriously wounded. The order was coordinated with President Boris Yeltsin. In order to carry out this order I tried for several hours to get in touch with the generals in Mozdok—the headquarters of the Russian force in Chechnya. It turned out that the generals were busy and could not come to the telephone. The generals are not lying. They really are busy ensuring that no talks are held. They very much do not want a truce. They very much do not want anyone to count up the number of corpses. They very much do not want the prisoners to stay alive."

Lastly, the car of the human rights commissioner in the Russian Federation came under fire in Groznyy.

Kovalev, Ilyushenko Outline Mission in Chechnya

MM1301112595 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1

[Interviews with Russian Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev, chairman of the Temporary Oversight Commission for the Observance of Citizens' Rights and Freedoms, and Acting Russian General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko in Mozdok by Colonel Oleg Falichev; date not given: "Order Must Be Restored"—first paragraph is introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Justice Minister Valentin Kovalev, chairman of the Temporary Oversight Commission for the Observance of Citizens' Rights and Freedoms, and Acting Russian General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko gave Colonel Oleg Falichev, your KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, an interview in Mozdok.

[[Falichev] Valentin Alekseyevich, what is the purpose of your coming here this time and for how long will the Temporary Oversight Commission that you head operate?

[Kovalev] According to the president's edict the Temporary Oversight Commission for the Observance of the Constitutional Rights and Freedoms of Citizens in the Chechen Republic will operate until the situation in the region has been fully normalized. What do I mean? There are several components to this. I think that the military component will be completed shortly, within a few days. But there are several subcommissions operating within our Oversight Commission, including legal and socioeconomic subcommissions. As for the socioeconomic one, I would say in principle that it is a permanent body. Since I think that the problems of providing the Chechen Republic's population with socioeconomic support will always exist. And we will try to resolve these matters to the best of our capabilities. Ilyushenko and I have come here now to perform a number of very specific tasks pertaining to the restoration of the system of Chechen law-enforcement organs. At present a temporary administration is already up and running in five out of the Chechen Republic's 14 rayons and four have law-enforcement bodies. Our task also involves organizing their normal work.

What is more, we are checking out specific cases of violations of citizens' constitutional rights. We are acting on the assumption that there are Russian citizens in the ranks of the warring parties. We do not divide citizens into "them" and "us." In this case they are all Russian citizens. Although we do also realize that, on the one hand, there are entities which are breaking the law. These being illegal armed formations that must be disarmed. And, on the other hand, there are law-enforcement organs, our Armed Forces, ensuring the restoration of constitutional legality. That is the position from which we are approaching the problem of settling the conflict and we will do everything to ensure the restoration of legality. Lastly, our mission also includes creating the appropriate conditions for a truce. But in that regard it is too early to speak of any significant results. [Kovalev ends]

[Falichev] What is being done by the prosecutor's office?

[Ilyushenko] We have once again recreated prosecutor's offices in the Chechen Republic and appointed a Chechen Republic prosecutor, who is now in the village of Znamenskoye. And those rayons where federal troops are operating are served by Chechen Republic prosecutors, who have been appointed in accordance with the current Constitution. Last year a Grozny Garrison Prosecutor's Office was formed and a garrison prosecutor appointed. Around 40 staffers have been appointed there and they are investigating criminal cases that arise in the conflict zone. They coordinate the activity of all law-enforcement bodies here.

All this work has, in my view, been well-organized. Criminal proceedings have been instituted, including in respect of general criminal cases, looting, etc. Criminal proceedings have also been instituted and are being

investigated in respect of Jordanian citizens who were arrested on charges of taking part in the activity of illegal armed formations.

Troops Reportedly Ordered To Kill Chechen Civilians

LD1201200995 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1600 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The truce period announced by Moscow officially ended at 0800 this morning. According to the Russian government press service, federal troops continued to observe the moratorium after the deadline passed and did not open fire. It also asserts that the Army has transported reserves and moved troops forward. However, somewhat different information is coming from Grozny itself.

[Correspondent Vladimir Varfolomeyev, speaking over telephone] The truce period declared by Russia did not end until this morning. However, Russian aviation bombed the center of Grozny during the night. This has been confirmed by local inhabitants and journalists. It is impossible to assess the damage caused by the bombing, because the presidential palace cannot be approached. Since early this morning the city center has been subjected to intensive artillery and rocket shelling. Later in the afternoon the Russian troops began using Grad multiple rocket launchers as well.

Today we were able to meet two Russian POWs who were captured literally yesterday evening. Their unit was transferred from Leningrad Region on 31 December. In three days of fighting their battalions alone lost between 260 and 270 dead and wounded. The survivors literally mutinied and refused to take part in the war.

However, this was ignored by the command; the soldiers did not succeed in escaping. They confirmed to us—there is a tape recording—that regular troops of soldiers on compulsory service have special purpose troops behind them, who shoot them in the back if they retreat or try to give themselves up.

The soldiers told us they had an order, which they were given in Mozdok, to kill all women, old people, and children. However, they did not even put up resistance when they were captured in Grozny. This happened at a moment when the soldiers, who had eaten nothing for three days, had begun calling at houses to find something to eat.

This was enforced marauding, but there is another kind. Today there was a clash near Urus-Martan between Chechen fighters and a small Russian military column. Stolen goods were found in captured Kamaz vehicles. We saw televisions, computers, kitchenware, and even women's underwear.

Chechen Militants Reportedly Moving South

LD1201205795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nalchik, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—Russian military sources said this evening that

about 40 Russian servicemen were kept in the underground of the presidential palace in Groznyy.

According to the same sources, most pro-Dudayev militants left Groznyy for earlier prepared bases in the southern part of the republic. Only those who want to fight until the end stay in Groznyy.

The sources told Interfax that shelling had damaged the gas distribution network. A gas flare on the Khrushchev square, the Minutka district, is 2-3 meters high. Another flare is burning about 500 meters towards the bus station.

Groznyy residents still remain in an extremely difficult situation. The water supply is out of order and potable water is delivered from the Chernorechenskoye reservoir. Old artesian wells are opened in various districts to extract potable water.

Interior Troops Control District in Groznyy

LD1201144295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1336 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Sevtsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 12 Jan—Russian Federation militia and interior troop units have taken full control of the situation in Groznyy's Leninskiy district, Vladimir Vorozhtsov, head of the public relations center of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs told ITAR-TASS today. According to him, shooting continues in the rest of Groznyy, although the fighting fitness and activity of the illegal armed formations are on the wane. The efforts of interior troop groupings in Chechnya are aimed at ensuring that special detachments can operate within Groznyy, and at revealing the location of bandit formations and military hardware.

The work of the law and order bodies is being organized in districts that are under the control of federal troops. According to Vladimir Vorozhtsov, the emphasis is on establishing close contacts with the elders and residents of inhabited areas.

According to the information from the public relations center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, interior troops and militia units are guarding the main economic facilities and maintaining security on the Mozdok-Groznyy and Nazran-Groznyy highways.

There is no information on interior troop losses over the past 24 hours. As of 11 January, 41 interior troops have died and 101 have been wounded since federal troops entered Chechnya (11 December 1994). Eighteen servicemen were taken prisoner in Khasav-Yurt (Dagestan) on 11 December.

Marines Dispatched for 'Decisive Assault'

MK1301080695 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk under the "War" rubric: "Russia Prepares Troops 'For Further Operations' in

Chechnya. Officers Openly Grumble Over the Way the Operation Is Being Conducted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to reports from Groznyy, at 8:00 AM yesterday—as soon as the two-day ceasefire announced by Moscow expired—the federal troops unleashed a barrage of artillery fire on the city. The shelling was concentrated on the city center, primarily on the presidential palace. According to reports from various sources, elite Russian military units are being sent to Groznyy, a development seen by experts as preparation for a decisive assault on the Chechen capital.

This was indirectly confirmed by information of the Russian Federation Government's press service, which reported that yesterday was devoted to "regrouping and rotating troops, and the preparation of units for further operations." The Russian military command appears to be pinning particular hopes on Marines subunits, which are currently being moved to the conflict area from the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets. "The Marines will be fulfilling the mission that will be assigned to them in Chechnya," Admiral Valentin Selivanov, chief of the Russian Navy's Main Staff. According to the admiral, "there is no way to defeat the Marines." Nonetheless he had to admit that the Marines subunits being sent to Chechnya had to be brought up to strength with a few hundred sailors taken from combat ships. That is, men who are not trained to fight on land.

Yesterday it transpired that Major Yevgeniy Zhovtoripenko, commander of a shock troops battalion in the Pacific Fleet Marines, refused to carry out an order to move his battalion to Chechnya. Giving reasons for his refusal, he said that a major part of the battalion personnel is made up of first-year soldiers, who "have never been fired upon," and also a reinforcement of sailors from Pacific Fleet combat ships. The battalion commander demanded urgent training for the soldiers, which, by his estimates, would take at least two weeks. Admiral Igor Khmel'nov, Pacific Fleet commander, ordered that the major be immediately removed from the post of battalion commander; officers at the fleet staff think that Zhovtoripenko's actions are punishable under criminal law.

At yesterday's hearings in the Russian Federation Council, it was officially stated that as of 11 January, losses of Defense Ministry and Internal Affairs Ministry forces in Chechnya amounted to 394 men killed and over 1,000 wounded. Figures from other sources differ significantly from the official ones, however. A Federal Counterintelligence Service member, who asked not to be identified, said to your SEGODNYA correspondent that "losses in army units alone are nearing 3,000 men."

Pacific Fleet Marines Depart From Vladivostok

LD1201112095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1029 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—"The marines will carry out their assignment in Chechnya," chief of the Russian Navy's General Staff Valentin Selivanov told ITAR-TASS today. He explained that the decision to send marine units to the conflict zone was made by the country's leadership and the navy command is only "an executor of the order".

Tass correspondent Yuriy Grachev reports from Vladivostok that seven military transport airplanes with a larger part of a regiment on board left Vladivostok for Chechnya on Thursday morning.

In addition to marines the regiment includes several hundred sailors from the Pacific Fleet's combat ships. The press service of the Pacific Fleet reported on Wednesday that most of the marines "expressed the desire to go to Chechnya".

TASS correspondent Valeriy Biryukov reports from Kaliningrad that a unit of Baltic Fleet marines left for Chechnya on Wednesday, after a group of Northern Fleet marines flew there earlier.

Admiral Valentin Selivanov told ITAR-TASS today that the fleet units would act as assigned and that "it is impossible to defeat the marines".

Responding to a question about possible losses, the admiral said such losses were "undesirable", and the command is taking all possible measures to ensure minimal losses.

The marines as an arm of the Russian Navy are specially trained for combat activities as part of landing troops to guard the coast, naval bases and ports and for other assignments. The Russian marines are armed with automatic guns, armoured vehicles and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Marine units are maintained by all major countries of the world. They are known to have taken part in all military conflicts of the past decade. The United States have been using marines since 1775.

Russian marines have existed since 1705. In the years preceding World War Two, Russia formed only one marine brigade, but the circumstances of the first months of the war made it clear that marine units are needed for successful actions in conjunction with land forces.

As a rule, marine battalions and brigades were manned with sailors and non-com officers coming from ship crews or from hospitals after treatment.

Marine units covered themselves with glory during the battles at Stalingrad and Leningrad and when liberating Black-Sea coastal areas and the Crimea during World War Two.

Soldiers Flee Khabarovsk Unit To Avoid Duty

MK1201095095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 3

[Report from Khabarovsk by Oleg Kryuchek under the "Army" rubric: "About 70 Soldiers Run Away From

Training Center in Khabarovsk. Officers Prefer Discharge to Chechnya; First-Year Soldiers Prefer a Court-Martial"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Your SEGODNYA correspondent has learned from the staff of the Far Eastern Military District that military formations are being brought up to strength at a training center near Khabarovsk to be sent to Chechnya. Staff officers are being recruited in defiance of any logic by snatching specialists from the most diverse units of the district. Most of the so-called Chechen battalions are made up of first-year soldiers, who were told that they would be sent to the Moscow Military District to continue their service. At the moment about 70 draftees have fled; a search for them is now being conducted by officers of the military prosecutor's office and the Counterintelligence Service, who would not comment on the incident.

Moreover, it has transpired that a number of officers, who were also officially supposed to be sent to the Moscow Military District, refused to obey the order and will be discharged for failing to comply with the terms of contracts they have signed earlier. An officer, who asked not to be identified, said: "Legally speaking, the command is acting correctly; indeed, a year ago, when we were signing the contract, we agreed to go anywhere in Russia if our superiors so ordered. But who could imagine at the time that we would be sent to such carnage?"

Caucasian Congress Urges Withdrawal of Troops

LD1201212695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Makhachkala, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—The emergency Congress of Caucasian Peoples decided to propose to the Russian president and parliament that Russian troops be withdrawn from Chechnya and talks on wide-scale settlement in the republic begin on the highest level.

The second part of the Congress was held under the sign of the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples and united 184 delegates of 21 Caucasian peoples. It was completed in Makhachkala (Dagestan) today.

If military actions in Chechnya continue the Congress will "use all methods of struggle for independence of the Chechen people proceeding from international law, in particular its provisions on the rights of colonized peoples."

The Congress created a special commission for investigating military crimes committed in Chechnya by servicemen of Russian troops.

The Congress also decided to apply to the UN, the Islamic Conference organization, the parliaments of the leading countries of the world, Russian and North-Caucasian public opinion urging them to "support struggle of the Chechen people for independence."

The Congress urged the North-Caucasian leaders to take more active measures for putting an end to bloodshed in Chechnya. The Congress said an action of civil disobedience could be carried out if appropriate measures were not taken. The Congress decided to create committees for support of the Chechen people and self-defense committees in all North-Caucasian regions.

The Congress created its permanent headquarters consisting of seven people for resolving urgent problems concerning the Chechen conflict. The members of the headquarters will have the right to make political statements when necessary. The headquarters will be situated in Makhachkala.

North Ossetia Urges Cease-Fire in Chechnya

LD1201135195 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1319 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladikavkaz, 12 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—The Government of North Ossetia today spoke in favor of an end to military action in the Chechen republic and of the immediate disarming of illegal armed formations on the basis of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

An official statement by the deputy chairman of the government, which was distributed here today, says that "the explosive events in Chechnya have a negative impact on the situation in the Caucasian region. They could become the detonator for the exacerbation of the social and political situation in Russia."

The statement recognizes that "the only right decision is a cease-fire and the declaration of a ban on military action in the Chechen republic. It is important that those who currently represent the interests of the majority of the Chechen population should play a full part in peace talks. Peaceful dialogue, based on the will of the people, is required."

Krasnodar Kray Head Backs Use of Force in Chechnya

LD1201134695 Moscow *Russian Television Network in Russian* 1100 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The need to solve the Chechen crisis by force was brought about by the federal authorities' earlier procrastination and inconsistency, and it is precisely because of this that chances to solve the Chechen problem by peaceful means alone have been wasted, said Yevgeniy Kharitonov, head of the Krasnodar Kray administration. He believes that the strong-arm option is unavoidable. After all, what is happening in Chechnya has an extremely negative effect on neighboring regions. In the governor's view, the necessary order should be maintained constantly throughout

Russia, providing Russia is a centralized state rather than a conglomeration of appanage principalities.

Nazdratenko Supports Crackdown on Chechnya

LD1201164295 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1555 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 12 TASS—Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, chief of the administration of the Maritime Territory, believes that "virtually all political forces represented in the State Duma are trying to provoke a large-scale political crisis in connection with the Chechen events".

In a letter to Boris Yeltsin, the governor of the Maritime Territory stated that these actions are aimed at removing the president from office before he completes his term and at dismissing the Russian Cabinet. The copy of this letter was sent to ITAR-TASS on Thursday by the presidential administration.

The events in Chechnya showed that "politicians' intriguing, the readiness to put at stake Russia's vital interests to gain during the elections, the constant provoking of the executive authorities and narrow-mindedness—these qualities of contemporary representative authorities run counter to purposes of Russia's economic revival", Nazdratenko writes.

"I am sure you will be firm in exercising your powers as guarantor of the Russian Constitution", Nazdratenko writes.

Chuvash President Warns of Coming 'Dictatorship'

MK1201145495 Moscow *OBSSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian* No. 2/78, 12-18 Jan 95 (Signed to press 11 Jan 95) p 1

[Interview with Nikolay Fedorov, president of Chuvashia, by Yegor Yakovlev under the "A Week For Two" rubric: "There Is No Choice"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Fedorov] Last week, I asked my neighbors and friends, the presidents of the Volga-Vyatka area republics and Karelia, to come to Cheboksary. We share anxiety for the destinies of Russia and the desire to oppose the catastrophic situation the country finds itself in. Then there were telephone calls on behalf of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin: Why are you meeting, are you hatching a plot? [passage omitted]

[Fedorov] Solving state problems at the price of massive casualties borders on an international crime. Two years ago, I stated publicly: If it took five tanks to destroy the parliament and the Constitutional Court in Russia's capital, what is in store for Russia's regions? What if there are six tanks? What if there happen to be seven of them? Now we can see: First, there are now civic

institutions in the country which can oppose the savagery of the powers that be; second, the bloody tragedy will inevitably spill over into Russia.

[Yakovlev] Are you sure?

[Fedorov] What else can you expect if the fascist-minded Barkashov is the most ardent supporter of the popularly elected Boris Nikolayevich? In the future, it is no longer the figure of Yeltsin that matters but the only method of rule that awaits Russia: the police truncheon. There is nothing else to rely on. Even if this is untenable, I am saying this as Chuvashia's president and I think they will say the same in Yakutia, Chukotka, Tataria [Tatarstan], and Bashkiria [Bashkortostan]: It is now longer possible to rule with the truncheon. [passages omitted]

[Fedorov] Yeltsin is responsible for what is happening in Russia. But I too am responsible to the people who elected me. Here is a bill I intend to sign into law: "On Protection of Servicemen, Citizens, and People Born in the Chuvash Republic." We must protect them against the violence of the federal authorities, and we must recognize that it is the right of our servicemen to take no part in combat operations connected with the settlement of inter-ethnic conflicts by federal organs. [passage omitted]

Dictatorship is indeed becoming a reality. We have been given a powerful push back toward the worst times of the totalitarian-administrative system. We have to protect ourselves. I will go on with the projects I have begun in Chuvashia. They will become pockets of resistance. I very much hope for support from honest and objective journalism. Meetings should be continued between the leaders of republics and regions so that federal authorities should finally realize: They are merely employees hired to serve the interests of Russia. Finally, the West should be ashamed: How much longer can it play the hypocrite? To constantly trumpet human rights and regard massive slaughter in Chechnya as Russia's internal affair? [passage omitted]

Udmurtia Demands End To War in Chechnya

LD1201120695 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Udmurtia demands that the war in Chechnya be stopped and that the principle "power for the people, not people for the power" should be complied with. After Valentin Tubylov, chairman of the Udmurt Supreme Council, met with heads of public organizations, an appeal to the Russian president and heads of both chambers of the Federal Assembly was adopted to stop the fratricidal war immediately.

Komi Legislators Urge Peaceful Solution in Chechnya

LD1201125095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1226 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Syktyvkar January 12 TASS—The Supreme Council of Komi, the autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, has urged the Russian president, the Federal Assembly and the government to stop the war in the Chechen Republic and to settle the conflict by peaceful means.

Opening its session on Wednesday, the Komi Supreme Council stood to observe a minute's silence in tribute to Komi soldiers killed in Chechnya. Two soldiers from the republic were killed in the war: Dmitriy Altayev from the mining town of Inta and Nikolay Malinovskiy from the village of Ust Vym. Dmitriy Altayev was killed with other 15 paratroopers who were in a vehicle which came under militants' fire near the village of Oktyabrsky on December 28.

In its address to the central authorities, which was adopted at Wednesday's session, the Komi Supreme Council noted that it is necessary to maintain the integrity of the Russian Federation. At the same time, it expressed concern over the developments in Chechnya. The council urged in its address to stop the fighting and use peaceful means to settle the conflict.

Chelyabinsk Parties Urge End To Hostilities

LD1301122595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1156 GMT 13 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chelyabinsk January 13 TASS—Representatives from several parties and public movements of Chelyabinsk, the Urals, today called on the Russian leadership to immediately stop the hostilities in Chechnya and to settle all the existing disputes by peaceful means. Their statement, read out to a press conference here today, held in the building of the local administration, was signed by representatives from the "Democratic Russia", "Soldiers' Mothers of Russia", and "For Nuclear Safety" movements, as well as from the "Yabloko" public association, the Economic Freedom Party, etc.

The press conference was told that the regional association of soldiers' mothers was collecting warm clothing and medicines for young soldiers deployed in Chechnya. A group of soldiers' mothers is ready to go to the conflict zone in order to learn the truth about the fate of their sons, because so far they were unable to learn this truth by dialing the telephone numbers, announced by the military establishment for this purpose.

ITAR-TASS has learned that Yuriy Nozhikov, the governor of Irkutsk region, had sent a telegram to President Yeltsin today, saying: "Due to the large number of appeals from soldiers' mothers I hereby ask you to adopt a decision that law and order in the Chechen republic should be enforced by professional military men, that untrained or poorly trained servicemen, recently called up to the army, should not be used in military actions."

Soldiers' Mothers Fail To Stop APCs in Yekaterinburg

LD1201190895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1743 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yekaterinburg, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—Several mothers of Russian soldiers tried to stop a group of armored personnel carriers [APC] following by the streets of Yekaterinburg, the Urals region, to the railway station to be sent to Chechnya.

Well-informed sources in the interior bodies told Interfax that an interior regiment equipped with armored vehicles had been taken to the conflict area. Only 20 servicemen stayed at the regiment's location.

The mothers and relatives of Russian soldiers lay on the road before the APCs demanding the regiment stay in the city. The police used force, but not special means to clear the road.

High-ranking officers in the Urals military district command did not deny the regiment had been sent to Chechnya, but declined to comment on the women's action.

Ruble Infusion Proposed To Restore Chechen Economy

LD1201124095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1212 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ulyanovsk January 12 TASS—According to Russian Deputy Minister of Economy Yakov Urinson, 2.3 trillion roubles will be needed for the restoration of the economy of the Chechen Republic.

He explained to ITAR-TASS that it is planned to channel the additional 800 billion roubles into the fuel and energy complex of the republic. Thus, according to the estimates of the Ministry of Economy, it is necessary to allocate for those purposes 3.1 trillion roubles. "The proposal has already been submitted to the State Duma," he stressed.

Urinson took part today in the ceremony of the presentation of a flight certificate on the TU-204 medium-range airliner.

Regions Polled on Crime, Chechnya Link

MM1201125595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Jan 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Sociological Service: "Russian Citizens Expect Determined Measures. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Sociological Poll on Fight Against Crime"]

[FBIS Translated Text] ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's own correspondents conducted a sociological poll in 13 Russian cities 6-8 January 1995. Around 800 people

representing various social groups took part in it. The respondents included workers, employees, rural workers, entrepreneurs, housewives, the unemployed, and representatives of parties and public movements. The respondents were asked two questions:

1. Do you think that the restoration of order in Chechnya will promote the fight against crime throughout Russia?
2. Should the president and the government be more determined in their fight against corruption, the spoliation of Russia, and crime?

The results obtained from the sociological poll have been placed in a table where the number of positive and negative responses to the questions asked by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's own correspondents and their value expressed as a percentage are broken down by region.

Thus, the overwhelming majority of respondents voiced the quite definite opinion that people expect determined measures in the fight against crime, corruption, and the spoliation of the country and hope for the earliest restoration of order in Chechnya.

During the poll respondents also spoke about their regions' special features. In particular, all respondents in Bryansk stressed during a conversation with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's own correspondents that the city's markets, hotels, and restaurants are literally filled with so-called "Caucasian nationals." This causes the townspeople some discontent.

In Yaroslavl, where 76 percent of respondents gave a firm "yes" to the first question, it was particularly noted that the authorities will undoubtedly curb criminals' insolent behavior if they demonstrate the will and determination. However, a proviso followed at the same time: The criminal world will hardly give in easily....

During the poll many residents of Tula voiced an extremely negative view of their fellow citizen Defense Minister P. Grachev in connection with the Chechen conflict.

In Tambov around 25 percent of respondents, mainly people of pensionable and prepension age, believe that the disarmament of Chechen troop formations will boost the Russian president's prestige, and around half said that the establishment of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic would help to reduce crime in Russia as a whole.

REGIONS	QUESTION ONE	QUESTION TWO
	(bracketed figures denote percentages)	
Bryansk	yes— 12 (25)	yes— 46 (96)
(48 people polled)	no — 35 (73)	no — 2 (1)
Kursk (57)	yes— 33 (58)	yes— 57 (100)
	no — 24 (42)	

Yaroslavl (100)	yes— 64 (76) no — 7 (15)	yes—100 (100)
Ulyanovsk (48)	yes— 41 (85) no — 7 (15)	yes— 43 (90) no — 5 (10)
St. Petersburg (53)	yes— 32 (60) no — 18 (34)	yes— 46 (87) no — 6 (11)
Vladimir (45)	yes— 26 (58) no — 19 (42)	yes— 39 (87) no — 6 (13)
Krasnodar (49)	yes— 49 (100)	yes— 49 (100)
Volgograd (136)	yes—129 (95) no— 7 (15)	yes—136 (100)
Tula (64)	yes— 15 (23) no — 10 (16)	yes— 5 (8) no — 19 (31)
Tver (68)	yes— 42 (68) no — 25 (37)	yes— 68 (100)
Chelyabinsk (43)	yes— 31 (72) no — 12 (27)	yes— 43 (100)
Orenburg	yes— 30 (75) no — 10 (25)	yes— 38 (95) no — 2 (5)
Tambov (35)	yes— 24 (65)	yes— 35 (68)

[No other figures provided for Tambov]

Muscovites Polled on Chechnya, TV Reporting

MK1201145195 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 1, 8-15 Jan 95 (Signed to press 10 Jan)
p 8

[Report by Yuriy Bogomolov under the "Poll" rubric:
"Being Loyal Does Not Pay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The hot war in Chechnya is being duplicated by an information war on the airwaves. Its front line runs not between Dudayev's forces and Russian Army units, but rather between the government and public opinion.

The first results of this "cold" war, losses and gains, have been summed up by a poll conducted among Muscovites by Vsevolod Vilchek's sociological service.

Do you follow developments in Chechnya?

"Yes," was answered by 80.5 percent. That can be regarded as an event. A rating which is not simply high or the highest, but one which is unprecedented even if you consider the ratings of some other events like those of October 1993 or the December elections the same year.

Whose position in the Chechen conflict do you see as the most sensible?

1. "President's" (26 percent).
2. "Yavlinskiy's and Gaydar's, who hold the view that one should seek compromise with national republics" (33.5 percent)

3. "Zhirinovskiy's, who claims that Russia may be divided into economic areas...." (12 percent)

4. "Solzhenitsyn's, who thinks Chechnya and the other republics situated in outlying areas of the country should not be held back" (27 percent).

5. "Communists", who are confident that interethnic conflicts will be recurrent unless the Union is reinstated" (14.5 percent).

It can be seen with the naked eye that the president has changed the social base. Now the problem is, how broad it is....

"Ostankino" has won as little as 2 or 3 percent of additional viewers resulting from the start of the Chechen crisis, with Russian Television gaining 30 percent over and above its normal audience; NTV has gained 70 percent.

Which television program was providing more factual information on Chechen developments?

"Vremya"—12 percent

"Vesti"—18 percent

"Segodnya"—28 percent

Which television company was ratcheting up worry the most?

"Vremya"—6 percent

"Vesti"—4 percent

"Segodnya"—4 percent

The figures are small but they point to one very important regularity: concealing information, suppressing the truth increases anxiety rather than calms down public opinion.

What results will the operation in Chechnya yield?

1. Russian statehood will consolidate, 19 percent; it will not, 34 percent.

2. The prestige of the state and president will rise, 8.5 percent; it will not, 49 percent.

3. Restoration of law and order in the country will begin with Chechnya, 15.5 percent; it will not, 30.5 percent.

4. Guerrilla war in the Northern Caucasus will break out, 26 percent; it will not, 15.5 percent.

5. People of Russia will have to tighten their belts to pacify and feed Chechnya, 56.5 percent; they will not have to, 8 percent.

It is hard to say if television programs have had a decisive impact on the audiences' attitude to the developments or the other way around. Most likely, it cuts both ways. The result of this impact is quite plain. It cannot be interpreted in any two ways. The government has lost both the "hot" and the "cold" wars.

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As one could notice from the results of the poll held, the "Ostankino" television company took the greatest beating in the latter war.

Chechen War Prompts Investors' 'Flight'

MK1201151295 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Igor Trosnikov: "Western Investors Are Doubtful About Finance Ministry's Capabilities"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian securities are being very negatively affected by the Chechen campaign. This applies first of all to Russian hard-currency debt obligations on both the external and domestic markets. Suffice it to say that in the past two days Russian foreign debts have lost nearly 50 percent of their value, while hard-currency bonds of the Finance Ministry's government internal loan shed 4-5 points. Moreover, nearly all Western companies and banks have refused to deal with hard-currency bonds, which gives grounds for talking about a deep crisis in the domestic market for these securities.

Like all previous collapses of the hard-currency bond market, the current crash began with foreign companies' massive flight from these securities. Furthermore, if initially the bonds were sold by the most panic-stricken investors, now virtually everyone is trying to get rid of them. Experts of the MKF-Moskovskiy Partner Bank attribute the current situation to the fact that the securities' prices fell below a certain level, at which Western brokers started selling them automatically at any price. In addition, the flight from bonds has not been offset by demand, because Western companies and banks have stopped submitting quotations to buy securities. As for Russian investors, they took little interest in hard-currency bonds even earlier, but now they have completely given up operations with them, focusing their attention on the much more lucrative currency market.

The main reason cited for the waning interest in hard-currency bonds is, of course, the conflict in Chechnya. Investors' fears have been fueled primarily by the fact that the expenses of the military operation would prevent the Finance Ministry from servicing the securities

market. It is well known that Russia's prospects for receiving Western loans (which make up one of the main revenue sources in the 1995 budget) are growing dimmer as the political situation continues to deteriorate. At the same time, Chechnya-related expenses are mounting and, what is more, according to reports circulating in the West, their actual amounts are considerably at odds with officially cited figures. For instance, in U.S. financial circles the cost of the Chechen operation is estimated at \$3 billion. By U.S. analysts' estimates, the reconstruction of the republic's economy would cost approximately the same amount. So, given the sensitivity of Western investors, the falling rates of hard-currency bonds and Russian foreign debts look entirely natural. [passage omitted]

Tatarstan's Premier Announces Resignation

LD1201161795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1502 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kazan, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—Mukhammat Sabirov, head of the Tatar government, has resigned. President Mintimer Shaymiyev announced the premier's resignation at a meeting of the republic's parliament presidium Thursday [12 January]. The official reason is formulated as the state needs. A final decision will be made at the session of parliament which will open in Kazan February 16.

Sabirov said that his resignation was caused by the lack of an agreed policy in the cabinet and a split in the team. Three of his deputies had resigned earlier. Four others are expected to maintain their positions. One deputy premiership is vacant.

At the parliament presidium meeting Speaker Farid Mukhametshin took Shaymiyev's offer of premiership.

Until the next elections the Tatarstan parliament is expected to be headed by Mukhametshin's deputies Zil Valeev and Aleksandr Lozovoi.

Shaymiyev told the presidium meeting that the government reshuffle before the elections was necessary because of the complicated economic situation and the need to make radical and urgent decisions.

International Affairs

Foreign Ministry Denies Crimean Tatars Involved in Chechnya

LD1201204495 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry has denied individual press reports abroad on the participation of Crimean Tatars in the Chechen developments on General Dudayev's side. Individual reports of such a kind in the mass media, according to a statement by the press center of Ukraine's Foreign Affairs Ministry obtained by ITAR-TASS, cannot be interpreted as anything other than misinformation.

Official: Chechnya No Obstacle to Signing Russia Treaty

WS1201113295 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0117 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 11—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's policy towards Chechnya will not be an obstacle to the signing of the Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation Treaty between Russia and Ukraine, presidential chief of staff Dmytro Tabachnyk said Wednesday [11 January].

"The agreement is an imperative problem for Ukraine, because it guarantees the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders," said Tabachnyk.

Both sides have agreed upon 90 percent of the document text, and the remaining section "depends upon diplomatic technology," not upon the negotiation of any major disputes," said Tabachnyk. "Some of the articles of the agreement have been rewritten 20-30 times," he said.

"I assure you, work on the agreement is moving forward," said Tabachnyk. "I am sure the agreement will not hurt the state interests of Ukraine," he added.

"I would like to regard the first several months of this year as a time for establishing neighborly relations with Russia, including signing of a long-term treaty between our countries. This is extremely important for Ukraine," said Kuchma Tuesday after his trip to Georgia.

Kuchma Adviser: Russia 'Apparently' Halts Pact Talks

WS1301100395 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0800 GMT 13 Jan 95

[Unattributed report from the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At a briefing on January 11, Dmytro Tabachnyk, chief of the Presidential Administration, stated that as of today, 90 percent of the text of a wide-ranging agreement between Ukraine and Russia has been accepted by the two sides. Nonetheless, the agreement is not likely to be signed in the very near

future. Mr. Tabachnyk further stated that Russia has apparently decided to temporarily halt the negotiation process.

No consultations regarding this agreement have been held between Kiev and Moscow since the beginning of the year. Oleg Soskovets, a deputy prime minister in the Russian Government, postponed his trip to Kiev, scheduled for late December, citing as a reason the complex situation in Chechnya. Mr. Soskovets was due to discuss the final wording of the text with Yevhen Marchuk, the Ukrainian deputy prime minister. Afterwards, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement, in which it denounced the presence of Ukrainian mercenaries in Chechnya. Although it is well known that mercenaries from various countries are actively fighting in the Chechen war zone, the Russian Foreign Ministry decided to single out Ukrainian mercenaries. Perhaps, Russia is, indeed, looking for a pretext to cancel any further talks on the subject of the nearly completed agreement as beneficial to Ukraine, since it will become yet another guarantee of Ukraine's security interests.

Once Yeltsin and Kuchma sign this document, the negotiations regarding the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet immediately acquire a different character. In accordance with this agreement, Russia will only be able to lease the naval ports and facilities on the Crimean coast. Moreover, any further discussion on issuing Russian passports to the residents of the Crimean peninsula will be simply meaningless. At a time when Yeltsin is facing growing opposition at home to Russia's military invasion in Chechnya, the chances of concluding a Russian-Ukrainian agreement seem even more remote. Besides, Ukraine has yet to conclude an agreement on friendship and cooperation with Romania, whose territorial claims to Ukrainian soil are somewhat rhetorical in nature and, in any event, by far less intimidating than Russia's.

Donetsk Council Reinstates Russian as Official Language

LD1201173995 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of Donetsk city council has ruled to allow the use of the Russian language on Donetsk territory. According to the decision, Russian will be used alongside Ukrainian in business and legal documentation, and in educational, science, and cultural establishments. The question whether to grant Russian the status of a working language was previously discussed by Donetsk Oblast council, but no decision was made at the time.

Presidential Assistant States Political Priorities

AU1201143795 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 7 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Rayisa Stetsyura: "Oleksandr Razumkov: 'Ukraine's External Political Course Will Be Oriented Toward Cooperation With CIS Countries, First and Foremost With Russia'"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] "Ukraine's external political course will be oriented toward cooperation with CIS countries, first and foremost with Russia." This was stated by the Ukrainian president's first assistant at a briefing on 4 January at the Ukrainian Presidential Administration building. He believes that, this year, "the Russian factor in mutual relations will be a determining one for our country." Oleksandr Razumkov is convinced that Ukraine will sign a large-scale agreement on friendship and cooperation with Russia in the near future and that all problems regarding the Black Sea Fleet will be resolved.

In his opinion, Ukraine must exert maximum effort to raise Ukrainian-Russian relations to a qualitatively new level. This not only concerns the political aspect. Oleksandr Razumkov stressed that the idea of creating transnational corporations with the participation of CIS countries is very promising. It will also make it possible to avoid many political problems.

The first assistant to the Ukrainian president believes that such problems must also be urgently resolved within the state. A reorganization of state power must become the first step in this direction, as it will have a beneficial effect on economic processes. In Oleksandr Razumkov's opinion, they will be successful, provided that the vertical structure of executive power is clearly defined and a legal venue is created to rule out contradictions between the legislative and executive powers. This must be taken care of by the constitutional bill "On State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine."

National Affairs

Kuchma Addresses Editors, Attacks Government Policy

LD1201154195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1415 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhitomir [no date as received]—"The implementation of economic reforms leads us to the question of reorganization and structural change in the government," President Leonid Kuchma told an all-Ukrainian conference of national, regional and local newspaper editors on 12 January. "It should be more autonomous, and independent of parliament and political parties," he said.

"The government today is poorly managed, working to no particular pattern, and almost never dealing with key economic issues, not even the energy-saving problem. Thus, the issue of increasing export potential remains beyond its attention. The government is also suffering from internal differences. Top government officials are creating fertile ground for making certain commercial entities very rich," President Kuchma said.

Speaking on the probability of Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol's resignation, the Ukrainian president said he is "ready to work with anyone," but needs "specific proposals."

Civic Congress Party Declares Opposition to President

LD1201211295 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Civic Congress of Ukraine Party has declared its opposition to President Leonid Kuchma as of today. A statement by the party says Kuchma has renounced his election promises and shows no serious intention of fighting the heavy legacy of the former regime, Ukraine's self-isolation. Having become president, he also put aside his other electoral trump card, the promise of equal status to the Russian and Ukrainian languages, the Civic Congress of Ukraine says. Its members also accuse the president of blindly following the International Monetary Fund.

The Civic Congress of Ukraine mostly unites representatives of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine's east. According to INTERFAX-UKRAINE, the party campaigns for an economic, political, and military union of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Kuchma Warns 1995 Will Be Toughest Yet for Economy

LD1201215895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan 12 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—"The year of 1995 will be the most difficult for the Ukrainian economy," Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma told the editors-in-chief of the regional media in Zhitomir today.

Kuchma said that "either the situation will be changed for the better or we will face a complete crash." "We have no more reserves," he added.

Commenting on the draft state budget for 1995, Kuchma said it would be "the toughest one comparing to all past years." He said "assignments will be directed only to the vital needs, including social security, law enforcement, health care, the army and some others." Kuchma said he did not intend to boost money supply and resolve economic problems by raising the inflation.

Kuchma said the Ukrainian leaders planned to cancel "numerous tax privileges." He said that in 1994 the amount of privileges totalled 268 trillion karbovatys decreasing budget revenues by 38 percent.

Kuchma Urges Journalists To Back Reforms

LD1201230995 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in 1900 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's chronicle of events brought us a somewhat unexpected statement by the head of state, Leonid Kuchma, to the effect that pro-presidential sentiments of certain mass media are required neither by the president nor society.

What we need is not propaganda but explanation of the objective nature of economic reforms—this quotation from today's speech by Leonid Kuchma at the all-Ukrainian conference of editors of central and regional newspapers is cited by the UNIAN agency. Meanwhile, UTN [Ukrainian TV news agency] special correspondents have dispatched a video report from Zhitomir, where the conference took place.

[Unidentified correspondent] A two-day all-Ukrainian conference of editors of rayon, city, and oblast newspapers took place in Zhitomir. It is their conscientious work that President Leonid Kuchma pins his hopes on. He delivered a report at the conference.

[Begin Kuchma recording] A genuine revolution in our citizens' conscience, significantly distorted by the previous history, is required today. If the situation is not changed, the process of getting out of the systemic crisis will take much more time, will acquire a more painful nature, and will be fraught with the danger of social conflicts. Help on the part of the mass media, particularly the local press, would be invaluable in carrying out this work. Moreover, we do not need propaganda, we need explanation and clarification of the objective nature and inevitability of the initiated changes. We should consolidate society rather than cultivate feelings of pessimism and despair everywhere.

For example, an opinion has already been formed that privatization is nothing but plundering, that the authorities encourage the squandering of the national assets to

the benefit of the International Monetary Fund, that allocation of land to private owners [payuvannya zemli] is sure to lead to a war over balks and [word indistinct]. What is more, I would like to focus your attention on the fact that, consciously or unconsciously, those aspects are touched upon, first and foremost, that serve to a certain extent as an indicator and a key element of the systemic economic transformations.

Of course, I am far from demanding that the press should serve the authorities blindly. What I have in mind is something different: This is impartiality and balance, sincerity in an attempt to look into the vital issues of society's development, an attempt void of political narrow-mindedness and incorrect interpretation of various social processes. Truth, scientific substantiation, and authenticity are the principles on which we all—the president and journalists—should build our activities. If we honestly abide by the above principles, I am sure that the differences between the president and the fourth power [the press] will be minimal. [end recording]

[Correspondent] 620 participants in the conference—editors in chief and responsible secretaries of Ukraine's periodicals from almost all oblasts of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea—seem to be ready to support the radical reforms initiated by the president of Ukraine for the sake of overcoming the crisis and for the sake of our country's economic revival. [passage omitted]

Belarus

Party Leaders Discuss Upcoming Elections

WS1101150095 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1200
GMT 10 Jan 95

[Unattributed report from the "Commentaries, Analysis, Forecasts" feature No.13, 3-10 January]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] The most radical prognosis comes from an MP in the Supreme Soviet Syarhey Antonchyk, who, as known, sharply raised the question of the struggle against corruption again, speaking before parliament with a report about corruption in the presidential team. Antonchyk suggests that now documents are being intensively prepared, which in about two weeks will accuse the MP of using false documents to prepare his report. According to Antonchyk, in the new year there will be no struggle against corruption from the side of the power structures and this is above all because there has been a revolution to a totalitarian state, in which the corruption of bureaucrats is greater. After the election of the new parliament, in Antonchyk's opinion, there may be a very strong clash between the presidential power and the new members of the Supreme Soviet, and before the elections the relations between the president and the democratic forces will be aggravated. Following this Alyaksandr Lukashenka's team will rudely breach the Constitution. It is possible, predicts Syarhey Antonchyk, that in February-April society will raise the question of introducing a Belarusian referendum concerning faith in the president.

The prime minister of the shadow cabinet of the parliamentary opposition the Belarusian Popular Front, Uladzimir Zablotski, points out in his prognosis that the self-destructive mechanism running the economy is still working, and there are no foundations to assume the economic crisis will decelerate in the new year. It is not likely that a national currency will be introduced while no conditions are created to keep it stable. We will not be threatened by an energy famine only if the state coffers are not exhausted. Judging from the last declarations of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Uladzimir Zablotski asserts that the president would do anything for the economic integration of Belarus with Russia.

The chairman of the Party of People's Accord Henadz Karpenka considers that a further fall in the living standards of the Belarusian people is inevitable. The day before the parliamentary elections there will probably be mass protests against the current leadership of the Republic. In the new composition of the Supreme Soviet most seats will belong to the forces of the opposition. The new parliament cannot be involved in old intrigues as is the current parliament, because, in the opinion of Karpenka, the development of the political conflict between them and the president's administration is programmed.

In the opinion of Viktor Chykin, one of the leaders of the communist movement in Belarus, in the new Supreme

Soviet there will not be a clear-cut majority representation. The BPF [Belarusian Popular Front] and the communists will win about 25-30 percent of the mandates. As a result, especially in questions concerning the relationship with the presidential team, there will theoretically be a possibility for some cooperation. Yet Mr. Chykin is very guarded concerning the activities of the electorate during the new parliamentary elections. It may happen that this process drags on for more than one month. Moreover, the leader of the communists predicts the repetition of mass unemployment and the mass strikes which occurred in April 1991. This could mean the worst possible consequences for the executive power.

As always, the former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus Stanislaw Shushkevich is very careful in his predictions. He emphasized that his prognosis for 1995 is very gloomy, but would not go into details. He only remarked that the basis for such gloom is the vanity of those in power, the attempt of one force or another to become an enemy, the incompetence of the leading structures to reform the economy, and the absence of a force able to prevent complete foolishness.

The chairman of the Belarusian Peasants' Party Yawhen Luhin views the future actions of the president with more optimism. According to him, however the new parliament will be, that is how the president will become as well, having to adapt himself to the new conditions.

The apportionment of the new parliament, according to the prognosis of Aleh Trusaw, chairman of the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada, will be such that the democrats will win about 51 percent of the mandates. It is true, and there are already some indications, that a single democratic pre-election bloc will be created. By autumn 1995, Mr. Trusaw considers, Mikhail Chyhir's cabinet will fall, and at the end of the year the declaration of the impeachment of the president himself is not out of the question. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections both market reforms and the processes of national revival are suspended. Social tension is mounting, and we will not get through spring without mass strikes. The chief of the Belarusian social-democrats considers that nothing will threaten the political state of Belarus, as distinguished from the economic.

As we can see, with certain variations these prognoses all make the same point. The new year will be no easier than 1994. But they are not all without hope. The most important one, is a radical change in parliament.

Presidential Power Law Passes First Reading

MM1201124595 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 3

[BELINFORM-TASS report: "Law on Presidency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk, 11 January—Belorussian [Belarusian] Supreme Soviet deputies have adopted a fundamentally new concept of presidential power in the republic. By passing the draft law "On the President of

the Republic of Belarus" on its first reading they have in fact given the go-ahead to a course of considerable curbs on presidential powers on the part of the parliament.

During the preparation of the draft law substantial differences arose between the Supreme Soviet commission for the organizational development of the state and representatives of the presidential administration. The president's representatives are categorically opposed to the enshrining in law of a provision under which, if the president undergoes treatment outside the republic or is admitted to hospital as an in-patient, the head of state personally or, on his instructions, the head of the cabinet of ministers is obliged to inform the Supreme Soviet within 10 days that it is impossible for the president to perform his duties because of his state of health. The president's representatives believe that in the event of Supreme Soviet disagreement with the nomination of candidates proposed by the head of state, the president should have the right to appoint an acting incumbent at his own discretion for a period of six months. The commission members consider that three months is sufficient.

The parliamentarians decided to somewhat curb the head of state's rights in instances of the absence of legislative norms necessary for the president to exercise the powers of head of the executive branch. That is, to prohibit him from replacing laws with edicts.

Other proposals from the presidential team also failed to win support. Many deputies pointed out that the legal status of the president's staff must be precisely regulated.

'Russians' Said To Recruit for Chechnya

WS1201153295 Minsk BTK Television Network in Belarusian 1900 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the information service "Mass Media Center," recruiting of our citizens for participation in Chechen events has been uncovered on the territory of Belarus. It became known to the Belarusian special services that representatives of the Russian Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs more than once visited Belarus for recruitment purposes. At least five such visits were noted. Recruiting agents are especially interested in reserve servicemen with special skills: combat engineers, signallers, operators of artillery systems, and some others.

Those desiring to take part in military operations on the Russian Armed Forces' side are to sign a printed contract stipulating all conditions of the hire, including compensations in the event of injuries or death. Apart from this, mercenaries are immediately granted \$1,500 in cash.

Syanko Signs 'Partnership for Peace' Program

WS1201160595 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko

has signed a framework document on the "Partnership for Peace" program. Belarus has become the 24th country to have joined the program.

Before the ceremony signing the program, Uladzimir Syanko met with NATO Secretary General [Willy] Claes. In the course of the meeting the sides exchanged opinions on international developments and the situation in CIS countries, particularly, in the Republic of Belarus. Claes expressed his deep satisfaction with the fact that the new leadership of independent Belarus decided to join the "Partnership for Peace" program, and thus demonstrated its intention to contribute to the construction of the new architecture of all-European security. Foreign Department Chief Syanko informed Claes about the internal political situation in the Republic of Belarus, and described measures taken by the country's leadership in the area of economic reforms and democratization of society. He said that the signing of the framework document by Belarus is an important step on the path to gradual integration of our country into the European community.

Foreign Minister Syanko also met with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State [Strobe] Talbott. In the course of the meeting, the Belarusian foreign minister addressed a range of issues of significant importance to bilateral cooperation between Belarus and the United States. In particular, he requested that the process of establishing a joint Belarusian-U.S. center for business development be accelerated, the assistance to Belarus within the framework of the Nunn-Lugar bill be made more active, and that the Republic be supported in its relations with IMF. He also said that Belarus is interested in the speedier signing of a bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance in civil, criminal, and family cases.

SABR 'Regrets' Joining

WS1301102095 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1603 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Slavic Assembly "Belaya Rus" (SABR) has made a statement in which it expresses "regrets for Belarus' joining the NATO program." According to the SABR leaders, this may entail the deterioration of relations with the fraternal Russian Federation.

Deputies Fail To Advance Budget Bill

WS1301102495 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1601 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On 12 January, at the morning and afternoon sittings the Supreme Soviet did not advance one step in the passing of the bill "On the Budget Estimates of the Republic of Belarus for 1995." In the morning the parliamentarians debated the expenditure of the budget. Then President Alyaksandr Lukashenka made an address, he urgently asked the parliament to approve the budget estimates, not putting them off for another two weeks. At the moment the Supreme Soviet continues discussing the bill.

Moldova

Snegur, Clinton To Discuss Aid During Visit

LD1201183095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1701
GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: Compiled by Nikolai Zhrebtssov and Andrei Petrovsky; Edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [no dateline as received] President Mircea Snegur is going to the United States late this month for a working visit at the invitation of his U.S. counterpart, Bill Clinton.

The two leaders are due to meet at the White House on January 30 to discuss American assistance to economic reforms in Moldova, sources close to Snegur told Interfax. They are also expected to look at the political situation in Moldova's breakaway region of Transdnister and at prospects for the implementation of an agreement between Chisinau and Moscow to have the Russian 14th Army withdrawn from Moldova.

The Council of Europe will not grant its full membership to Moldova before the 14th Army is gone, a Council delegation currently visiting Moldova told its prime minister, Andrei Sangheli. Sangheli replied that Russia had not yet decided how to put into effect the withdrawal agreement, namely whether the accord is to be ratified by its parliament or just be endorsed by its government. He said a Russian delegation was shortly due in Chisinau to clarify the point.

The premier said the future transit of the 14th Army's 400,000 tonnes of armaments and ammunition through Ukraine also posed a problem since a decision on how to pay for it had to be taken by the Russian parliament.

The Council of Europe delegation on Thursday was due to leave for Tiraspol, capital of Transdnister, to meet the region's political leaders, members of local ethnic minorities and religious communities and Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the 14th Army, which is stationed there.

According to the chairman of the Moldovan parliament's Foreign Policy Commission, Dmitriy Dyakov, the delegation's main task is to collect facts for a report on whether Moldova is fit to be a full member of the Council. The country's admission will be considered by a plenary session of the Council in Strasbourg next spring or summer, Dyakov told Interfax.

Moscow Calls Off 14th Army Inspection

AU1201171195 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930
GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 11/1/1995—The scheduled inspection of the 14th Army by Russian Defence Ministry Commissions was postponed and so far it is not known if they will resume their

activity at all, BASA learned from the 14th Army command. In a telephone discussion with 14th Army officers, Vladimir Semenov, Russian ground troops supreme commander, said that no flight to Tiraspol or Chisinau is planned; the commissions for administrative problems and for ground troops, and General Konstantin Kobets himself declined Pavel Grachev's directive to leave for Tiraspol to penalize [14th Army Commander] Lebed for his harsh attitude toward the conflict in Chechnya. This morning, General Kobets categorically denied the information that he was to leave for Tiraspol to discharge Aleksandr Lebed. Kobets said that, indeed, he will soon visit Tiraspol together with a group of officers but his inspection of the 14th Army will be "an ordinary one as stipulated in regions."

BASA learned from the 14th Army that the 14th Army command did not agree to receive the three commissions from Moscow that were to inspect the 14th Army. Their visit to Chisinau was called off today and the date of inspection was not announced. The quoted sources presuppose that Aleksandr Lebed alluded to the Russian Defence Ministry that he refuses to have any kind of discussions with the members of these commissions as well as with Russian Vice Minister of Defence General Konstantin Kobets. The same sources think that in order to avoid this awkward situation, the Moscow Ministry of Defence leadership called off the visit to Tiraspol. Last November, Lebed declared that he does not accept to be inspected by the commission headed by General Matvey Burlakov, former commander of the Russian ground forces in Germany. As a consequence, the inspection was called off, relay the quoted sources.

Transdnistrian Leader on Demilitarization

LD1201154495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1400
GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TIRASPOL, Jan 12 (Interfax) - Igor Smirnov, president of the unrecognized Transdnistrian Moldovan republic believes that a demilitarized zone in Moldova is essential if the regional crisis is to be settled.

Meeting a delegation of the Council of Europe led by David Atkinson, chairman of the Commission on contacts with European non-member countries, Smirnov declared that Tiraspol and Kishinev [Chisinau] have so far been unable to overcome "the barrier of alienation and distrust that has come up after an armed conflict in Transdnistria in the summer of 1992."

Smirnov believes that such a demilitarized zone and retained neutrality in Moldova could help to remove this obstacle. He wished that Russia or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would act as the guarantor of the non-use of force.

Regarding the property issue as crucial to a settlement in Transdnistria, he stressed that pending the final solution to the problem his government will be categorically

against the withdrawal of the 14th Russian army from the region since this army is in his opinion a bulwark of regional security and stability.

Official Sees Withdrawal Accord as 'Success'

AU1201172295 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2300 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, INFOTAG, 11/1/1995—The First Deputy Foreign Minister, Nicolae Osmochescu, considers the agreement on the 14th Russian Army withdrawal as a success of the Moldovan diplomacy.

In his interview with INFOTAG he disagreed with the assessment of the document given by Anatol Taranu, former Moldovan Ambassador to the Russian Federation, who believes the agreement is a mistake of Moldovan diplomats.

"Mr. Taranu claims the three-year term is too long. But we proceeded from the situation on site. Military experts have scrutinized the armament stocks, and have come to a conclusion that the term is optimum. One should bear in mind that dozens of thousand tons of armaments and ammunition are stockpiled on the eastern side of the Dniester River, that were intended not only for the 14th Army, but for the entire South-Western Group of the Warsaw Pact. Besides, over 30 percent of the arsenals are the so-called Category 3, i.e. they cannot be removed and must be annihilated on site. And this needs time, too", Osmochescu said.

He pointed out the necessity to take into consideration transit via Ukraine, technical capacities of railroads, and many other factors affecting the withdrawal duration.

Concerning Taranu's criticism of synchronizing the withdrawal process with the political settlement in Dniester, Osmochescu pointed out that the term 'synchronization' appeared in use when Taranu was head of the Moldovan delegation at the negotiations with Russia. "And there are all prerequisites to solve the Dniester problem politically during the three years in question", Osmochescu said.

In his view, events in the Chechen republic may make the Agreement implementation longer.

"Any event in any country affects, to a greater or lesser extent, the balance of political forces, may lead to changes in leadership, etc. The Chechen events, which may influence Russian policy, are able to complicate the Agreement realization, that it cannot be stopped completely, because even in the current, non-ratified state the document is binding on both sides that signed it. At least this last circumstance makes it impossible to consider the Agreement as a mistake of the Moldovan diplomacy, Osmochescu said.

Confident About Dniester Settlement

AU1301115995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1950 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, INFOTAG, 12/1/1995—The First Deputy Foreign Minister Nicolae

Osmochescu believes there are all prerequisites for soon political settlement of the Dniester conflict. He said in his interview with INFOTAG that he proceeded from the existing realities in the current relationship between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

"We have removed many controversies. Expert groups have been working fairly well. The experts held four meetings in recent time, and advanced far in elaborating a status for Dniester", Osmochescu said.

He pointed out that the sides had achieved a very important agreement: the Dniester problem has to be solved in the framework of integral and indivisible Moldova. This principal moment has already been agreed upon and fixed in the preamble of the status draft law.

The sides have also agreed to arrange meetings monthly between the Moldovan and Dniester leaders, and have delineated a circle of problems to be solved in near time.

"Thus, we have agreed that the next summit scheduled for February 15 will be devoted to discussing interim document on Dniester status. The working groups are supposed to prepare by that time a summary status draft. Everything what have already been negotiated and settled shall be included in the draft as our common position, and so far disputable issues shall be presented in two variants", Osmochescu said.

"The principal results of the work accomplished is that we have overcome the formerly hostile attitude toward each other, and switched from reciprocal accusations over to finding reasonable solutions".

Concerning a possible introduction of the Moldovan leu in Dniester, Osmochescu said that problem had not been solved yet.

"Our Dniestrian counterparts now realize that all accounts have to be effected on the leu basis. Tiraspol showed such understanding before, but insisted on correlating the leu to the Russian ruble. But that was and is unrealistic, because the leu is relatively stable, while the ruble is not. Very many Dniester enterprises have bank accounts in the Moldovan national currency, and they pay salaries to their workers in the Moldovan lei. Hence, the leu is already being used in Dniester and sooner or later it shall become a single means of payment throughout the Moldovan territory", the first deputy foreign minister said.

Dniester Militia Detains Two Journalists

AU1201145095 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 2300 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, INFOTAG, 11/1/1995—On the Orthodox Christmas Eve, two free-lance journalists from Chisinau, Alexander Tkhorov and Vladimir Popov, were detained by the Dniester militia in Bendery. Both reporters are active participants in a special investigation team operating under the Joint

Control Commission and involved in search for persons missing from the 1992 armed conflict in Dniester.

As Alexander Tkhorov explained to INFOTAG, the journalists have been detained after they thumbed a lift in a Bendery street. A private car they thus halted happened to be driven by a Dniester interior captain.

The officer demanded them to show their identification documents, and summoned by radio a squad of submachine-gunners, who delivered the two, on their own insistence, to the City Military Commandant's Office.

No physical pressure was used against them. However, the journalists were deprived of their documents, and were forced to agree to take part in court proceedings right after Christmas. Tkhorov and Popov were warned that they would be accused of violating public order and insulting militiamen.

"In reality, the principal offenders in the situation were the militia themselves. Due to their efforts, the work of both the Dniester militia and the Moldovan police, who share one premise in Bendery, had been paralyzed for

five long hours. While the former sought for every pretext to through us to jail, the latter were doing their best to 'rescue' us, blaming such actions of militia were illegitimate", Tkhorov said.

In his words, a vicious practice has established in Bendery where, instead of catching criminals, the Dniester militia prefers to hunt for the Moldovan police. He believes that the attempt to blame the journalists of unclear "crimes" is largely due to the fact that both of them have been accredited in the Moldovan Interior Ministry's press center.

"I would like to point out the militia's low professional level. Having taken us for 'dangerous criminals', it did not even occur to them to search through our clothes for possible weapons. Things could be much more tragic for them if they had dealt not with casual journalists but with true criminals. Such an incompetence and carelessness took away the lives of two Dniester militiamen recently who were killed by an armed criminal when they attempted to detain him", Tkhorov said.

Kazakhstan**Nazarbayev Leaves for Treatment in Moscow**

LD1301093395 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0852 GMT 13 Jan 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev left by air on Friday [13 January] for an unofficial visit to Moscow, the president's press service informed INTERFAX. In Moscow Nursultan Nazarbayev will undergo a course of treatment. The president of Kazakhstan will spend about a week in Moscow. After that, he may have a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Presidential Decree Liberalizes Foreign Trade

LD1301095295 Almaty Kazakhstan Television Network in Russian 1500 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to further liberalize foreign economic activity, the president of the republic has issued a decree granting all economic entities in the republic the right to carry out foreign economic activity, including intermediary activity. This excludes export and import deals involving resources of strategic importance, for which a list of exporters and importers is defined by the country's Cabinet of Ministers.

The full text of the decree is to be published in the press.

Kzyl Orda Region's Ecological Health Problems Worsen

LD1201161895 Almaty Kazakhstan Television Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Social issues have been the focus of our government's attention for a long time. In this connection the president issued some resolutions and the Supreme Council adopted several documents. There are enough laws, as well, but it seems that the Kzyl Orda regional administration is not working enough to ensure that these problems are tackled. Here is a report from our correspondent on this:

[Unidentified correspondent] The poisonous dust and various harmful remnants which fall to earth during the launch of spacecraft, the salt which has covered the soil, and in addition to that the worsening of people's living conditions, caused a rapid spread in such diseases as infectious typhus, epizootic illnesses, hepatitis, and infectious intestinal diseases in the Kzyl Orda region over the last few years. And also the number of people suffering from pulmonary diseases is increasing from year to year. About 700 people are registered every year as suffering from these diseases and 120-130 of them die of pulmonary diseases. Over recent years, out of 1,000 people, the number suffering from heart disease and respiratory problems has grown by ten times, from gall bladder and nephritis by six times, and from tumors 1.5

times. Over 10,000 people undergoing treatment at hospitals suffer from complicated types of nervous diseases. Over the last two years about 400 babies were born either sick or crippled.

It is true that there is a regional program on eliminating the regional ecological problems, and meetings by state officials on these matters are being held as well as scientific conferences. But it is also true that we do not see any results from this.

Profitable Company Questions Bankruptcy Order

LD1201171995 Almaty YEGEMEN KAZAKHISTAN in Kazakh 5 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Anna Kamkina, head of the economic planning department of the Pavlodar aluminum joint-stock company; "Can You Cut a Fur Coat Without Measuring?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, the first list of insolvent enterprises that might go bankrupt was published in the press. The Pavlodar aluminum joint-stock company also happened to be among them. Frankly speaking, this news struck the people at the factory—which was going to celebrate its 30th anniversary—like a bolt from the blue. People asked: How can a plant making profits go bankrupt? Who needed this? There seems to be enough major industrial enterprises, which make considerable contributions to the republic's economy, on the 'black list'. In my opinion, they were declared bankrupt in order to be sold to someone else later.

It is known that now any enterprise can undergo a temporary financial deficit. It is not clear who is behind such lists and who is jumping to hasty conclusions without thinking over the situation. It is also not known on whose behalf this has been done.

The Pavlodar aluminum plant was one of the significant and major non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises of the former Soviet Union. The plant came into operation on 6 November 1964. After 10 years, when it started operating at full production capacity, there has never been a time when the plant did not fulfill the state order. The plant did not decrease its production even in 1991-93 when the transition to the market economy began. For example, in 1991 production of goods in terms of that year's prices was 100 percent and the production of aluminum was 100 percent. In the following year these indices were 102.2 and 100 percent and in 1993 they rose to 104.8 and 103.7 percent respectively.

Now, let us dwell on the production situation in 1994. All the trouble started since the Pavlodar aluminum plant was transformed into KRAMDS [name as transliterated] on a holding basis. Otyrar, together with the foreign Trans World firm took our whole annual production into their hands. In doing this they ignored the provisions of their contract. By not providing funds for production, they just aggravated the situation for us.

Even though we managed to get rid of such 'well-wishers' in the end, we are still waiting for them to meet their commitments.

Production at the aluminum plant must be continuous. It cannot be halted, people cannot be sent on compulsory leave. The second specific point is that 95 percent of our output is being sent to Russian plants for further processing into finished products. Payment for this is being made in hard currency. But we are also suffering from a common disease, which is mutual nonpayments. Thus, we always happen to be between the hammer and the anvil because of our inability to pay in foreign currency for products. The consumers are also unable to pay for products, and as we sell our production for hard currency we have to recalculate others debts to us in accordance with the current exchange rate every month. It is for our own benefit. The amount the enterprise is owed is mainly counted in the national currency—the tenge. As incomes from the products sold are exchanged at the current rate and included in the balance profits there is very little money left for the enterprise's material fund. For example, over nine months of 1994 our balance profits were 1,420 million tenge. This includes 548 million tenge profits from the sale of products and about 862 million profit from money exchange. But some of it has still not been paid off by consumers, despite the fact that the enterprise has to pay taxes according to its total income. In this situation one can easily see where non-payments begin.

The Republic of Kazakhstan law on bankruptcy passed in 1992 and resolution No. 1002 issued by the Cabinet of Ministers on 7 September 1994 say that only an appropriate competent commission is authorized to declare an enterprise bankrupt. In our case neither the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Finance, or banks can give a proper explanation. Debts of and debts owed to the Pavlodar aluminum joint-stock company, if converted into coefficient, were 0.5 for the six months of 1994 and 0.9 for nine months. It is incomprehensible how an enterprise that had profits of 390.4 million tenge over six months and 482.5 million over nine months from selling its products can be called a bankrupt. Even the fact that total production profits over six months were 492.7 million tenge and 625 million over nine months was not taken into account.

We hope that the interdepartmental commission on reviving prospective enterprises and closing loss-making ones will give a full explanation of the reasons why our enterprise was included on the list.

Kyrgyzstan

OSCE Observers Arrive To Monitor Kyrgyz Election

LD1201150695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1303 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek January 12 TASS—Representatives of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] arrived in the Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] capital on Thursday [12 January] to monitor the Kirghiz parliament elections to be held on February 5. They are Stephanie Luti and Dominick Saudan. They were officially invited by the Kirghiz Government. On the first working day, the representatives of the OSCE began to analyse the political situation in Kirghizia and arranged a number of consultations with representatives of non-governmental organisations and political parties.

It is the second time that Kirghizia invites international observers to monitor the election campaign. The first group of observers worked in Kirghizia in October last during a referendum on changes in the Constitution. Summing up the results of the referendum, international observers then pointed to a democratic character, openness and principledness of the voting. They have not spotted any substantial drawbacks.

This time the Kirghiz authorities want the presence of international observers during the canvassing and the election.

Akayev: No Democracy Without Independent Civic Institutions

LD1201185195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1617 GMT 12 Jan 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] There will be no democracy in Kyrgyzstan without a broad network of effective civic institutions independent of the government and political groups, President Askar Akayev said Thursday in his policy-making speech at the first meeting of the Council of Elders in Bishkek.

The president thinks that the functioning of such councils which he described as a traditional body in modern conditions is closely linked with the task of building a strong civic society. Akayev thinks that the council can effectively influence the public opinion and consolidate the society.

The president said that the main purpose of the councils which should combine elements of civic, criminal and arbitration courts is to settle problems at the local level.

On Thursday [12 January] the conference discussed the regulations of the councils.

Investment Chief on Investment Policy

LD1301100895 Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA in Russian 7 Jan 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Askar Sarygulov: 'One Step Forward and Two Steps Back is Bad Policy'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The development of our economy largely depends on the amount of the assistance granted by which foreign donor countries and international financial organizations. And of course, we need to learn to use foreign credits and investments effectively and advantageously.

It is a rare day when Askar Islamovich Sarygulov, deputy chairman of the Kyrgyz State Commission for Foreign Investments and Economic Assistance, does not talk with foreigners. He is also the head of the general directorate of the State Commission for Investments. But in the West they are celebrating Christmas just now so the holiday has given him the opportunity not only to rest a bit, but also some spare time to talk with a reporter.

Correspondent: Perhaps, we will begin with the following question: Why was the State Commission for Investment created?

Sarygulov: The main aim is to coordinate foreign aid. Since Kyrgyzstan gained its independence it has not only received a great deal, but has also lost, above all, in economic terms. The center used to use about 12 percent of GDP to support the budget, but now there is no such subsidy. What was available to fill the gap? Naturally, there was only one hope—foreign assistance.

When experts from the World Bank and UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] came to Bishkek they spoke about their experience of working with other countries which have achieved independence. Whether the work will be successful or not depends on properly established institutions which are responsible for the coordination of foreign aid. The main thing is that this should be a structure of a very high level. [passage omitted]

The general directorate of the State Commission for Investments was formed in February 1993 and now, after two years of work, I see how true the advice of the World Bank and UNIDO was.

Correspondent: But, evidently there are such structures in other CIS countries as well?

Sarygulov: Now we are talking about the level. Our State Commission for Investments is unique in terms of status, and it is no accident that people from the CIS come here to study its experience. Moreover, the World Bank and UNIDO recommended the Kyrgyz State Commission for Investments as a successful model suitable for countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics.

Indeed, this is the only state commission that is headed by the prime minister. There are other commissions—for states of emergency, for controlling drugs, for closing down loss-making enterprises. But all of them are lower in status.

Our commission is a collective body which is made up of many members of the government. Therefore its decisions have a special significance. The general directorate is the executive working body of the commission. There are not so many of us, just 35, but the volume of work is fairly large.

Correspondent: What are you doing now?

Sarygulov: We are preparing a voluminous report on our activities in 1994, we will discuss it, then present it as an official document to ministries, departments and local administrations.

In addition, I would like to show you a special booklet that is called the "User's Manual" in English. The booklet is on the main tenets of our investment policy, the macro-economic situation in the republic, and contains basic information about Kyrgyzstan.

This document, which is now being printed in Turkey in 2,500 copies, will be a kind of a business card of the republic and is designed for potential investors. I think that we will receive all the copies by 7 or 8 January.

A similar document on direct foreign investments will be ready in the middle of this year.

Correspondent: Evidently, your sphere of activities mainly involves state investments?

Sarygulov: And credits given by international financial organizations as well. But we also work together with private investors. In principle commercial banks should deal with them, and first of all analyze and examine all proposed projects. But today these banks face great difficulties, so we have taken part of their troubles on ourselves.

For instance, the Government of Germany, through the German Bank of Reconstruction and Development, granted 15 million German marks targeted to support our economy, including 10 million for private business. The question arises: How can this credit line be established? We assigned a group of specialists to make a preliminary examination of projects, to analyze them, and then experts from the German bank will be brought into the work.

The joint-stock commercial bank, Kyrgyzstan, will be employed here as a financial channel. But in the future, after consolidating their positions, our banks will start working on the preparation of projects.

Correspondent: Does that mean that you are keeping control over all foreign credits?

Sarygulov: Not exactly. The World Bank allocated \$60 million under the PESAK [Expansion not known] program, and the state commission for closing down loss-making enterprises checks that these funds are used properly. The Ministry of Communications has also received credits. But we are also working at the stage of preparations for loans.

Correspondent: There is an opinion that foreign assistance often, as they say, goes down the drain.

Sarygulov: That is not completely true, although I have to say that at times it is difficult to control the situation. So, for instance, in 1993 the World Bank allocated \$60 million for the development of our economy. But there arise issues connected with the purchase of equipment, the time scale for supplies, and so on. Sometimes these procedures take 9-12 months. Say, initially we reserved some money for equipment, it is hard to say when we will receive the equipment—in May or in December. Sometimes our consumers suddenly change the orders they placed. And there have been several such cases which have caused blunders.

Correspondent: And how many investments does Kyrgyzstan get every year?

Sarygulov: It gets \$250-\$300 million in various forms. Namely, financial assistance which is intended to support the budget's revenue section. Then there is technical aid and loans for the implementation of investment projects, and finally, grants which do not have to be paid back. Incidentally, the Commission of the European Community (CEC) has allocated Kyrgyzstan \$40 million and will deliver flour, oil, and children's food.

Sarygulov: Evidently the CEC decided to smooth over the impression from the first credit which was not very successful for us, didn't it?

Correspondent: Yes, that was a short term high interest commercial credit. And at that time we were inexperienced. But it happened so and it has passed. Today, preferential credits are, in general, being extended for a term of 40 years and with a 10-year [repayment] deferral and an interest rate of 1-3 percent.

Correspondent: And do we "eat up" the foreign aid?

Sarygulov: I would put it differently: How efficiently do we use it? Since Nanayev became finance minister, the approach to the expenditure of money has become very different. And that is right. Let us say that the republic has obtained \$30 million, which, converted into our currency is approximately 300 million soms. It now depends on the Ministry of Finance what the money will be used for. And God forbid we should make the same mistakes again.

Correspondent: What do you mean?

Sarygulov: Just remember how the government was forced by the Supreme Council to allocate large amounts of money to support the production of collective and state farms in the fall of 1993. But the state order was not abolished and freedom was not given to the producers. And then a sharp reaction started—the government did not have spare money and therefore there were no sales. No sales means no profits. Taxes do not reach the treasury and people are not paid their wages as a result. And what have we gained? We have added 20 soms to

wages but inflation has eaten up 35 soms due to credit emissions. Do people really need this?

The government should be consistent in carrying out the reforms. One step forward and two steps back is a bad policy. But we should explain to the people the need for radical reforms. Any deviation can lead to deplorable results.

Correspondent: Askar Islamovich, with which [group of] foreigners has joint work given you the most satisfaction?

Sarygulov: I would not like to single out anybody. But, since the question has been put, we have excellent relations with the German experts. A mission came from Japan in December. One of the specialists is 68 years old; he has devoted to the textile industry for more than 40 years. And he advised: Only five million [currency not specified] can be allocated for the project and not the 20 million which were asked for. And he is right, you know! I think such technical assistance should most likely be paid for. Do you know how much money that person is saving us?

Correspondent: Of course you encounter problems.

Sarygulov: They do exist. Different donor countries have their own approaches and we have to find the optimum version. Frankly speaking, some ministries are not ready to receive foreign aid. It is necessary to strengthen support for private enterprise. Finally, and probably it is the main thing, it is not only Bishkek but the regions also that need assistance. This is becoming one of the priority areas of our policy. I hope we will establish closer contacts with the state committee on the economy. [passage omitted]

Correspondent: And how has the new year begun for you? With foreign delegations, most likely?

Sarygulov: Nothing of the kind! They celebrate Christmas, you know. But usually I have 5-6 meetings a day, sometimes up to 12.

Correspondent: And do you have to find a common language with every visitor?

Sarygulov: Of course I do! By the way, this summer there were heated disputes about the political situation in the republic. Do you remember what President Akayev was accused of? I talked to the U.S. ambassador and spoke about the features of democracy in different countries. You know, the United States has made many mistakes during its 200 years of independence, although its people's mentality differs from ours. So, should the Americans be didactic in discussions?

Frankly speaking, foreign countries and international organizations extend many investments on the basis of our president, noting his loyalty to democratic policies. By the way, the foreign press usually says everything it

thinks and it does not spare the heads of governments. But their attitude to our president is one of respect and is good.

Correspondent: Christmas is coming to an end. What next?

Sarygulov: Three missions are to come: from the European Community, the Asian bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Again, meetings and again normal work. It seems to me that only our schoolchildren will have longer vacations than usual.

Tajikistan

UN Military Observers Meet Rakhmanov

LD1201145895 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0625 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Abaza, head of the UN group of military observers in Tajikistan, and Roman Mishtal, adviser to the UN group of military observers in Tajikistan, held talks yesterday with Emomali Rakhmanov, leader of the communist regime.

The conversation dealt with issues relating to the implementation of the Tehran and Islamabad inter-Tajik agreements, and the preparations for the regular round of [inter-Tajik] talks in Moscow.

Interviewed by Tajik television after the meeting, Roman Mishtal said in reply to a reporter's question on the observers' relationship with the opposition:

Our relationship with the opposition takes place through their representatives who are the members of the joint cease-fire commission.

The reporter's second question was about the observers' opinion of the inter-Tajik talks.

Our point of view is positive, otherwise we would not come to Tajikistan, Roman Mishtal stressed.

Election Campaign Begins Despite Calls For Postponement

LD1201120195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1143 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe January 12 ITAR-TASS—Tajikistan today began registration of candidates for seats in the country's new national legislature and local government.

According to the Central Electoral Commission, "the election campaign has begun in an atmosphere of notable public activity".

Independent observers note however that the election date may be changed and put off, since international organisations, including the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have pointed out that some clauses in the country's election law are not

democratic in character as they rule out the participation of the political opposition in the elections.

OSCE Secretary-General Wilhelm Hoynck in his recent visit to Dushanbe discussed the postponement of the elections with President Emomali Rakhmanov. The secretary general insisted that such a decision would testify to the leader's flexible policy in the field of political plurality.

The U.N. secretary-general's special envoy to Tajikistan Ramiro Peres Ballon, who presided over three rounds of talks between the government and the opposition on the political settlement in Tajikistan, voiced a similar wish. He said the political opposition will be able to return to the country's political life as soon as required changes to Tajik laws are made.

Abdumalik Abduladzhonov, 45, once a candidate for the post of the president of Tajikistan and now chairman of the Popular Unity Party registered in the republic recently, told ITAR-TASS that he would back the proposal to reschedule the elections.

Uzbekistan

Envoy: Afghan Mojahedin Screened on Way to Chechnya

LD1201213095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tashkent, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—Uzbekistan has become a screen on the way of Afghan mercenaries to Chechnya, a high-ranking Uzbek diplomat told Interfax. Thanks to this, there are much fewer Mojahedins in Chechnya as could be, he said. The diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity confirmed Tashkent's position towards the Chechnya crisis, according to which Chechnya was an item of the Russian Federation and must obey to the Russian Constitution and law.

The source remarked that "it is a strong Russia that can guarantee stability within the CIS, and this is the reason why its weakening is unprofitable."

The diplomat made clear that but for the presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan, the republic would have long been in the hands of "other forces." In his opinion, "this would have affected the stability of the whole Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, in the most tragic way and led to spreading Moslem fundamentalism here, which Uzbekistan has always opposed."

Natural Gas Sold to Kyrgyzstan at 1994 Prices

LD1201105795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1046 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek January 12 TASS—The ex-Soviet republics of Kirgizia [Kyrgyzstan] and Uzbekistan have signed an intergovernmental agreement on mutual most favoured treatment in trade and economic

cooperation for one year, the press service of the government of Kyrgyzstan reported today.

The agreement's main clauses provide for the lifting of export/import customs duties earlier levied on goods moving between the two republics.

In addition, Uzbek natural gas will be sold in Kyrgyzstan at the 1994 prices, which are sixty percent lower than the world market prices.

Third Repeat Election Ordered for Constituency

LD1301105395 Tashkent NARODNOYE SLOVO in Russian 11 Jan 95 p 1

["Resolution by the Central Election Commission for elections to the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan: On holding repeat elections in Constituency No.238/Universitetskiy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In line with Article 44 of the Law of the Republic on Elections to the Supreme Assembly of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Central Election Commission resolves:

1. Repeat elections are to be held in Constituency No.238/Universitetskiy 22 January in view of the fact that in the [repeat] elections held 8 January 1995 neither of the two candidates standing here was elected to the post of deputy.

2. The election commission set up to hold the main elections is instructed to run the repeat election.

[Signed] Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Q. Ahmedov; Secretary of the Central Election Commission, A. Anorqulov.

Armenia

Russian Mig-23's Arrive; First Joint Missions Flown

MM1201140795 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report from "Inform" roundup: "Russian Army Enters Armenia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the signing of an Armenian-Russian agreement on the creation of a Russian military base in Armenia, two squadrons of Russian MiG-23 air defense fighter-interceptors arrived in the republic recently. On the eve of 1995 the first joint missions were carried out. To be more precise, Russian pilots flew while the Armenian military provided ground support. Major General Aleksey Tretyakov, commander of the combat command and control group for the Russian Armed Forces on Armenian territory, expressed the hope that cooperation between Armenia and Russia in the creation of a single air defense system will continue successfully.

Speaker, Iranian Delegation Discuss Cooperation

NC1201204395 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International
Service in Armenian 1615 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Babken Ararktsyan, chairman of Armenian Supreme Council, received on 11 January an Iranian delegation which is on an official working visit to Armenia lead by the Iranian Economy and Finance Minister Dr. Mohammad-Khani.

In welcoming the guests, Ararktsyan expressed satisfaction at the steadily growing mutually advantageous multifaceted cooperation between the two countries. Babken Ararktsyan noted particularly that the friendly interstate ties are at the present stage manifesting themselves in new forms, thus consolidating concrete programs of cooperation in economic, cultural, and other fields.

The chairman of the Supreme Council also favored the development of interparliamentary relations.

In expressing thanks for the warm reception, the high-ranking Iranian guest briefed the chairman of the Armenian parliament in detail on all those initiatives the realization of which is undertaken by the Joint Commission for Coordinating Iranian-Armenian Ties. Mohammad-Khani noted in particular that the 17 out of the 19 existing interstate agreements have already been implemented. He gratefully stressed the great contribution made in this work by the Armenian vice president. In assessing the achievements, the Iranian economy and finance minister expressed his country's readiness to further develop multifaceted cooperation with friendly Armenia in the interest of the two countries and of the other regional countries.

Iranian Bank Department Opens in Yerevan

NC1201201695 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1533 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 12/01/95 (NOYAN TAPAN)—On January 12, the department of the Iranian Bank "Mellat" was inaugurated in Yerevan. The Chairman and director of the Bank's administration Morteza Arami pointed out that the capital of the Armenian department of this Bank is 3 mln U.S. dollars, the personnel of the Bank consists of 17 people, only three of which are Iranians. The acting director of the Bank is Iradze Mostashar Nezami and his two Deputies are—the Deputy Director on International Affairs Varuzh Chatikyan and the Deputy Director on Financial and Administrative questions Ruben Akhnazaryan.

The Chairman of co-ordinating state commission on ties Iran-Armenia, the Iranian Minister of Economy and Finance, doctor Mohammad-Khani pointed out, in particular, that at present favourable conditions for the establishment of ties between Armenia and Iran are created, amidst which is the inauguration of the department of the Bank "Mellat".

Khan also reported that the Bank has about 1,500 departments in Iran. This is the only Iranian Bank, which has three departments in Turkey and which functions over 20 years in banking system of England. The Bank has its department also in Germany. The gross capital of this Bank totals 350 mln U.S. dollars, and the total amount of deposits is 5 billion dollars. The number of employees of the Bank is more than 20,000.

The Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the Vice-President Gagik Harutyunyan and the Chairman of the Armenian Central Bank Bagrat Asaturyan were present at the inauguration ceremony.

Trial of Opposition Party Opens in Yerevan

LD1201223295 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT
12 Jan 95

[Report by Dmitriy Pisarenko from Yerevan]

[FBIS Translated Text] The trial of the opposition party Dashnaksutyun began today in the Armenian Supreme Court. The activities of the party in the republic have been temporarily halted by President Levon Ter-Petrosyan's decree of 28 December.

Earlier, the special services of Russia and Armenia had exposed a criminal group engaged in carrying narcotics along the Beirut-Yerevan-Moscow-Los Angeles route. Further raids and arrests led to the discovery of the underground organization Dro, which has been active in Armenia since 1992. Documents of the organization that have been deciphered show that it was set up by a decision of the highest body of Dashnaksutyun, the party bureau, which meets in Athens. In the Republic, the activities of Dro were coordinated by the local central committee of Dashnaksutyun. The main aim of

the underground activists was to seek money to strengthen the power of the party. One of its sources was the narcotics business. During an operation at the airport Sheremetyevo-1 5 kg of heroin, worth about \$1 million was confiscated from criminals. In addition, Dro, in the interests of the party, carried out intelligence work in the republic's security bodies. The national Army and the contingent of Russian troops stationed in Armenia were also targets of its intelligence work.

Speaking on local television, President Ter-Petrosyan stated that investigations have shown that Dro was linked with the killing of Marius Yuzbashyan, former chief of Armenia's KGB, and former Yerevan Mayor Ambartsum Galstyan. At the same time, the president emphasized that in view of Dro's conspiratorial activities, 90 percent of the membership of Dashnaksutyun obviously did not know anything about the existence of such a structure within the party.

If the court finds Dashnaksutyun guilty and it is completely banned, the main rival of Ter-Petrosyan's party at the parliamentary elections this coming May will to all intents and purposes have been removed from the political arena. This will obviously ensure the adoption in Armenia of a constitution strengthening presidential power.

Union Protests President's 'Illegal Decree' on ARF

NC1201204795 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1539 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 12/01/95 (NOYAN TAPAN)—The Union "Constitutional Right" appeared with a statement which says that "the Armenian President through his illegal activity has taken the internal political struggle in Armenia out of the framework of the Constitution and into an unlawful, anti-democratic, totalitarian sphere."

The Presidium of the Union states that the "illegal decree" of the Armenian President temporarily suspending the activities of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation "Dashnaksutyun" has permanently established in Armenia tyranny of Levon Ter-Petrosyan's administration. At the same time it adds that the "illegal decree of the President indirectly concerned also the activities of the Union", since on December 29 of last year the Armenian Interior Ministry "high-handedly sealed also the office of the Union 'Constitutional Right', and the latter's documents and possessions are under arrest." According to the statement, oral and written demands of the Attorney General to cease the illegal activity against the Union have not resulted in anything. The administration of the Union considers that the events on the eve of elections pursue a "goal to retain power until the end of the century."

"In this crucial moment the Union 'Constitutional Right' calls upon the people to unite and protect national

democratic powers in order to prevent intensification of anti-national tyranny in Armenia," - the statement concludes.

Nagorno-Karabakh Claims Azeri Cease-Fire Violations

NC1201143995 Yerevan SNARK in English 1119 GMT
12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stepanakert, January 12 (SNARK)—Nagorno-Karabakh has blamed Azerbaijan for violence of agreement on armistice.

The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NKR [Nagorno-Karabakh Republic] distributed today says that last days in northern and south-eastern parts of Karabakh dead-line [front line] cases of firing Karabakh Defence Army on the part of Azerbaijan are registered. As a result three Karabakh military men are killed, some of them are wounded.

The statement further says, intensive movement of Azerbaijani troops and accumulation of martial technique is observed on these parts.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NKR treated these actions as direct violence of armistice by Azerbaijan.

The statement stresses that if similar actions of Azerbaijan will further take place, Karabakh will be forced to take adequate measures. The responsibility for escalation of the tension in a region and its consequences will fall on the leadership of Azerbaijani Republic [remainder of item not received]

Azerbaijan

Abasov Receives Moldovan Muslim Community Leader

AU1201170695 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1930
GMT 11 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 11/1/1995—Abbas Abbasov, vice prime minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan and chairman of the State Committee for Ethnic Minorities from Azerbaijan, met yesterday with Tanyr Mustafaev, chairman of the Muslim community and co-chairman of the Azerbaijan Society "Araz" from Moldova. Tanyr Mustafaev told BASA that Abbas Abbasov was interested to learn about the fate and conditions for preservation of ethnic identity of the Azeri citizens from Moldova. The Azerbaijani vice prime minister expressed his satisfaction that there is an Azeri national cultural society in Moldova and promised to do his best to provide it with literature for studying the Azeri language and national musical instruments. Zinaida Ocunshi, head of the Moldovan National Relations Department, requested the help of Abbasov to establish relations with the Moldovans from Azerbaijan to form the Moldovan Diaspora in that country and to

prepare for its congress to be held in November this year. Currently 2,645 citizens of Azeri nationality reside in Moldova.

Negotiations Held With Turksat Firm To Transmit TV

NC1201170295 Baku TURAN in English 1002 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 12) TURAN—Azerbaijan's Ministry of Communication negotiates with Turkey's "TURKSAT" firm about broadcasting of programmes on the territory of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. As was earlier reported, from January 3, 1995 Russia's Ministry of Communication suspended broadcasting of programmes of Azeri television in Nakhichevan since Azerbaijan owes Russia's Ministry of Communication for broadcasting of programmes in 1994.

"Azerbaijan has already paid debts to Russia's Ministry of Communication and since January 11 Russia's satellite resumed broadcasting of programmes in Nakhichevan", Senior Engineer of "Teleradio" Production Union, Sahib Aliyev, said. He said that it is not advantageous for Azerbaijan to use Russian satellite due to financial difficulties. Turkey suggests broadcasting of programmes of Turkey's television through the territory of Azerbaijan in exchange for satellite channel utilization. Presently Turkish programmes are broadcasted only in Baku", Ali [item received unfinished]

Journal for Azeri People Living in Iran Issued

NC1201192495 Baku TURAN in English 0658 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 11) TURAN—"On the eve of New Year a first monthly literature and scientific journal 'Guney Azerbaijan' (South Azerbaijan) was issued. The goal of issue the journal is to fill in the vacuum of Azeri population of Iran totalling twenty millions, created after clerical-political censorship of authorities," TURAN was told by the Editor of the journal Anvar Borusoylu. 3,000 copies of first issue of journal was issued in Latin alphabet.

Chechnya's Communications Minister on Widening Conflict

NC1201184695 Baku TURAN in English 0658 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 11) TURAN—Today press-conference of Chechen's Minister of Communication, Chairman of Chechen's Committee for Human Rights Protection, Saidemin Ibrahimov, was held in Baku.

"The purpose of my visit is to inform world community about real events in Chechnya. The myth of unconquered Russia is shattered, today all men in Chechnya rose to protect their Motherland. It is a struggle for

Dudayev, for our freedom", Ibrahimov says. "Events taking place now in Chechnya can be repeated in Azerbaijan too", Ibrahimov mentioned.

Asking if meeting between Dudayev and Yeltsin is possible, Ibrahimov said that such meeting is possible but without preliminary terms. Fighting spirit of Chechens is high, discipline is established in troops, Dudayev takes control over the situation from Grozny, Minister says.

Ibrahimov said that "Russia's special services exert powerful pressure on Chechen's lobby in Moscow in order to make them to accept Kremlin's conditions". Over the past days scores of acts of terrorism were committed in Moscow and 50 Chechens were killed during those acts of terrorism, Ibrahimov added.

"Humanitarian assistance provided by world community is not delivered to Grozny, population is starving, we do not have food, water, gas and electrical energy", Ibrahimov said.

Asking about reasons of Chechen war, Ibrahimov said that "Russia fights for oil and not against Dudayev. Moscow realizes that without control over Chechnya, it is impossible to take control over oil pipeline, which must ship Azeri oil to Novorossiysk", he added.

Speaking about losses of Russian troops in Chechnya, Ibrahimov said that 7 divisions have been transported to the zone of conflict and most of them were destroyed. Due to this fact, Russia continues transporting additional units to Chechnya. He said that presently about 2,000 Russian soldiers have been imprisoned. "The number of Russian soldiers killed in action is about 1,500-2,000 persons", he said.

"At present volunteers from Abkhazia, Daghestan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Tatarstan, Afghanistan and other countries fight in Chechnya", Chechen's Minister of Communication says. "If Grozny is seized, the guerrilla war will broke out. Bombarding of peaceful towns and villages, Russia proved that is it dangerous to the member of the CIS and we will not give up our independence", Saidemin Ibrahimov says.

Today Chechen's Minister of Communication was received by Turkish Ambassador to Azerbaijan. "I am grateful to Azerbaijan for support and understanding of our problems. I hope that this country will continue supporting our just struggle", Ibrahimov says.

Humanitarian Aid for Chechnya Collected in Baku

NC1201202095 Baku TURAN in English 1511 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 12) TURAN—Medicines and dressings totalling 1 million manats have been collected in Musavat headquarters. In the near future group of Azeri surgeons, members of Musavat party, will leave for Chechnya to provide medical aid to

persons suffered from military activities in Chechnya, press-service of Musavat party told Turan.

Possible Parallel Seen Between Chechens, Lezgins

NC1201185795 Baku TURAN in English 0658 GMT
12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (January 11) TURAN—Yesterday National Self-determination Union held a rally in Yerevan in front of residence of Russian Embassy as a sign of protest against Russia's actions in Chechnya. The participants of rally supported the Chechens in their fight for independence. Baku explains that action of Armenians against their historical ally by the shaken position of Russia in the Caucasus. In Chechnya this actions were accepted ambiguously. One of the leaders of law enforcement organisation in Chechnya Huseyn Ayubov said that "Armenian and Osetians have always defended Russia's imperial policy on the Caucasus. To my mind, this action of Armenians is explained with worsened position of their hosts. Unlike Armenians we are fighting for self-determination in our native territories," noted he.

Ayubov also said that Russia concentrated on the north border of Azerbaijan a great deal of forces. Russian emissaries are conducting instigation policy among the Lezgins population in the Dagestan regions neighbouring with Azerbaijan. The Lezgins themselves admit that Russia is going to use them against Azerbaijanis. According to Ayubov, if Russia manages to deal with the Chechens, the next blow will fall on Azerbaijan. And the next time for these plans of Russia the Lezgins card will be played.

In 1990 the Lezgins organisation "Sadval" announced about the beginning of fight for creation in the northern regions of Azerbaijan and near by regions of Dagestan an independent state Lezgistan. After Azerbaijan entered CIS that issue was excluded the agenda. Azerbaijan believes that "Sadval" is governed by Russia's special services, which "include" Lezgins separatists when Moscow needs to make pressure on Azerbaijan and to obtain from Baku political and other concession necessary for Kremlin.

Georgia

Turkmenistan Cuts Off Gas Supplies

LD1201141695 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just gotten in touch with Tamaz Gagaa of the Sakgazi department, who said that for reasons which remain unclear, Turkmenistan cut off gas supplies to the Transcaucasian republics, including Georgia.

Today Georgia is receiving 3 million cubic meters of gas instead of the usual 8 million. By decree of the Georgian Government, all the gas will be fed to the Tbilisres

hydroelectric station to produce power. Because of this, at 1500 today gas supplies were cut off to the capital. We have been told that work is underway to overcome this problem.

Defense Minister Declines To Buy Arms From Ukraine

LD1201164595 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1430 GMT
12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 12 Jan—A military team from Ukraine, which was on an official visit to Georgia within an official government delegation led by the Ukrainian president, has suggested that Georgia purchase modern combat equipment for its armed forces from Ukraine. [Georgian Defense Minister] Vardiko Nadibaidze has turned down the suggestion because Russia will hand over similar equipment to Georgia free of charge.

Agreement Signed on Economic, Technical Cooperation

LD1301101095 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia yesterday received Ioannis Anthopoulos, Greek deputy minister of national economy. They discussed agricultural and industrial cooperation between Georgia and Greece. At the end of the meeting, Georgian Minister of Economy Vladimir Papava and Ioannis Anthopoulos, Greek deputy minister of national economy, signed an agreement on economic and technological cooperation between Georgia and Greece.

Kitovani Expedition To West Georgia Opposed

LD1301120895 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1100 GMT
13 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi (IPRINDA)—On 13 January MP Tengiz Kitovani, former defense minister of Georgia, led a group of partially armed veterans of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict who are also members of the National Liberation Front (the organization was set up at the initiative of Kitovani and former Premier Tengiz Sigua), to West Georgia planning to recapture the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone.

In connection with the above-mentioned, head of the Georgian State Eduard Shevardnadze on 13 January held a meeting with the heads of power ministries and departments, as well as with Jaba Ioseliani, head of the Rescue Corps.

Shevardnadze said that at the initiative of Tengiz Kitovani and Tengiz Sigua, a partially armed group of 200-250 men, having seized buses, set off for West Georgia. Shevardnadze added that those two men had a wide experience of adventure and that they hoped more people would join them as they moved on. The head of state noted that Kitovani and Sigua were leading the

people to believe that Russia had agreed to entering Abkhazia quoting some Estunov who allegedly was Yeltsin's envoy (Shevardnadze apologized for a possible inaccuracy of the name). The head of state got in touch with the head of the headquarters of the Russian troops in the Transcaucasus, Major General Yuriy Baluevskiy, who branded the above mentioned incident as a provocation. Shevardnadze also noted that Kitovani and his supporters will not manage to enter Abkhazia and said the aim of this action is to trigger a civil war. Shevardnadze concluded by saying that there are no grounds for panic. However, despite this, he gave orders to stop the armed convoy and reinforce the protection of the parliament building, the television center, and other vital installations.

Archevani Urges Active Participation by Ethnic

LD1201210295 Tbilisi SAKINFORM in Russian 1834 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The social and political organization, Archevani [Choice], held a meeting with representatives of all ethnic minorities residing in Georgia on 11 January. Deputies of the Georgian Supreme Council, as well as members of the Rescue Corps participated in the meeting. It was emphasized that the Archevani supported all citizens regardless of their nationality who aspired to build an independent and democratic Georgian state. Deputy Jaba Ioseliani emphasized at the meeting that representatives of ethnic minorities could and had to participate in the political life of the country more actively.

Abkhazia Appeals for Disarming of 'Illegal Units'

LD1201190595 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The CONTACT news agency reports that the Supreme Council Presidium of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic held an extended meeting in Tbilisi today. An appeal to the Georgian head of state and the Georgian Supreme Council was made on

behalf of the Supreme Council deputies of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic.

The appeal says that illegal armed units of Abkhaz separatists continue unlawful actions of robbing and killing civilians. Their aim is to drive ethnic Georgians and generally all the non-Abkhaz population out of Abkhazia. By their actions the illegal units impede the return of refugees to their domicile and the restoration of peace and stability.

The Supreme Council of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic appeals to the Georgian head of state and the Georgian Supreme Council to consider the subject of disarming illegal armed units of the separatists acting at present in Abkhazia in order to establish order in Abkhazia.

A similar appeal has been addressed to Vasiliy Yakushev, the commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces.

Abkhaz Fighters Continue to Fortify Positions

LD1201170095 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1430 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Gali (Abkhazia) 12 Jan—Armed units of the Abkhaz side continue to gather in Ochamchire and Gali rayons and to fortify their positions. There are now 1,000 Abkhaz fighters in the area. Sultan Sosnaliyev, the defense minister of the so-called Republic of Abkhazia, is now in a Gali rayon village.

Ardzinba Appeals For Help Against Imminent Georgian Attack

LD120112995 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1045 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sukhumi, 12 Jan—The Abkhaz separatist leader Vladislav Ardzinba has sent a letter to Valeriy Kokov, president of the Republic of Kabardobalkaria, and the so called parliament of the confederation of mountain peoples, appealing for immediate help as, according to Ardzinba, Georgian armed forces are planning to attack in the direction of Ochamchire-Sukhumi in the near future.

Estonia

Tarand: No 'Chechen' Methods in Baltics

LD1201155895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1400 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, Jan 12 (Interfax)—Estonian Prime Minister Andres Tarand does not see grounds for invasion of Russian tanks into his republic like it was done in Chechnya. The threat was pointed to by a group of deputies of the German Bundestag, who called on Estonia and Latvia to give up territorial claims to Russia.

"The situation in the Baltic countries is different than in Chechnya," said Tarand in Tallinn on Thursday [12 January] in an interview with Interfax.

He said that "Russia had recognized independence of the Baltic states and it never did so in relation to Chechnya."

Tarand also said that Estonia raised the question of the territorial dispute before the statement by the deputies of the German parliament. "Whether the border will pass where it passes now, will be determined at the talks, but the problem will be tackled by diplomats, not by the military," he said.

Interfax reported earlier that on December 16 in Helsinki, Tarand made a statement in which he voiced "preparedness" to give up territorial claims to Russia, if Moscow recognizes the force of the Tartu peace treaty of 1920. Russia believes that this document, according to which part of the territory of the Pskov and Leningrad regions should belong to Estonia, lost its force after the republic joined the former Soviet Union in 1940.

Russian Officials Disagree in Lake Border Statements

WS1201132195 Tallinn BNS in English 1020 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 12. BNS—Estonian border guard officials categorically deny claims of Russia's Baltic Fleet hydrographers that they have marked down the borderline between Estonia and Russia in border lakes.

Border Guard Department chief of staff Major Aare Evisalu told BNS Wednesday [11 January] that reports concerning demarcation of the border in the lakes are "strongly exaggerated." He said neither Estonian nor Russian border guards had any information about it.

The Border Guard Department addressed an official inquiry concerning border demarcation to the staff of Russian border guard's northwestern division who confirmed that the borderline hadn't been marked down. Evisalu said he was told that Russia proposed to start

demarcation of the borderline in Lake Peipus and the Narva artificial lake only after coordinating the operation with the Estonian side.

But Captain Yuri Sidorov, head of the Baltic Fleet's hydrography service, stated Wednesday again that Russian teams had dropped six buoys from a helicopter into ice-free areas of the lakes at the end of last year. Baltic Fleet hydrographers say there's nothing strange in Estonian border guards failing to notice the buoys.

"There's no way border guards can see the buoys on the surface of the water, because they are located at a distance of at least four kilometers from the coast. It's like looking for a needle in a haystack," Russian hydrographers claimed.

Officials at Baltic Fleet headquarters told BNS the commander of the fleet, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, had reported on completion of border demarcation to deputy head of Russia's Pskov regional administration, chairman of a border demarcation commission, and the commander of Russia's naval forces.

Estonian border guards, however, have failed to discover any border signs in the lake. They had observed the Russian helicopter's flight over the Narva artificial lake and Lake Peipus, but said its speed was too great to allow hydrographers to place buoys in the water.

Riigikogu Committee Receives Russian Demarche on Chechnya

LD1201152995 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We will continue from Toompea [seat of parliament], but on the subject of Estonian-Russian relations. Over to Urmas Loit:

[Loit] The Estonian Riigikogu's Foreign Commission received today a demarche signed by Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the committee for international affairs at the State Duma's Federation Council of the Russian Federation. The demarche says that, in connection with a Riigikogu statement on the situation in Chechnya, the Russian State Duma's committee no longer sees it possible to develop relations with the Estonian Riigikogu's Foreign Commission.

At a Fatherland party news conference, this document—which, incidentally, was written on 29 December—was commented on by Merle Krigul, a Riigikogu Foreign Commission member.

[Begin Krigul recording] Russia views this as the crudest interference in its domestic affairs. In connection with the statement in question, the [Russian] Committee for International Affairs does not consider it possible to have relations with the Estonian Foreign Commission as long as we have not taken a position on this issue. From this we conclude what we have already known: that the Russian State Duma is far from united and that this statement, quite harsh in tone—the more so as it is dated

29 December and it arrived here only today—speaks of quite strange developments in relations within the State Duma as well as outside it.

For instance, Russia has recently been emphasizing the need for a positive impetus—this is Russia's phrase, a positive impetus—for communication between Estonia and Russia. It is now quite difficult to see this demarche as a positive impetus. At the same time, we have to acknowledge that the statement we made then and that has by now become dated—that is, the development of events in Chechnya altogether—has reaffirmed the development of relations, as well as reaffirming the hesitations that we at one time voiced. Third, foreign countries' representations have also been moving closer to our positions quite consistently. [end recording]

[Loit] The Riigikogu Foreign Commission discussed the document today and reached the following conclusions. Force against small nations and repression of both human rights and a wish for self-determination do not amount to solely a Russian domestic matter. The Riigikogu Foreign Commission continues to hold the position that bloodletting and the violation of human rights in Chechnya must be ended immediately. The Foreign Commission recommends that the Foreign Ministry should continue to protest against what is happening in Chechnya and to more effectively explain our position, both in international organizations and within the foreign countries' diplomatic corps. The Riigikogu Foreign Commission hopes that, despite the complicated domestic political situation in Russia and rivalry between different political forces, contacts between the two countries' top legislative chambers' foreign commissions will continue, which undoubtedly would help to normalize relations between Estonia and Russia.

This is what the Estonian Riigikogu Foreign Commission thinks about the demarche from the chairman of the committee for international affairs at Russian State Duma's Federal Council [as heard].

Tallinn Russian Newspaper Declared Bankrupt

LD1201214295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2000
GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—One of Estonia's major Russian-language newspaper, ESTONIA, announced Thursday [12 January] it had been declared bankrupt by the court.

Estonia's acting editor-in-chief, Vyacheslav Ivanov, told INTERFAX that ESTONIA was one of the few official newspapers. However, the state had invested nothing in the newspaper's development despite numerous reorganization projects, including with foreign investments. ESTONIA used to be the organ of the republic's Communist Party and was then named SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA.

Nevertheless, the newspaper will still be issued despite the Tallinn court's decision to declare the state-run

joint-stock company newspaper ESTONIA as bankrupt, Ivanov said. The newspapers' journalists decided to set up a joint-stock company named Kronist and sell the newspaper as before and at the same price.

Latvia

Russia Accused of Cooperating With 'Crime Groups'

LD1301101795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0958
GMT 13 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga January 13 TASS—A statement of the press centre of the Latvian Interior Ministry circulated on Thursday [12 January] evening asserts that Russian secret services planned to set up in Latvia a shipping company that would illegally carry people under the pretence of carrying cargoes.

The statement says that the Latvian security services have thwarted these plans. Then agents of secret services began to draw Latvian crime groups into organising illegal transit. The group headed by Sergei Katan was mentioned. It enabled 83 people to reach Sweden in July last on board the vessel Sode. Most of the members of the group have been arrested by now.

It is stated that the security police has also other information attesting to illegal activity of Russian secret services in Latvia and their penetration into various crime groups to further Russia's interests. The investigation is in progress, and the persons detained will face criminal proceedings, the press centre of the Latvian Interior Ministry stated.

Condemnation Sought of Russian Actions in Chechnya

LD1201205095 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1800 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] (?Sixty-one) Saeima deputies have signed an appeal to Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis, and the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, urging the highest state institutions to condemn the genocide being carried out by the Russian Federation in Chechnya, and call on Russian President Boris Yeltsin to immediately cease the military action. The Russian Government must withdraw its troops from Chechnya and observe the right of the Chechen people to self-determination, says the document.

Prime Minister Reports on First 100 Days in Office

LD1201154595 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1200 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Maris Gailis delivered a report to the Saeima today about the government's work in the 100 days [it has been in office]. The prime minister mentioned state security, rural development, and education as priorities in the government's

work. In the sphere of security, according to the government statement, the fight against organized crime is carried out particularly vigorously. Gailis stressed that state investment in private farms and subsidies for agricultural production has increased by 100 percent this year as a positive factor in the sphere of agriculture.

Rules for the procedure on teachers' pay and the appropriate instructions were drafted and submitted for consideration by the Cabinet of Ministers during the 100 days. The prime minister believes that the rules were drafted in such a way that teachers' pay will depend on the quality of their work and their education.

Beginning from the new year, the social budget has been separated from the state budget. However, the prime minister noted that social reform is not progressing as quickly as desired. Society's increased social sensitivity, when it reacts to such decisions as a change of the procedure of financing health care and an increase of the pension age, which is, nevertheless, currently supported by the Association of the Free Latvian Trade Unions, the Confederation of Employers, and the Union of Pensioners, is an objective obstacle which hampers reform. Mutual understanding has also been reached on the problems of medical employees and thus the real cause for a strike by medical employees has been averted.

The government put forward the reconstruction of the National Opera, completing the construction of the Valmiera theater, and beginning the construction of a National Library building as priorities in the sphere of culture.

Lithuania

Slezevicius: Oil Terminal Will Be Built Without Russia

LD1201203195 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1520 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A news conference was held by Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius at the Seimas today. Here is Arturas Matusas with his report from the news conference.

[Matusas] Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius confirmed at the news conference that a decision to cancel the talks with Lithuania on Russia's participation in the construction of the Butinge oil terminal was adopted by the Russian oil company Lukoil two days ago.

As is known, the oil company Lukoil demanded that they be given the controlling parcel of shares in the future international joint-stock company. Describing the decision made by the Russian oil company, the prime minister said the Lithuanian Government's stance on this issue was very clear—the controlling parcel of shares will never be given to a foreign company.

Adolfas Slezevicius described the cancellation of the talks Adolfas Slezevicius a failure of only one idea and not the whole project.

Of course, the refusal by the Lukoil company to take part in a joint project has made the implementation of the project much more difficult. However, if no other proposals are put forward then we will build the terminal ourselves from the budgetary funds, the prime minister said.

Answering the question as to what measures the government would take in case the Lukoil company refused to sell oil to Lithuania, Adolfas Slezevicius said that in this case a way out had been foreseen. According to the prime minister, already today it is possible to ensure the import of oil or fuel oil from the Western states through the port of Klaipeda. Lithuania would purchase the tankers and the fuel oil would reach the country in 10 days. Adolfas Slezevicius named Shell and Neste companies as possible suppliers of oil products to Lithuania. [passage omitted]

State Must Control Coastal Terminal

LD1201163495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1507 GMT 12 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius January 12 TASS—Prime Minister of Lithuania Adolfas Slezevicius said during a press conference here today that his country cannot be dictated by the Russian oil company "Lukoil" which is striving to get the control package of shares in constructing an oil terminal in Butinge on the Baltic coastal area near the resort town of Palanga.

The premier described this as Russia's attempt to exert economic and political pressure on Lithuania, since "Lukoil" has almost stopped talks with them, if conditions laid down by the oil concern are not met. This kind of pressure by Russia will compel us to integrate ourselves with the West European market as early as possible, Slezevicius said.

According to the prime minister, the control package must be owned by Lithuania. Alternative versions are being worked out at present, and the most workable among them is the creation of a 100 per cent Lithuanian joint-stock company with a registered capital of 10 million U.S. dollars to begin with, he said.

The head of the Lithuanian Government added that he still hopes a lot from his meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin expected to be held in Moscow at the end of January. Possibly we will succeed in resolving the share issue with "Lukoil" and put into practice the Lithuanian-Russian agreement on mutual provision of most favourable trading status, which has remained ineffective not due to our fault, although it was signed in Vilnius on November 19, 1993.

Speaking of problems concerning transit of Russian military equipment across the Lithuanian territory, Slezevicius said that rules and regulations governing military shipments have not been abolished, but so far

they have not become effective for Moscow. There will be more talks, all sorts of possible compromises will be considered which will be beneficial to both sides. I think that this issue will be resolved within the next 2-3 weeks, the Lithuanian premier emphasised.

Lithuania Seen Retaliating for MFN Rebuff

MM1201141995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Not Getting Out of RailCars, Not Using Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vilnius—As of 1 January new regulations governing the shipment of military cargo from Russia have been in operation in Lithuania.

I do not know whether the new procedure will satisfy the military-transport requirements of the Russian military, who are concerned that their major military grouping in Kaliningrad Oblast should have a normal life, but I am sure that Russian diplomats will probably remain unhappy—Lithuania and Russia have been unable to reach common ground and have failed to work out a coordinated draft agreement regulating the movement of military and dangerous cargo from "mainland" Russia to and from Kaliningrad Oblast via Lithuania.

Vilnius, which unilaterally turned its back on a treaty which Moscow had insisted should be signed—something, indeed, that it was completely entitled to do under generally accepted international norms, whereby the country of transit dictates the "ground rules"—has brought in its own procedure for the movement of military trains across its territory. The Russian authorities were nonetheless expecting that Lithuania would make concessions and conclude corresponding agreements on military transit. Although the Russian side's conclusions were relatively weighty (unlike other countries, Russia has been carrying out regular shipments, which is why a separate treaty is needed), this did not happen.

How will Russian military traffic move across Lithuania now? First, shipments will henceforth be permitted only with permission on each occasion from the republic's Ministry of National Defense Transport Service (such a service has already been set up), and only by rail. Incidentally, air transport is also possible, but only by special permission. Second, the shipment of mass destruction weapons or their components is banned. Third, Russia has to submit applications no later than 21 days before a shipment, indicating the itinerary, the number of the transporting vehicle, the name of the cargo, the number of cars, the makeup of the guard, and

the number of firearms. The total number of military transport railcars must not exceed 110. No more than 180 unarmed foreign servicemen are allowed to transit Lithuania at any one time. Fourth, getting out of the cars, using mobile communications, using or having weapons, or needlessly halting the train during the transit are all categorically banned.

Lithuania believes that the republic's government has decided to demonstrate its character since most-favored trading status, which had received the blessing of Viktor Chernomyrdin, was not forthcoming. Russia constantly linked the granting of this status to various demands, including demands regarding military transit. Ultimately it came down to the fact that this card had already been played, and Lithuania stopped paying attention to these arguments. Under the pressure of double customs duties in the East, the Lithuanian economy has turned sharply westward, and this has given a boost to its revival. Lithuania has now emerged from its economic trade problems and can easily make do without the Russian market—with the exception of the raw-materials market, of course. It can now also dictate its own terms, as it has with military transit shipments.

Januska: No Official Representatives Sent to Chechnya

LD1201203995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1743 GMT 12 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 12 (INTERFAX)—Lithuania's Deputy Foreign Minister Albinas Januska declared about non-involvement of the Lithuanian state in sending secret service men to Chechnya. In an interview with Interfax on Thursday [12 January] he reassured that "Lithuania has sent neither official representatives nor agents of the Lithuanian intelligence service to Chechnya."

At the same time Januska did not rule out possibility that Lithuanian citizens could appear in the zone of the armed conflict on the Russian territory on their own will. "If these facts are confirmed this will testify to the fact that the citizens have come there by themselves," he noted. Januska abstained from any comments concerning moral aspect of foreign citizens' participation in the armed conflict on the territory of an alien state.

Earlier a source in Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service reported to Interfax that a Lithuanian citizen "who was illegally staying in Russia and who is an agent of the Lithuanian intelligence service" was detained in the zone of the Chechen conflict. The detainee said during interrogation that about 80 Lithuanian citizens are staying in Chechnya, many of them are in the composition of Dzhokhar Dudayev's formations.

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